



Policy Unit

NOTE

on the

Republic of Haiti

Abstract:

The note describes the political and economic aspects of the situation in the Republic of Haiti. It deals especially with the situation following the presidential and legislative elections of early 2006: restoration of security, disarmament of gangs and their reintegration into civilian life, rebuilding of infrastructure and institutions and the revitalisation of the economy. The role of the UN mission MINUSTAH and of the EU is also highlighted.

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Basic data

Official name: Republic of Haiti

Date of independence (from France): 1 January 1804

Head of state: President René Prével of the Lespwa (Hope) coalition, inaugurated on 14 May 2006 following his victory in the February 2006 election

Head of government: Prime minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis

Form of government: the president, elected for a five-year term by popular vote, chooses the prime minister from the largest party in parliament; the president and the prime minister appoint the government, subject to approval by the National Assembly

Legislative branch: bicameral National Assembly (a 30-member Senate and a 90-member Chamber of Deputies); new National Assembly in May 2006

National elections: Presidential and legislative elections took place on 7 February 2006. The second round run-off elections took place on 21 April 2006

Judiciary: justices of the peace, 15 courts of first instance, five regional courts of appeal and the Supreme Court

Main towns: Port-au-Prince (capital, 1.5 million inhab.)

Cap Haitien (120 000)

Gonaïves (70 000)

Jacmel (20 000)

Area: 27,750 sq.km

Administrative divisions: 9 departments

Population: 8.5 million
Population growth: 1.82% (high mortality and emigration)
Fertility rate: 4.3 (region: 2.8)
Infant mortality: 94/1000 (twice the regional average)
Total population under 15 years: 3.3 million
Total life expectancy at birth: 52 Years (region: 70)
Ethnic groups: Black (95%), mulatto and white (5%)
Languages: French (official), 20% Creole
Religions: Roman Catholic 80%; Protestant 16%; half of the population also practices Voodoo.
Literacy: male 48% ; female 42%
GDP Growth (%): 1.5 % (2005)
GDP (US\$): 4.154 (2005)
GDP per capita (US\$): 441 (2005)
Inflation (%): 16.7% (2005)
Trade balance: - (US\$): -.98 bn

External debt: (US\$):1.4 bn

Natural resources: bauxite, copper, calcium carbonate, gold, marble, hydropower

Currency: 1 gourde; (40.45 G =1 US\$) (2005). Floating exchange rate since 1996

Survey

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere (€ 480 GNP/per capita, est. in 2000) - about 80% of the population live in abject poverty. The economic situation deteriorated seriously following the 1991 embargo imposed after the military coup by which president Aristide was removed from power, and again since 1997 because of the uncertainty due to the ongoing political crisis. The country imports twice as much as it exports. Haiti is member of CARICOM.

The country is overpopulated with 300 inhabitants/km². Two thirds of the population live in the countryside. The shanty-towns of main cities are rapidly increasing. There are 1.3 million Haitians living abroad (650 000 in the USA, 600 000 in the Dominican Republic and 55 000 in Canada).

Malnutrition affects about half of all children under the age of five. Half of all adults are illiterate. The environment has been severely damaged with much of the country's topsoil lost through erosion. Agricultural

output is plummeting. Basic services such as electricity and health have deteriorated. Haiti's infrastructure is in a very bad condition due to poor public management and a lack of resources.

Political system

Following the adoption of a constitution by way of a referendum on 29 March 1987, which instituted a parliamentary democracy, Haiti is a republic with an elected president (maximum two non-consecutive five-year terms). The President shares executive power with a prime minister who both appoint a cabinet, which is subject to parliamentary approval. Parliament consists of a Senate of 30 members (with a six-year term) and an Assembly of 90 members (serving a four-year term). The constitution provides for administrative decentralisation.

Main Political Organisations

The primary parties are:

- Lespwa (Hope)
- FL: Fanmi Lavalas former ruling party which served as a political vehicle for President Aristide;
- Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates, composed of CONACOM (Parti du Congrès National des Mouvements Démocratiques), PANPRA (Parti Nationaliste Progressiste Révolutionnaire Haïtien) and Ayiti Kapab;
- OPL (Organisation du Peuple en Lutte);
- Alliance Démocratique composed of Parti Populaire du Renouveau Haïtien and the Konvansyon Inite Demokratik (KID)
- RDNP : Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes
- UNCRH: Union Nationale Chrétienne pour la Reconstruction d'Haïti
- MOCHRENA: (Mouvement Chrétien pour une Nouvelle Ayiti);
- LAAA: Latibonit Ann Aksyon
- GFCD: Grand Front de Centre Droit

- FRN: Front de Reconstruction Nationale

- Group of 184, a coalition of private-sector, religious and non governmental organisations;

Historical background

The collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship (father and son from 1957 until 1986) was followed by two failed attempts to hold elections, two military coups, four different presidents, as well as 14 different governments amid continued political violence. Since 1987 five general elections have taken place of which only the (general and presidential) **elections of 16 Dec. 1990** monitored by the UN are considered free and fair. They brought to power **J.-B. Aristide** (67.5% of the vote), a former radical Roman Catholic priest, leader of the majority of democratic movements (the so-called Lavalas wave) opposing the "duvalierists" and the "narco-military". He secured the resignation of six out of eight generals and launched an investigation into allegations of corruption. Seven months later - following discontent in parliament, private business and above all in the army - President Aristide's government was removed from office by an **army coup led by general Cédras**. Aristide went into exile in the USA. The OAS and international donors imposed an embargo on Haiti and in mid 1993 the UN Security Council imposed trade and financial sanctions. About 5000 people have died at the hands of the military and its supporters.

Following an American military intervention in September 1994, shortly before the end of his mandate, **Aristide was restored to office** (General Cédras went into exile). In September 1995, according to the pre-coup electoral time-table, parliamentary elections took place (victory of OPL, Organization Politique Lavalas) and the OPL candidate René Préval won 87% of the vote in the presidential elections of December 1995 (voter turnout: 25%).

Prime minister Smarth's programme of liberal reforms negotiated with the World Bank and the IMF caused civil unrest and conflict between the OPL and the anti-liberal faction in Parliament. Discontent was fuelled by a controversial election for nine Senate seats in April 1997 (turnout: less than 10%). After widespread allegations of fraud, the second round was postponed.

The "Lavalas"- wave split into two movements: the followers of Aristide (FL, Famni Lavalas) and the (new name, same acronym) OPL (Organisation of People's Combat). In June 1997 Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned. The OPL (majority in parliament) blocked all of Préval's nominations for the premiership and held up legislative business which created an institutional and financial crisis (and foreign aid remained frozen). Parliamentary elections scheduled for November 1998 had to be postponed. Parliament's mandate expired in January 1999. In March 1999, President Préval reached an agreement with the opposition on the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Mr Jacques E. Alexis. A "Provisional Electoral Council" was set up (CEP) to organise parliamentary and local elections.

The procedure of the **legislative elections** (21 May 2000) and participation (60%) were satisfactory. FL won 18 of the 19 Senate seats and 72 of the Lower House seats as well as the majority of posts in the local government elections. The count by the CEP for 9 Senate seats was, however, heavily contested by the opposition and the international community. In protest, an opposition alliance boycotted the **presidential elections** on 26 November 2000. Given the credibility of the charges raised against Aristide's Lavalas Family Party and the concerns expressed by CARICOM and the OAS, international observers from the main donors (US, Canada, EU) refrained from monitoring these elections. **Mr Aristide won the presidency** by a large majority (92%) which is explained by the opposition's refusal to contest the election. Since his inauguration on 7 February 2000 the CD had refused to recognise parliament or his presidency.

As the government had not taken into account the international community's observations, the EU invited the Haitian authorities to consultations (starting on 26 Sept. 2000) in application of art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, with no tangible results. The **EU Council** concluded the consultations on 29 January 2001 and adopted '**appropriate measures**'.

Following mediation by the OAS, starting in June 2002, an independent electoral council was set up to arrange legislative elections in May 2000 to replace the flawed elections, but its Vice-President, V.R. Joseph resigned in December 2003.

Throughout 2001 Haiti was wracked by **political and social unrest** as a result of the disputed national and local elections, increasing corruption and a lack of international assistance. Ambitious social programmes

could not be implemented and the authorities failed to cope with the growing violence. Disillusionment with the ruling party deepened and the Government's repressive reaction to street protests added to social tensions.

Violence between rival supporters of the FL and Democratic Convergence has led to numerous politically motivated assassinations. In December 2001 a coup was attempted against J.-B. Aristide, when the National Palace was stormed by gunmen. Aristide's partisans reacted violently: a dozen people were killed and homes and CD offices burned. In August 2002 gang violence left 20 people dead and hundreds wounded. The police were forced to give up. The imminent threat of the Haitian state collapsing convinced the USA to agree to the release of international aid on certain political conditions.

In early February 2004 antigovernment militia destroyed a police station and freed one hundred prisoners in Gonaives. The unrest spread quickly to other towns and the **rebels controlled over half of the country**. Under pressure from the international community **J.-B. Aristide left the country on 29 February 2004** and pro-Aristide gangs, the so-called *chimères* rampaged through the streets armed with guns and machetes.

The president of the Supreme Court has been appointed as President in accordance with the constitution. **The interim Prime Minister, Gérard Latortue**, selected by a seven-member 'Council of the Wise' appointed a new cabinet of 13 ministers excluding those linked with the deposed President Aristide which is a cause of new tensions.

2006 Presidential and legislative Elections

Election dates had been postponed several times during the transitional period. Finally the presidential, legislative and senatorial elections took place on 7 February and 17 March 2006. The second round of the legislative and senatorial elections was on 21 April 2006. An EP delegation observed the elections. A number of organisational shortcomings were noted.

Over 30 candidates contested the presidential elections. Mr Préval won 51% of the vote in February 2006 following reallocation of blank ballot papers among the candidates on a pro rata basis by CEP (Provisional Electoral Council), an act which was not in agreement with the Constitution requiring the absolute majority. The discovery of pro-Préval ballots in a rubbish tip gave rise to massive and sometimes violent

protest which was tackled by the dubious allocation of 85 000 blank votes, an act of pragmatism which was probably the best solution given the violent protests.

The winners of the legislative elections were determined in a second round, which, however, did not lead to a working majority, Lespwa turning out to be the largest party. The fragmentation led Mr Préval to include in his government parties traditionally opposed to his own, such as the OPL.

Situation following the 2006 presidential and legislative elections

President Préval's choice of prime minister J.E. Alexis received almost unanimous approval in the National Assembly and the Senate on 24 May 2006. Alexis is a close confidant of Mr Préval and one of the Lespwa party leaders. He is agronomist by education and had held academic posts at the State University. He had previously served as prime minister under Mr Préval's presidency, between 1999 and 2001. The new cabinet was announced on 6 June 2006 following consultations with the main parties. Five former ministers are in the new cabinet. In a spirit of bridging the political divisions the cabinet includes members of six political parties, one of whom is a representative of Fanmi Lavalas. Particular attention was paid to proven track records in their respective area of expertise concerning the appointment of the minister of Justice (René Magloire), the minister of finance (Daniel Dorsainvil) and the minister of public works (Frantz Verella). Mr Renald Clérisme, formerly representative at UNCTAD, was appointed foreign affairs minister. The cabinet appointments were almost unanimously approved by both houses of parliament. Protests outside the parliament centered on the inclusion in the cabinet of ministers from political parties that had helped bringing the FL government down in 2004 and a lack of FL representatives.

Another point of strong discontent is that almost one hundred FL activists, arrested during the interim government, are still being detained without trial. On 1 August 2006 Amnesty International called for them to be brought to trial or be released. The president and the prime minister declared not to intervene in the judicial process. Two high profile detainees, Mr Privert and former FL prime minister Neptune, have been released in June and July 2006. In July and August others have been released as well. Former FL member of parliament, A. Mayette remains in prison.

Given Lespwa's lack of a majority in the legislature parliamentary alliances will have to be forged to make progress on the government's programme.

The Government's programme

According to Mr Alexis' address to the National Assembly on 6 June 2006 the government's priorities include eight key areas:

- public works, mainly road construction
- PAS, a social reconciliation programme
- Justice and security
- increase of government's revenue
- strengthening of state's institutions
- education
- health
- agriculture

In his speech Mr Alexis dwelled on the need for political dialogue and reconciliation to overcome the political divisions, which is essential for the government policy's success. Particular attention was drawn to economic reconstruction and access to public services for the poor and the promotion of tourism and the manufacturing industry. Mr Préal's policies are enshrined in the 25 years' Governability Pact presented to IDB in April 2006. Cracking down on corruption is one of his major goals.

Three specific issues are, however, potentially explosive:

- paying the salary arrears of public employees including pensions for former members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti (FAD'H)
- meeting the demands of public-sector employees dismissed by the interim government of 2004-06 and threatening to turn to violent protest. The government has promised a substantial allocation.
- restoring the national army or creating an additional police force, a 'gendarmerie'.

As security is key to the government's success, it intends to strengthen the Police Nationale d'Haiti by recruiting about 1 500 new officers each year over the next five years and by investing in training and

improvement of the police's infrastructure (weapons, communications, transport), an expenditure estimated at 1.2 bn US \$. A purge of existing officers who had abused of their positions in the past is planned.

Vetting the police force and eliminating the considerable number of corrupt officers, training the remaining ones and increasing their number up to 14 000 (by 2010) will take time. The government depends on financial and technical support from abroad.

There are indications that the president will enjoy strong support from the foreign governments (mainly US, France and Canada) and the multilateral agencies as well as the goodwill of the majority of Haitians. The expectations for progress on reconciliation and national dialogue are substantial and therefore the risk of slow improvement of living conditions of a population in deep economic and social distress is high. Since his election the president made several official visits to secure foreign support (Miami, Paris, Brussels) to provide (financial) backing for rapid impact projects for the improvement of social infrastructure and employment. This is much needed for consolidating the security situation. A worsening socio-economic situation could prompt Mr Aristide's return from exile. At the CARICOM's meeting in early July 2006 the regional body voted for Haiti to be readmitted as a full member following its suspension in March 2004.

Persisting Difficulties

The political instability prevailing in the 1990s persists to the present day. Only the international community appears to be in a position to lay the foundations for the country's future which can be achieved only by addressing both the political and humanitarian crises.

Because of the past dictatorship, civil unrest, instability, extreme poverty and deep-rooted corruption, democratic "culture" is insufficiently developed. The notion of the citizen's responsibility is almost non-existent. Due to the repression following the 1991 coup d'Etat, the embargo, wide-spread poverty, the American military intervention and the international community's strong presence, people have no common society project. Political structures are prey to personal ambition and factionalism on the part of politicians.

Increasing political polarisation, accentuated by the experience of the 2000 elections, led to renewed intimidation, violence and even murder. The concept of resolving disputes and crisis by dialogue is not deep-

rooted. The parties' insufficient political representation and the poor level of election organisation cause ongoing problems.

MINUSTAH' activity

Following the deployment (on 29 February 2004) of a US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorised by the Security Council with a three-month mandate, MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de Haiti) took over in June 2004 in accordance with a United Nations decision of 29 February and 30 April 2004. The mandate of this peace-keeping force was to support the transitional government in ensuring security and stability and to assist in the reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP), which is now the only armed force following the army's dissolution in 1994. Its main challenges are: political neutrality, integrity and professionalism.

On 22 June 2005 the Security Council decided to increase MINUSTAH to 7.500 troops and the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) force to 1.622 officers.

On 15 August 2006 the Security Council extended MINUSTAH's mandate until 15 February 2007 and recommended that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts should focus on a community-based violence-reduction programme.

MINUSTAH's achievements were quite unsatisfactory during the transition period, as it had failed to disarm the supporters of Aristide, opposition groups as well as the members of the disbanded Forces Armées d'Haiti (FAD'H). Insecurity persisted, since September 2004 hundreds of people had been killed by armed gangs. FL representatives criticised MINUSTAH for not having turned the national police PNH into an efficient, neutral force. While the immediate threat of violence came from the urban gangs, most disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs were offered to the former army.

Since February 2006 violent incidents in the capital diminished markedly. However, in the first two weeks of June 2006 ten policemen were killed and an increase of kidnappings for ransom was reported (30 people in July 2006 - in 2005 10 people a day were kidnapped, when political and gang-related violence and killings increased political polarisation). Presently, there is no clear evidence of the motivation of this type of crime. On 6-7 July a massacre of residents in Grande Ravine claimed between 20 and 40 lives, 100 homes were burned. Mr Préal

insisted that there was a combination of poverty and drug-trafficking without political motivation. But these incidents show the still fragile nature of the stability prevailing since the elections.

Security is the core challenge for president Préval. The newly created NCDDR (National Commission on Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration) is to coordinate the disarmament and violence reduction strategy. MINUSTAH has set up 32 checkpoints in order to control better the slum areas and to squeeze the gangs by seizing and holding their territory. Lacking border and port controls cause a loss of US\$ 100 to 240 million a year in uncollected customs and port revenues. Progress on disarming and dismantling the gangs in and around the capital is still slow. Following hard pressure in the capital, gang members emigrate to other areas.

Combining security with socio-economic development

Close cooperation between the government's security forces, MINUSTAH and UNPOL is required to reach an acceptable level of security, indispensable for a stable environment which is conducive socio-economic development. Simultaneously visible improvements of infrastructure, public services and in the employment sector, especially in the poor urban slums must be achieved in order to take duly into account the interrelationship between economic development and security. It is essential that the government is perceived by the public to have a leadership role in achievements in both sectors as this will help stabilising the government's position.

Human rights situation

As far as the principles of the State of Law and Human Rights are concerned, legislative and legal practice as well as actions by the security forces slight improvements can be noted. Flagrant human rights violations are common. The judicial system is corrupt and inefficient (financially under-resourced, badly paid judges, a large case backlog, an outdated legal code, and poor facilities). In 2003 up to 4000 people (nearly 80% of all prisoners) were awaiting trial in conditions well below minimum international standards. The penitentiary administration is run by the police. 75% of the population is believed not to have access to the courts. Judicial reform so far exists only on paper and is drafted very vaguely.

In view of Haiti's police force 's incapacity to cope with increasing criminal anarchy, President Aristide himself had publicly called on citizens to take the law into their own hands! The police force is understaffed, badly equipped and insufficiently trained. Following cases of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial executions, deaths in custody and unlawful killings, citizens perceive the police often as a threat rather than a protection. Despite the government's statements, these crimes remain unpunished.

Amnesty International has reported repeatedly on the human rights situation in the country. Numerous testimonies reported on grave human rights abuses perpetrated by the national police, former military personnel, rebels and armed gangs of rival political factions.

National reconciliation and consultation process

At the end of May 2005 a national dialogue commission was set up. It was composed of 12 representatives of political parties, members of the Group of 184 as well as a former FL senator. The commission could not achieve anything because of the increasing tension before the elections and because the commission was dominated by the Group of 184 and failed to reach out to other sectors.

Right after inauguration president Préval started courting the FL National Grassroots Cell and the leaders of the main political parties by-passing the official structure of the Dialogue Commission. Mr Préval encourages efforts to reach consensus and cohesion of the population, essential for Haiti's political stability. As Aristide is still popular in the country, his return might lead to some instability. As part of the consultation process government representatives met delegates of the Peasant Farmers' Confederation. Before the end of the year municipal and communal section-level council and assembly elections are scheduled to take place. These bodies are intended to create a decentralised political structure.

The regional context

The country is relatively isolated despite renewed diplomatic relations and Haiti's membership in CARICOM which, however, was suspended in February 2004 following Mr Aristide's departure. Membership will be restored after violence has ceased and free and fair elections have taken place. The problems of migration, drug trafficking and commerce must be resolved in close collaboration with its direct neighbour, the

Dominican Republic. Following the killing of 30 000 Haitians in towns along the border by Dominican forces, diplomatic relations had been suspended for 60 years until 1996. Due to the country's geographical position and the weakness of its institutions Haiti is a major link for drug trafficking between Colombia and the USA. This in turn affects Haiti's political and socio-economic situation.

The economy - constant need of foreign support

The economy is crippled by high levels of unemployment (only one in 50 people has a steady wage-earning job), soaring inflation and a high balance of payments deficits. The informal sector accounts for 60 to 70% of economic activity. Political stability and the consensus of the political class on the future of the country are prerequisites for economic reforms. Until recently the permanent state of emergency has largely dictated governmental action.

After a period of relative prosperity in the 70s, economic decline started in the early 80s, and was accelerated after the end of the Duvalier regime and with the 1991 military coup, when the international embargo seriously affected the production sector and, consequently, living conditions. Positive, but only temporary, results were achieved by an IMF economic stabilisation and recovery programme (US\$ 2 bn for 1995-97) which reversed the downward trend and brought GDP growth of 4.4% in 1994/95. Supply-side constraints, including weak infrastructure, power shortages and transport difficulties impaired competitiveness in a period of strong external demand growth.

The latest political crisis of 1997 brought to a halt another structural adjustment programme. Macroeconomic management policies by the IMF brought inflation down from 21% in 1997 to 8.7% in 1999. Between 1996 and 1999 Haiti received US\$ 1.4 bn in external grants (mostly from NGOs) compared with US\$ 600 million in loan disbursements from multilateral sources. The worsening of the political crisis in the first half of 2001 blocked the reform of the public sector and discouraged private investment. The continuing kidnappings and the targeting of members of the small business community had a corrosive effect on economic life. In addition, electricity supply problems affect economic activity adversely. The combined effect of violence and natural disasters led to an economic contraction by 5%.

Stabilisation of public finances are a *conditio sine qua non* for economic development. The interim government was not in a position to develop an

economic strategy as it had to pick up the pieces of the civil conflict that led to president Aristide's departure in February 2004.

An Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) agreed with the donor community in Washington in July 2004 (€ 294 million from the EU) set up a programme of US\$ 1.1 billion for the period July 2004 - September 2006. This programme provided for:

- the distribution of 2.4 million schoolbooks;
- the construction and rehabilitation of more than 200 schools;
- the improvement of access to potable water for more than 150 000 rural households;
- the construction and rehabilitation of 300 km of roads, generating labour-intensive employment.

External financing of US\$ 432 million underpinned a 70% rise in budget spending for fiscal year 2005/06. Again

for 2006/07 government will depend on foreign assistance for increased spending for social services and infrastructure. A structural reform programme will focus on better targeting of allocation and increasing economic transparency. An important objective will be the restructuring of the largely inefficient state enterprises, in particular Electricité d'Haiti. The high oil prices weigh heavily on Haiti's economy and electricity generation is dependent on imported oil. The government could reach an agreement with IMF for financing, via a supplementary budget, the higher costs for imported oil.

At an international donors' meeting in Brasilia, on 23 May 2006 representatives of 16 countries and 11 international organisations signalled their commitment to providing assistance, in particular in ensuring the necessary budgetary support for the government to meet its spending targets in 2005/06 and 2006/07. The IMF signalled its support, too, noting the government's commitment to fiscal discipline.

Capital flows and foreign debt

Debt relief in 1991 brought the figure down from US\$ 889 to US\$ 758 m. New credits brought the external debt to US\$ 1.27 bn in 2004 (90% concessional lending by official creditors). Presently Haiti is not a country eligible for debt relief under the HIPC scheme as the country's external debt-to GDP and export ratios in 2004 were only 37% and 187% respectively. But the high indebtedness and the continuing weak fiscal capacity underscores the importance of highly concessional loans for the

country. The government is expected to apply for a PRGF with IMF to be considered in one year's time which could lead to debt relief under HIPC in a few years. An informal agreement with some Paris Club creditors to defer debt-service is likely to be extended.

Financial transfers from migrants amounted to about 800 million US\$ in 2005, about 8% of family income and 20% of GDP!

Agriculture

Agriculture constitutes more than 30% of GDP. The terrain is mostly rough and mountainous, with 20% arable land. 750 sq km are irrigated. Nearly half the population depends on this sector (1/3 of GDP) which consists mainly of small subsistence farms. Agriculture employs about two-thirds of the work-force. Income distribution is highly uneven. Due to the decline of the traditional export commodities sugar and coffee, the population active in the primary sector is constantly diminishing.

Agricultural productivity is decreasing because of soil deterioration (partly due to the use of wood as the staple cooking fuel), primitive farming techniques and a lack of fertilisers and investments.

Demographic growth adds to the overexploitation of agricultural land. Population pressures have caused a shift from traditional cash crops to subsistence crops like rice, maize, sorghum, millet and beans.

Coffee is by far the most important export crop (employing 380 000 people). It also contributes significantly to export earnings: about 20 to 40 million a year US\$. However, production is continuously falling. The second most important agricultural export is essential oils (cosmetics industry) with export earnings of US \$ 6.5 million.

Adverse weather conditions affect various regions of the country. Drought and subsequent torrential rains and several hurricanes have caused serious damage. Following Hurricane Dennis in July 2004 the Commission allocated € 400 000 in emergency assistance.

A report of July 2004 highlights a decline in national food production which between 1999 and 2003 covered only 49% of food needs. WFP provides food aid for over half a million of the population. According to WFP, 2.4 million Haitians are unable to afford the minimum daily recommended calorific intake of food.

Environment

The country lies in the middle of the hurricane belt, there are occasional floodings, earthquakes and periodic droughts. Intense poverty and high population density has been devastating for the country's natural resources. Forests cover less than 3% of the country and deforestation continues. The loss of topsoil is estimated at 16 000m/hectar. Biodiversity will soon almost disappear. In 1999 the government approved a 15 year Environment Action Plan but it lacks the finance to implement it. Thousands of people live in squalid and dangerous conditions in the vast slum areas around the capital.

Manufacturing

This sector accounts for only 7.5% of GDP, giving employment to about 25 000 people in 2004. During the period of the embargo the assembly and manufacturing industries almost disappeared. The potential, given the low wages, would be excellent but political instability, insecurity and the absence of an appropriate legal framework, as well as of public infrastructure and services (transport and energy) hamper private investment. 130 out of the 180 assembly plants were closed during the military rule following the 1991 coup. Light manufacturing exports have become the leading foreign exchange earners. The country's garment assembly sector, 40% of Haiti's merchandise exports, totalled an estimated US\$ 372 million in 2004. Manufacturing for domestic consumption has been in recession due to failure to compete with imports, as a result of under-investment.

Trade

The trade sector accounts for 47% of GNP. International trade is characterised by a strong imbalance between imports (1.27 bn US\$) and exports (0.43 bn US\$ in 2004). Haiti imports mainly foodstuff, machinery, equipment and fuel. Textiles (largely garment-assembly oriented) are the main export, followed by agricultural products including coffee (18%). Haiti's trade is dominated by its relationship with the US (most of the country's exports and half of its imports). In September 2004 the US House of Representatives blocked a bill granting Haitian textile manufacturers duty-free access as it would give unfair advantage to third-country producers. Furthermore, following the expiry of quotas under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing at the beginning of 2005, the country's apparel sector faces increasing problems to survive in a more

competitive market. The EU's share is increasing and, as a signatory of the Cotonou agreement, Haiti is eligible for EU trade preferences. Main European export customers are France and Italy for coffee.

As trade with CARICOM (agreement in principle signed in July 1999, full membership since July 2000) is less than 1% of Haiti's external commerce, its accession to this organisation will not have a tangible impact, despite the temporary (until 2005) suspension of CARICOM common external tariffs (30% average) on 500 import products. Numerous custom tariffs will need to be modified (up to a global increase of 2%) to reduce the effects on the poor of Haiti's integration into CARICOM.

CARICOM imposes free circulation of capital and services and the modernisation of the customs administration. Being a member of CARICOM, Haiti's weight in negotiating international and regional agreements is reinforced.

Concerning the EU, Haiti has derived very little advantage from the commercial opportunities offered by the Lome IV Convention. The Cotonou Agreement provides for economic partnership agreements on the basis of regional initiatives.

The EU accounts for 10% of Haiti's imports and 5% of its exports. Coffee represents half of the country's exports to the EU.

Public Finance

Notoriously weak and imbalanced due to the economy's large informal sector and weak governmental structures, public revenue contributes only about 8% to GNP (275 million €). Given a rising budget deficit, government spending is being financed by the Central Bank, which, on the other hand strangles the private sector by controlling monetary expansion firmly. This tendency continued in 2001 when the budget deficit was twice the amount agreed with the IMF. Since 1996/97 there was **no vote on the annual budget**. Extra-budgetary transactions increased just before the elections. Elementary control mechanisms are lacking. This state of affairs leads to generally weak implementation of sectoral policies (apart from the education sector). Particularly insufficient is progress in the health, justice and environment sectors. In the agricultural sector land reform and irrigation projects have been implemented.

Infrastructure

1/3 of the population lives in or close to Port-au-Prince. Half of Haiti's population lives in the countryside. Infrastructure is generally under-developed. Goods are transported either by donkey or by people. 2/3 of the roads (4000 km of roads, of which only 25% are paved) are suitable for motor traffic. Maritime and air transport play an important role but lack modern equipment.

Telephone density is at six lines per 1000, one of the least developed telecommunications systems in the western hemisphere.

Social Development

Haiti ranks at 150 (out of the total number of countries) in the Human Development Index. It is the only LDC in the Caribbean region. 80% of the population lives below the poverty level. Social inequalities are enormous: 4% have 66% of the country's resources, whilst 70% have only 20% of total revenue. Social and political stability, indispensable for development, are hampered by differences connected with wealth, colour and religion. Most of the poor live in rural areas far away from government services and support, which leads to rural exodus and anarchic settlement in shanty-towns and, as a consequence, to unemployment, unhealthy living conditions and crime.

Health

Poor nutrition, unsanitary conditions and inadequate health services are due to the increasing levels of poverty. Only 43 % have ready access to safe drinking water. Among the most serious concerns is the high incidence of HIV/AIDS (highest rate outside Africa). The people infected by HIV total around 210 000 (12% of the urban population and 5 % in rural areas). The death toll was 23 000 in 2003.

Education

In 1998 adult literacy was 48%. There is limited access to education and the education offered is generally substandard. 63% of children are enrolled in primary and only 15 % in secondary schools. In rural areas only 23% of children are enrolled in school. 80% of schools are private (family expenditure on education amounts to 14% of GDP compared to 1,7% government expenditure). Only 10% of teachers are properly

trained. 50% of primary school children and 89 % attending 5th year secondary are too old for their class. Only 3.8% of pupils successfully finish secondary school. Education and training do not correspond to the country's needs.

Development cooperation

The most important donors are: the US (a vast Haitian community is living in exile in the US) who exercise a strong influence on Haitian affairs (they were crucial in securing Mr Aristide's return in 1995), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the EU (closest bilateral ties with France). The EU is the most important donor.

By letter of 25 May 2004 Prime Minister Latortue confirmed the government's commitment to return to constitutional democratic governance, including the conduct of free and fair elections within 18 months. The Council adopted on 24 September 2004 the Commission's proposal for a twin-track approach: the support of development activities and the signature of the CSP/NIP on the condition of holding elections in 2005.

Haiti joined the ACP-EU Convention in 1989. Due to the political situation (embargo) the country could not participate in the 7th European Development Fund until November 1994. But the country received European emergency and humanitarian assistance amounting to € 100 million between 1976 and 1990.

At the end of 1999, assistance had totalled 487 million € over 5 years. Under the Cotonou Agreement 239 million € are foreseen for the National Indicative Programme. Together with the EU Member States' bilateral assistance, Europe is the second largest donor after the US. The main objective of the EU's development efforts is the strengthening of the democratic process and good governance to create the necessary conditions for economic development and the reduction of poverty. The programmes focus mainly on consolidating the rule of law, social and human development and economic environment. In December 2003 the Council extended the 'appropriate measures' of Art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, in force since January 2001, to the end of 2005. With direct Community aid to the government being suspended, the Commission continued to provide considerable aid to the population (democratisation, civil society, private sector, poverty reduction and emergency and humanitarian aid). The Council modified the 'appropriate measures' in September 2004 allowing it to spend the balance of the 7th and 8th EDF

for actions defined in the Interim Cooperation framework. Following the natural disasters in May 2004, the Commission unblocked humanitarian aid amounting to € 12.6 million. Presently the 'appropriate measures' are being reviewed to unblock € 72 million.

On 17 October 2005 development cooperation resumed fully.

EU aid went mainly to:

1) public infrastructure (primarily road construction and maintenance)

€87 million have been spent on the road network. An additional €52 million had been foreseen but was withdrawn because of the political situation. The result was unsatisfactory due to serious shortcomings in planning, execution and maintenance.

2) food aid/food safety and rural development

The goal is to improve agricultural production in order to compensate for the embargo's catastrophic effects on farm incomes. €20 million had been spent (without any snowball effect, unfortunately, as in many other cases). The food aid programme had to be stopped because of the worsening political situation: only €5million of a total of €33 million had been spent over 4 years.

3) the environment

For a start, awareness of environmental problems must be raised. Up to now there are no concrete programmes.

4) health

From 1994 to 1997 ECHO financed four programmes of € 34 million. The aid was given directly to the population and basic services. Due to the lack of a clear sectoral policy, the result is well below what could have been expected from such a level of financial input. The same is true for the many other efforts of international donors.

5) education

Children's education is the only sector in which national and local consensus could be reached so far. "Public" schools offer only 20% of primary education. But private schools are of lower quality. Support for

the education sector could have a direct impact on the fight against poverty.

Access to education must be guaranteed and improvement of teaching standards is needed. School canteens need to be financed. In this field important progress has been achieved through the implementation of the National Education Plan, drawn up in 1995. Contrary to the other international donors, the EU was able to implement its support to the education sector (€ 4,2 million) from 1997 to 2001 with very satisfactory results given a clear sectoral policy supported by all actors and carried out by a motivated and competent team.

Conclusion

Haiti is still attempting to consolidate the process of democratic government. The return to power of a democratically elected government is a major step towards a bettering of the situation. However, institutional weaknesses and limited economic resources constitute a major handicap. The country will need foreign assistance for a considerable number of years.

Political stability and good governance, the state of law and respect for human rights, justice and security, i.e. the impartiality and efficiency of the courts and the police, are preconditions for Haiti's growth and development. Central state institutions and local authorities must operate with the broad consensus of the Haitian people. Qualified and dedicated staff at all levels are a prerequisite. Much remains to be done in the fields of education, professional training and institutional support.

Annexes

European Parliament resolution on the EU-Caribbean partnership for growth, stability and development (2006/2123(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Communication of 2 March 2006 from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee entitled 'An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development' (COM(2006)0086) (hereinafter the "Commission Communication"),
 - having regard to the evaluation of the Commission's regional strategy for the Caribbean, Volumes 1 and 2, of April 2005,
 - having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 10 April 2006, which include a confirmation of the Common Position on Cuba of 2 December 1996,
 - having regard to the Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus'⁽¹⁾,
 - having regard to the Vienna Declaration of the Third European-Latin American-Caribbean Civil Society Forum of 1 April 2006,
 - having regard to its resolution of 23 March 2006 on the development impact of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)⁽²⁾,
 - having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A6-0211/2006),
- A. whereas by 2020 some Caribbean States will have achieved developed country status, whilst others face a drop from the category of middle-income countries to that of low-income countries,
- B. whereas these small island States have an inherent vulnerability to natural disasters and other external shocks,
- C. whereas a dialogue has taken place between the Commission and representatives of CARIFORUM⁽³⁾ on the Commission Communication when it was in draft form,
- D. whereas the establishment, on the basis of self-determination, of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) represents an important instrument for regional integration,
- E. whereas the CARIFORUM States wanted the EPA negotiations to incorporate a clear development policy dimension with a view to combating increasing poverty and inequality, fostering social cohesion and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
- F. whereas over 60% of the region's population is under 30 years of age, and whereas universal access to education is an unresolved problem for all Caribbean States, with the exception of Cuba,
- G. whereas the Belgian Government has made a positive assessment of the critical dialogue and development cooperation with the Cuban Government,
- H. whereas the programming phase for appropriations under the 10th European Development Fund has started, and whereas this aid should in future be disbursed more quickly and more efficiently and should be better tailored to the needs of the countries in the region,
1. Applauds the involvement of the CARIFORUM Group in the discussions on the draft Commission Communication and welcomes the fact that the communication has taken account of most of the concerns raised by the States in the region;
 2. Welcomes the fact that the Commission has based its strategy on the ethos of equality, partnership and ownership;

3. Regards Parliament's de facto marginalisation by means of a timetable which ruled out its involvement in the drafting of the cooperation strategy for the Caribbean as an exceptionally regrettable departure from the consensual approach employed by the three European institutions, an approach which had proved its worth in connection with the drafting of the Africa Strategy and the European Consensus on the European Union's development policy;
4. Deplores the Commission's failure to take proper account of the recommendations made in its evaluation report;
5. Endorses the Commission's analysis that cooperation between the two regions has not thus far been accompanied by proper political dialogue; regards as inadequate the practice of holding, once every two years, a one-hour meeting between the EU Troika and the CARIFORUM heads of government and welcomes the proposal that in future the requisite amount of time should be allocated to such a dialogue at all levels;
6. Welcomes the planned involvement of the French overseas departments in the region (Guadeloupe, French Guinea and Martinique) and the Caribbean overseas countries and territories (OCTs) in the future political dialogue; in that connection, however, endorses the view expressed by the Caribbean States that the arrangements for this involvement must first be negotiated with those States which, in the context of the Cotonou Agreement⁽⁴⁾, signed the agreement on the methodology for the political dialogue;
7. Endorses the standpoint adopted by the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) that the definition of separate EU policies for the three ACP regions must on no account serve to undermine overall relations between the European Union and the ACP States; welcomes the establishment of an additional forum for political dialogue in the form of summits between the European Union and the States of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC States), but insists on the primacy of the arrangements made in the context of the Cotonou Agreement;
8. Welcomes the intention stated in the Commission Communication of strengthening credible institutions and of encouraging good governance and transparency in the spheres of finance, taxation and justice in the Caribbean States; calls on all Caribbean States to ratify the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption;
9. Endorses the Commission's intention of giving priority to supporting the newly-created CSME; reiterates its view that development objectives must form the focus of the EPA negotiations, that the fledgling Caribbean internal market needs adequate trade-related support and capacity-building and that trade liberalisation must be properly sequenced;
10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that EPAs are structured in a way which takes into account regional realities and constraints, allowing for recourse to variable geometry if necessary; calls for any commitments undertaken within the framework of the EPA negotiations to be carefully sequenced with the delivery of EPA-related development support which targets the main areas of concern to the governments concerned, including economic restructuring to enhance competitiveness, fiscal adjustment and trade facilitation support;
11. Draws attention once again to the very significant contribution made by income from customs duties to the budgets and investment capacities of some Caribbean States and concludes, on that basis, that measures leading to the loss of this income, which at present cannot be offset by means of taxation, should not be taken without adequate compensation being provided; stresses, however, that the growth of trade between Caribbean States and between developing countries in general could help to offset losses of tariff revenues and contribute to more stable sources of revenue;
12. Endorses the Commission's assessment that the region's small, open economies are particularly vulnerable to global market forces; points out, however, that progressive trade liberalisation, with adequate safeguard mechanisms and allowing sufficient time for adjustment, promotes development and can therefore be a tool for combating poverty;
13. Believes that trade-related capacity-building measures must address supply-side constraints, inter alia by supporting the processing of basic products and the diversification of production, stimulating consultations with and support for small and medium-sized enterprises, eliminating bureaucratic obstacles to investment and thus promoting business development in the region;
14. Urges the Commission to implement Recommendation 7 of its own evaluation report, to take account of the principles underpinning the United Nations Small Island Developing States Network; and requests the Commission to publicly disseminate the study carried out on the impact of trade liberalisation and globalisation on the sustainable development of such States;

15. Regards the compensation and adjustment programmes to cushion the impact of changes in the market for sugar and bananas as underfunded and, in the light of the recent demonstrations in the region, fears that social cohesion, a cooperation objective, may be seriously undermined;
16. Calls on the Commission to develop programmes to encourage agricultural conversion with a view to safeguarding and creating, in a manner consistent with the objectives of social, food security, energy and environmental policies, acceptable jobs in farms currently run along conventional and uncompetitive lines;
17. Calls for greater attention to be paid to the social, cultural and environmental implications of the cooperation strategy and for the development of systematic impact forecasting and assessment on the basis of the indicators provided by the MDGs;
18. Welcomes the incorporation of important environmental-protection tasks in development cooperation with the Caribbean region and calls for massive funding to develop the use of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency with a view to forestalling the ruinous impact of the increase in oil prices and to slowing down climate change;
19. Shares the Commission's concerns that, as a result of global climate change, the frequency and intensity of weather-related disasters in the region will increase even further and supports the objective of improved natural disaster management, but deplores the lack of any reference to the EU-ACP natural disaster facility established in 2005; calls on the Commission to support the permanent long-term establishment of such a facility; requests the Commission to provide regular follow-up on this process to the European Parliament's Committee on Development and to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Social Affairs and the Environment; draws attention to the vulnerability of the Caribbean States' economies to natural disasters and welcomes the Commission's announcement that it will employ new, quicker disbursement procedures for reconstruction aid which involve compulsory pre-financing;
20. Criticises the fact that the strategy for the Caribbean pays far too little attention to the task of dealing with the problem of youth unemployment and the growing frustration among young people; is concerned that the impending crisis in the Caribbean farming industry will serve to exacerbate this situation;
21. Emphasises the key role which the development of sustainable tourism can play as a force for economic development and advocates long-term financial support for the building of the requisite infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, etc.); draws attention, however, to the Commission's failure to acknowledge that regional and local ownership of tourist amenities is fundamental to that sustainability and must be encouraged in order to reduce the outflow of profits to ensure that local people are not forced into roles as menial workers and to prevent the ultimate destruction of landscapes;
22. Welcomes the Commission's offer to keep the door open for political dialogue with Cuba; criticises, however, the tight restrictions imposed on any such dialogue on the basis of the 1996 Common Position;
23. Points out that successful representations by the EU to the USA resulting in a lifting of the embargo policy could have substantial economic benefits for the entire region; in keeping with a policy based on respect for political, social, individual and economic human rights, urges the opening of a critical dialogue with the Cuban Government;
24. Emphasises the importance of coordinating development programmes with non-European players in the region, in particular Canada, China, Brazil and Venezuela and, in that connection, regrets the fact that the Commission's portrayal of the involvement of other players is characterised by a degree of mistrust;
25. Emphasises the heterogeneous nature of the region and calls for a more nuanced cooperation strategy; against that background, calls on the Commission to assess, for each individual Caribbean State, on the basis of, inter alia, its degree of transparency, strong and independent institutions and good governance, whether the focus on budgetary aid is a suitable method of achieving development objectives;
26. Draws particular attention to Haiti's desperate plight and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a special programme for Haiti which goes beyond the scope of general cooperation with the Caribbean region and for which additional resources will be required; welcomes the generally satisfactory conduct of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in Haiti in February and April 2006;

27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the governments and parliaments of the Caribbean States.

(1) OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1.

(2) *Texts Adopted* , P6_TA(2006)0113.

(3) The Forum of the Caribbean States of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States.

(4) Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3).

P5_TA(2004)0188

Haiti

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Haiti

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Resolution 1529, unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council,
authorising the sending of an interim force pending the deployment of a blue helmets mission ninety days later,

– having regard to the CARICOM Heads of Government statement of 3 March 2004 at the conclusion of an emergency session on the situation in Haiti,

– having regard to the renewal in January 2003 of the partial suspension of EU cooperation with Haiti,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on this matter,

– having regard to Rule 37(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas anti-government protests have steadily grown in strength and violence, leading up to the control by an armed rebel movement of the whole country, and resulting in hundreds of dead and wounded civilians,

B. whereas President Aristide's second term has been mired by crises, including a coup attempt in July 2001, and whereas the political opposition called for him to step down as a condition for participation in legislative elections,

C. whereas the political situation, marked by insurrection, has led to the forced resignation of President Aristide,

D. whereas the President of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre, is acting as interim president, as provided for by Haiti's Constitution,

E. whereas the UN Security Council decided to authorise the deployment of a multinational interim force to Haiti for three months in order to promote security and stability, to facilitate humanitarian assistance and to assist the Haitian police and Coast Guard in maintaining law and order and protecting human rights,

F. whereas there is some unease over the fall and departure from Haiti of President Aristide, including the reservations expressed by CARICOM regarding the conditions surrounding his forced departure,

G. whereas the CARICOM Action Plan, endorsed by the EU, was based on the precepts of shared government, binding both President Aristide and the legitimate opposition to specific commitments,

H. whereas President Aristide's election in October 2000 had taken place without the participation of the opposition parties, which wished to protest against the vote count at the May 2000 parliamentary elections, and whereas the political situation had been at a deadlock since then despite various mediation attempts,

I. whereas the national police and judicial system were unable to enforce the rule of law,

J. having regard to the establishment of the Tripartite Council to prepare the transition period following President Aristide's departure,

K. whereas a Council of seven 'wise men' has been set up to submit a new Prime Minister to the Haitian Interim President and give its opinion on the choice of members of the provisional government,

L. whereas all insurgents and militias must be disarmed to stop widespread looting and revenge killings,

1. Regrets the fact that it has proved impossible to achieve a peaceful and negotiated political settlement between all the country's political forces because of the inability of all the political parties to resolve the dispute over the 2000 parliamentary elections in a peaceful and democratic manner and with due respect for the rule of law;

2. Regrets that the international forces did not intervene earlier, as called for by CARICOM, to put an end to the spiral of violence;

3. Welcomes the establishment of the transition Tripartite Council and the Council of seven 'wise men', representing the diversity of Haitian society, with a view to finding a peaceful settlement to the country's crisis;

4. Calls for the creation of a broad-based interim government of national unity;

5. Calls for national reconciliation and calls on the transition authorities to consider holding a 'national conference' to debate the country's future and seek a consensus on future action;

6. Calls on the transition authorities to set up an independent and representative 'electoral commission';

7. Demands that all parties to the conflict in Haiti cease using violent means, and reiterates that all parties must respect international law, including with respect to human rights, and that there will be individual accountability and no impunity for violators thereof;
8. Calls on the transition authorities, with the help of the international forces, to disband all non-constitutional armed organisations, require them to hand in their weapons, put an end to corruption and step up the fight against drug trafficking with the assistance of specialised international agencies;
9. Calls for an impartial investigation of allegations of human rights abuses and for convicted human rights violators to be brought to justice; calls, in this context, for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission;
10. Suggests that a Human Rights High Commissioner's Office be set up, responsible for the independent monitoring of respect for human rights;
11. Calls for the multinational interim force comprising French, US and Canadian military personnel to be replaced with United Nations peace-keepers on the date decided by the Security Council;
12. Welcomes the Commission emergency funding of EUR 1.8 million but calls for EU and international aid to increase, in order not only to address humanitarian needs but also to provide long-term assistance with the reconstruction of the legal system and the national police and security forces on a basis of respect for human rights and the rule of law;
13. Regrets and condemns the continuing violence, which has claimed new victims, in particular the Spanish journalist Ricardo Ortega, who was killed while carrying out his job as a press photographer;
14. Calls on the Commission to step up its humanitarian and health aid, in particular by responding to the appeals of the International Red Cross and providing victims of violence with specific assistance;
15. Calls for the resumption of full cooperation with Haiti as soon as the relevant conditions are met;
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the ACP Council, the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the UN, the Organisation of American States, CARICOM, and the Haitian Interim President and Tripartite Council.

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 21 February 2006
6604/06 (Presse 52) P31 (OR.
fr)

Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union following the presidential election in Haiti

In view of the preliminary statement by the European Union Election Observation Mission, the European Union expresses its satisfaction that the presidential and parliamentary elections of 7 February passed off peacefully and notes that they will have marked an important step forward for the democratic process.

The European Union welcomes the high turnout by and the serious engagement of the people of Haiti in exercising their democratic right to choose their future leaders, despite the major technical and logistical problems encountered during the organisation of the vote.

The European Union welcomes the fact that a significant turning point has been reached in carrying through the democratic transition process.

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The European Union congratulates the President of Haiti, Mr René Préval, on his new mandate and reaffirms its lasting commitment to the people and authorities of Haiti in their efforts to rebuild and develop their country.

The European Union underlines the importance of the second round of parliamentary elections and hopes that their successful conduct will serve to cement the rule of law and complete the establishment of strong, stable institutions capable of completely fulfilling the role assigned to them under the Constitution.

As Haiti enters a new chapter in its history, it is vital that all political and social forces make national reconciliation the watchword for the dialogue they pursue, in order to achieve the political, economic and social stability that the country needs for its development.

The Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.

* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

6604/06 (Presse 52)

United Nations S/RES/1702 (2006)
Security Council
15 August 2006

Resolution 1702 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5513th meeting, on
15 August 2006

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Haiti, in particular its resolutions 1658 (2006), 1608 (2005), 1576 (2004) and 1542 (2004), as well as relevant statements by its President,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,

Welcoming the successful and peaceful political transition to an elected government, as well as the election of a new President and Parliament, which will give Haiti a unique opportunity to break with the violence and political instability of the past,

Welcoming the political agenda of the Government of Haiti on the modernization of state institutions and on wealth creation and the adoption, by the Haitian authorities, of the "Programme d'Apaisement Social" to respond to Haiti's immediate social needs,

Emphasizing that security, rule of law and institutional reform, national reconciliation, and sustainable economic and social development remain key to the stability of Haiti,

Recognizing that MINUSTAH constitutes a key actor in the continuing stabilization of the country and *expressing* its appreciation for its efforts to continue to assist the Government of Haiti to ensure a secure and stable environment,

Reaffirming the importance of appropriate expertise on issues relating to gender in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), *recalling* the need to address violence against women and children, and *encouraging* the MINUSTAH as well as the Government of Haiti to actively address these issues,

06-46877 (E)

Condemning all violations of human rights in Haiti, *calling on* all Haitians to renounce violence, and recognizing, in this context, that rule of law and respect for human rights are vital components of democratic societies,

Urging the Government of Haiti to undertake, in coordination with the international community, a comprehensive reform of the police, judiciary and correctional systems, to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to end impunity,

Welcoming the Government of Haiti's final approval of its Haitian National Police (HNP) reform plan, and calling upon it to implement that plan as soon as possible,

Recognizing that conditions for conventional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration do not currently exist in Haiti and that alternative programmes are required to address local conditions, and to further the goal of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration,

Underlining the need for the quick implementation of highly effective and visible labour intensive projects that help to create jobs and deliver basic social services, and *emphasizing* the importance of quick impact projects in the post-electoral phase,

Welcoming the outcomes of the Ministerial Donor Meeting on Haiti, held in Brasilia, on 23 May, as well as those of the International Conference of Donors for the Social and Economic Development of Haiti, held in Port-au-Prince, on 25 July,

Expressing its support for the extension of the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) until September 2007, and *urging* the Government of Haiti to continue to make progress in its implementation in close cooperation with all relevant international stakeholders,

Welcoming the re-admittance of Haiti to the Councils of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and *calling on* MINUSTAH to continue to work closely with the Organization of the American States (OAS) and CARICOM;

Welcoming also the appointment of a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Haiti with overall authority on the ground for the coordination and conduct of all the activities of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Haiti,

Paying tribute to the continued support of the international community, particularly the Core Group, interested stakeholders, donors and regional organizations, for Haiti and MINUSTAH, which remains essential to the achievement of stability and development,

Expressing gratitude to the troops and police personnel of MINUSTAH and to their countries,

Noting that the Haitian people and their government hold the ultimate responsibility for achieving political stability, social and economic development, and law and order,

Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as described in section 1 of operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1542 (2004),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MINUSTAH, as contained in its resolutions 1542 (2004), and 1608 (2005), until 15 February 2007, with the intention to renew for further periods;
2. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's report S/2006/592 of 28 July 2006, and *supports* the priorities set out therein;
3. *Decides* that MINUSTAH will consist of a military component of up to 7,200 troops of all ranks and of a police component of up to 1,951 officers;
4. *Authorizes* MINUSTAH to deploy 16 correction officers seconded from Member States in support of the Government of Haiti to address the shortcomings of the prison system;
5. *Urges* Member States to provide enough well-qualified, particularly francophone, police candidates, to ensure full staffing of MINUSTAH police and, in particular, to provide specific expertise in anti-gang operations, corrections, and other specializations identified as necessary in the report of the Secretary-General;
6. *Urges* the Haitian authorities to complete the run-off legislative, local and municipal elections as soon as feasible, and *calls* on MINUSTAH to provide all appropriate assistance in this regard, consistent with its mandate, and with the support of regional and sub-regional organizations;
7. *Reaffirms* its call upon MINUSTAH to support the constitutional and political process in Haiti, including through good offices, and to promote national dialogue and reconciliation;
8. *Welcomes* the important contribution provided by MINUSTAH in capacity and institution building at all levels, and *calls upon* MINUSTAH to expand its assistance to support the Government of Haiti in strengthening state institutions, especially outside of Port-au-Prince;
9. *Underlines* the importance of MINUSTAH's continuing support for the institutional strengthening of the HNP and, in this regard, requests the Haitian authorities, especially the HNP, and MINUSTAH to achieve optimal coordination in order to counter crime and violence, particularly in urban areas, taking into account the needs expressed by the Secretary-General for specialized capacities to enhance MINUSTAH's ability in this field;
10. *Strongly supports* in this regard the Secretary-General's intention to maximize MINUSTAH's crime prevention role, particularly with regard to the threat of gang violence and kidnapping,
11. *Requests* MINUSTAH to reorient its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, to further that goal, towards a comprehensive community violence reduction programme adapted to local conditions, including assistance for initiatives to strengthen local governance and the rule of law and to provide employment opportunities to former gang members, and at-risk youth, in close coordination with the Government of Haiti and other relevant actors, including the donor community;
12. *Urges* donors engaged in supporting the implementation of the HNP reform by the Haitian authorities to coordinate their activities closely with MINUSTAH;

13. *Reaffirms* MINUSTAH's mandate to provide operational support to the Haitian Coast guard, and *invites* Member States, in coordination with MINUSTAH, to engage with the Government of Haiti in order to address cross-border drugs and arms trafficking control;

14. *Decides* that MINUSTAH, consistent with its existing mandate under resolution 1542 (2004) to assist with the restructuring and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order, will provide assistance and advice to the Haitian authorities, in consultation with relevant actors, in monitoring, restructuring, reforming and strengthening of the justice sector, including through technical assistance to review all relevant legislation, the provision of experts to serve as professional resources, the rapid identification and implementation of mechanisms to address prison overcrowding and prolonged pre-trial detention and the coordination and planning of these activities, and *invites* the Government of Haiti to take full advantage of that assistance;

15. *Reaffirms* MINUSTAH's human rights' mandate, and *calls on* Haitian authorities to undertake a comprehensive reform in all areas of rule of law and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;

16. *Recognizes* the progress achieved thus far in the disbursement of pledged assistance, *welcomes* the pledges of donors, and *notes* the need for these funds to be rapidly disbursed, given that further sustained and generous international assistance will be essential for the Haitian people and their government to succeed in pursuing its programme for social and economic development;

17. *Requests* MINUSTAH to continue to implement quick impact projects;

18. *Calls on* MINUSTAH to enhance its coordination with the UN Country Team and with the various development actors in Haiti in order to ensure greater efficiency in development efforts and to address urgent development problems;

19. *Reaffirms* the need to maintain a proactive communications and public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the mandate and role of MINUSTAH in Haiti and to deliver messages to the Haitian people directly;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of MINUSTAH's mandate not later than 31 December 2006;

21. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/RES/1542 (2004)

Security Council Distr.: General

30 April 2004

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Resolution 1542 (2004)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4961st meeting,
on 30 April 2004**

The Security Council,

Recalling resolution 1529 (2004) of 29 February 2004,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on 16 April 2004 (S/2004/300) and supporting its recommendations,

Affirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,

Deploing all violations of human rights, particularly against the civilian population, and urging the Transitional Government of Haiti (“Transitional Government”) to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights and the establishment of a State based on the rule of law and an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

Reaffirming also its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004) on children in armed conflicts, as well as resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Commending the rapid and professional deployment of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and the stabilization efforts it has undertaken,

Taking note of the Political Agreement reached by some key parties on 4 April 2004 and *urging* all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

Reiterating its call upon the international community to continue to assist and support the economic, social and institutional development of Haiti over the long term, and welcoming the intention of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and of the international donor community, as well as international financial institutions, to participate in those efforts,

Noting the existence of challenges to the political, social and economic stability of Haiti and determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the stabilization force called for in resolution 1529 (2004), for an initial period of six months, with the intention to renew for further periods; and requests that authority be transferred from the MIF to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004;

2. *Authorizes* remaining elements of the MIF to continue carrying out its mandate under UNSCR 1529 (2004) within the means available for a transition period not exceeding 30 days from 1 June 2004, as required and requested by MINUSTAH;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative in Haiti who will have overall authority on the ground for the coordination and conduct of all the activities of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Haiti;

4. *Decides* that MINUSTAH will consist of a civilian and a military component in accordance with the Secretary-General's report on Haiti (S/2004/300): a civilian component will include a maximum of 1,622 Civilian Police, including advisers and formed units and a military component to include up to 6,700 troops of all ranks; and *requests further* that the military component report directly to the Special Representative through the force commander;

5. *Supports* the establishment of a Core Group chaired by the Special Representative and comprising also his/her Deputies, the Force Commander, representatives of OAS and CARICOM, other regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and other major stakeholders, in order to facilitate the implementation of MINUSTAH's mandate, promote interaction with the Haitian authorities as partners, and to enhance the effectiveness of the international community's response in Haiti, as outlined in the Secretary-General's report (S/2004/300);

6. *Requests* that in carrying out its mandate, MINUSTAH cooperate and coordinate with the OAS and CARICOM;

7. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to Section I below, *decides* that MINUSTAH shall have the following mandate:

I. Secure and Stable Environment:

(a) in support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place;

(b) to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and training, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police;

(c) to assist the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures;

(d) to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of the corrections system;

(e) to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, taking into account the primary responsibility of the Transitional Government in that regard;

(f) to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities;

II. Political Process:

(a) to support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti, including through good offices, and foster principles and democratic governance and institutional development;

(b) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to bring about a process of national dialogue and reconciliation;

(c) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections at the earliest possible date, in particular through the provision of technical, logistical, and administrative assistance and continued security, with appropriate support to an electoral process with voter participation that is representative of the national demographics, including women;

(d) to assist the Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels;

III. Human Rights:

(a) to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, particularly of women and children, in order to ensure individual accountability for human rights abuses and redress for victims;

(b) to monitor and report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, including on the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons;

8. *Decides* that MINUSTAH in collaboration with other partners shall provide advice and assistance within its capacity to the Transitional Government:

(a) in the investigation of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, in collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to put an end to impunity;

(b) in the development of a strategy for reform and institutional strengthening of the judiciary;

9. *Decides further* that MINUSTAH shall coordinate and cooperate with the Transitional Government as well as with their international partners, in order to facilitate the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance, and access of humanitarian workers to Haitian people in need, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable segments of society, particularly women and children;

10. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to facilitate and support the early deployment of MINUSTAH in advance of the United Nations assumption of responsibilities from the Multinational Interim Force;

11. *Requests* the Haitian authorities to conclude a status-of-force agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-force agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;
12. *Demands* strict respect for the persons and premises of the United Nations and associated personnel, the OAS, CARICOM and other international and humanitarian organizations, and diplomatic missions in Haiti, and that no acts of intimidation or violence be directed against personnel engaged in humanitarian, development or peacekeeping work; *demands further* that all parties in Haiti provide safe and unimpeded access to humanitarian agencies to allow them to carry out their work;
13. *Emphasizes* the need for Member States, United Nations organs, bodies and agencies and other international organizations, in particular OAS and CARICOM, other regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations to continue to contribute to the promotion of the social and economic development of Haiti, in particular for the long-term, in order to achieve and sustain stability and combat poverty;
14. *Urges* all the above-mentioned stakeholders, in particular the United Nations organs, bodies, and agencies to assist the Transitional Government of Haiti in the design of a long-term development strategy to this effect;
15. *Calls on* the Member States to provide substantial international aid to meet the humanitarian needs in Haiti and to permit the reconstruction of the country, utilizing relevant coordination mechanisms, and *further calls* upon States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by the United Nations organs, bodies and agencies;
16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide an interim report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate, and to provide an additional report prior to the expiration of the mandate, containing recommendations to the Council on whether to extend, restructure or reshape the mission to ensure the mission and its mandate remain relevant to changes in Haiti's political, security and economic development situation;
17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.