



**DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION
DIRECTORATE B
- POLICY DEPARTMENT -**

NOTE

SOMALIA: CRISIS AND HOPE

Abstract: Somalia's current humanitarian and security situation is one of the world's worst and the country is often written off as too difficult and for being a hopeless case. Yet, at the moment, there are perhaps the best prospects for peace, stability and relief to this troubled country that has not had a government for 17 years. At same time, there is also a risk that the process collapses. This is a critical period. After an overview of the humanitarian political and security situation, the note analyses the factors underlying the conflict and options for EU action. This is a time when increased and responsible international engagement is much needed.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OPTIONS FOR ACTION

This paper is intended to update Members of the European Parliament on the situation in Somalia and to outline options for supporting international peace and humanitarian initiatives.

Findings

- The humanitarian situation is one of the worst in the world, due to war, floods and drought.
- There is a surge in fighting due to an offensive by former Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) forces and other groups against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is supported by the Ethiopia. This has led to considerable human rights abuses.
- This forgotten crisis needs greater international attention.
- Following 2 rounds of talks in May 2008 organised and mediated by the UN, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS, which includes former leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts) signed a peace agreement on 9th June. This includes a cease-fire, withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the deployment of a UN peace keeping mission.
- There are a number of factors that could help with its long-term recovery: strong economy; common language, religion and culture; and change in clan dynamics from the early 90's.
- The 14th March Report of the UN Secretary-General had proposed actions to support the peace process, including a limited duration interim international stabilisation force, with greater operational capabilities than AMISOM, to be replaced eventually by a UN mission.

European Interests

- European principles, aims and commitments include responding to humanitarian crisis, supporting sustainable development and upholding the responsibility to protect civilians.
- Improving development, governance and stability in Somalia will increase stability in the Horn of Africa and will help to prevent radicalisation and to counter terrorism.
- Improving the humanitarian and security situation will reduce the number of Somalis being forced to flee and seek refugee asylum, both in neighbouring countries and the EU.

Options For The European Parliament

1. Call upon Member States and the Commission to support the peace initiatives of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and ensure their activities are coordinated by his office, so the international community speaks with a single, effective voice;
2. Increase awareness of the situation to encourage international re-engagement and support, including via hearings and seminars (possibly jointly with the US Congress or Senate and linked to international advocacy groups eg Amnesty, OXFAM, Human Rights Watch);
3. Ask the Council to examine the feasibility of the EU providing an interim stabilisation force (a Battle Group or other force) and increasing the operational capability of the AMISOM with the provision of equipment, technical assistance and airlift support;
4. Call upon Member States to help implement UN Security Council Resolution 1816 to protect ships from pirates operating from Somalia, as France and Denmark have already been doing;
5. Suggest that Member States and the Commission support security sector reform, in line with the Djibouti agreement, through the Joint Security Committee and via the International Assistance Framework for the Security Sector;

6. Advocate increased accountability of the TFG to its people and for the use of aid funding, (eg prosecution of those responsible to human rights abuses; the establishment of forums for dialogue between Somalis and the Transitional Federal Institutions on topics such as a new constitution; improved reporting on the use of donor funds);
7. Request an independent investigation of recent human rights violations in Somali;
8. Help build the capacity of the Transitional Federal Parliament (including for example via an exchange of parliamentary experience and skills, in Brussels or Nairobi, with the European Parliament, supported by the External Policy Directorate General), coordinated with the current capacity building efforts;
9. Encourage regional engagement (Ethiopia, Eritrea, AU, Arab League, etc.) and commitment to the Djibouti process led by the UN and the implementation of the peace agreement;
10. Call for targeted sanctions (asset freezes, travel bans, etc.) against individuals implicated in violations of the UN Arms Embargo and strengthen international and regional states' enforcement capacity of the embargo;
11. Ask Member States and the EC to maintain a balance of assistance between immediate support for humanitarian needs and the peace process and support for longer term development, including economic recovery, investment in public infrastructure and goods, support for civil society and democratic governance, including the planned elections.

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Executive Summary

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SOMALIA: CRISIS, HOPE AND NEED FOR SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION

The current humanitarian and security situation is one of the world's worst and the country is often written off as too difficult and being a hopeless case. Yet, at the moment, there are perhaps the best prospects for peace, stability and relief to this troubled country that has not had a credible nationwide government for 17 years.

This note first covers the current situation: humanitarian; political and security across the country; and the peace process. Secondly, it then examines some of the key factors underlying the current conflict, these include: the clan system; socio-economic interests and their historic development; the tension between those vying for power (particularly the TFG, the Islamic Courts and the clans); and involved external actors. It looks at the current EU and other international support and areas proposed for additional assistance to support the UN coordinated peace process. Finally, it suggests options that the European Parliament could take to support international peace and humanitarian initiatives.

This short note cannot hope to provide a very detailed analysis of the situation and background of Somalia. There are many good articles, reports and books on different aspects, which will be noted later on. The contents of this note are drawn almost entirely from these sources, but the author takes responsibility for any errors.

I - OVERVIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION

i) HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The UN and NGO's have called Somalia's humanitarian situation the worst in the world and are trying to raise the profile of this forgotten conflict. ECHO's 2006 global needs assessment ranked Somalia fourth of over 130 countries most in need of humanitarian aid.

Displacement: The UN's Humanitarian Coordinator estimates that 2.6 million Somalis are in need of assistance. Fighting, drought and food shortage have displaced over a million Somalis from their homes, roughly 14% of the country's population, including over 700,000 from Mogadishu in 2007, 2/3rds of the city's inhabitants, according to the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In Mogadishu, this is due to both fighting and a food shortage. There are 464,000 refugees, with 315,000 in nearby countries, who have a difficult time coping with them. Many fleeing across the sea do not survive the journey (so far 300 have died in 2008, trying to cross to Yemen).

Human Rights: National and international human rights organisations have condemned all of the belligerent forces for the killing of civilians in recent fighting and severe human rights abuses. This includes families whose homes collapse, those caught in the crossfire of both small arms and heavy weapons exchanges, those who are wounded but do not receive medical attention and those executed, assaulted, raped and looted by soldiers from all sides.

Health: There is a severe health crisis. As ECHO has found, public health services in Somalia - where they exist - lack drugs and qualified personnel. 70% of Somalis lack access to health services. With 0.4 doctors and 2.8 nurses per 100,000 people, Somalia shows some of the world's worst health indicators. Malaria, diarrhoea and respiratory infections kill nearly one quarter of children before they reach the age of 5, according to UNICEF analysis. Somalia is among the countries with the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world. Acute and chronic malnutrition are also high. Gunshot and other traumas (from landmines) also cause death and disability.

Cholera is endemic. Many water supply facilities have been destroyed and looted during the conflict. Only 20% of Somalis have access to safe drinking water. There is also widespread contamination of wells and unhygienic collection and storage of water. Over half the population lives without sanitary means, whilst a lack of garbage collection affects the urban environment and water sources.

Food Security: ECHO estimates that 60% of the Somali population is dependent on livestock which typically provides at least half the daily calorie intake, mainly from milk. By 2005, livestock herders had faced three successive years of drought or poor rains and livestock deaths of 60% in some areas. This left large numbers of people destitute and without the means to start their herds again. Again this year, the Jilaal dry season has been drier and hotter than usual, the situation could become even worse if the April-June Gu rains are poor, as anticipated (these rains are critical to 75% of the country's cereal production). Conflict in some areas has distorted markets and limited access to grazing areas.

The UN Food Security Analysis Unit estimates that 945,000 people, 13% of the population, are facing a food and livelihoods crisis. The price of locally produced cereals (maize and sorghum) as soared by 300-400% in a year and inflation from January to March hit 80%, leading to food riots in Mogadishu and food insecurity in towns across the country. Various factors are leading to the price rises, including rising fuel prices, transport costs, the spiralling inflation and disruption of trade. The latter includes increasing tolls and numbers of checkpoints and the robbery of and attacks upon aid organisation vehicles.

Humanitarian Access: The increasing checkpoints are part of an overall increase in reduced humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Since 2007, armed groups and criminals are increasingly targeting humanitarian actors, including: 7 humanitarian workers and four foreign (2 UK, 2 Kenya) teachers killed; 7 kidnappings or attempted kidnappings (including 2 UN workers in March); frequent hijackings of humanitarian vehicles (7 in March 2008); shooting at staff in UN vehicles and flights; four recent incidents of looting of food aid and other relief items; and increasing accusations that aid workers are supporting different sides and international strikes. Journalists are also often targeted, with stations shut and 8 Somali journalists killed in 2007.

ii) POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION

National Level And South And Central Somalia: In 2004, after two years of talks, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led and internationally supported Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI's) of government, parliament and president, a mandate to govern Somalia from 2004 to 2009 and the task of organising a constitutional referendum and democratic elections at the end of this period. The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) elected Abdullahi Yusuf (profile in Appendix II) as the President of the Transitional Federal Government. The President appointed Ali Mohamed Gedi (profile in Appendix II) as Prime Minister. Yusuf comes from the Darod clan and was the former President of the semi-autonomous Puntland, prior to this he had been a guerilla leader, having started out as an army officer. Gedi comes from the powerful Hawiye clan family, strong in Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia, but also had close ties to Ethiopia. It was hoped that Gedi could bring Hawiye support for the TFG, while reassuring Ethiopia.

The SNRC had its shortcomings. Somaliland opposed it and did not participate, because it wanted independence. It did not involve the religious groups and even the appointment of Gedi did not satisfy many key leaders of the Hawiye clan family. Despite Gedi's presence, opponents felt that President Yusuf's Darod clan family and its allies dominated the TFG.

Rise Of Islamic Courts: When, in 2005, the TFI's established their presence in a few towns in Somalia, another new and increasingly important player had already established itself on political landscape. Supported by influential businessmen, the Islamic courts had first emerged in the neighbourhoods of Mogadishu in response to the public frustration with continuing insecurity, gang violence, and growing kidnapping industry. They received considerable popular support for bringing law, order and stability. Alongside them, Islamic charitable organisations responded to social needs. The courts also received the support of the politically marginalised, including the relatively wealthy urban coastal trading class of Merca and Brava.

In 2006, Mogadishu contained then as now a widely varied set of political actors. This included members of the TFP who had quarrelled with President Yusuf,¹ Hawiye clan leaders (many opposed to the TFG led by President Yusuf), the UIC leaders, various business leaders and leaders of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). The latter was an alliance of Hawiye warlords and businessmen that formed in February 2006 and received support from the US to help it act against terrorists.

Tension grew between the increasingly powerful courts, united under their Supreme Council as the Union of Islamic Courts, and the ARPCT. The links of the latter to the US made it deeply unpopular in the post-11th September 2001/Iraq world. It was most likely increasing hostility and confrontations between rival businessmen that triggered the violent conflict.²

¹ The parliamentarians present in Mogadishu, including the Speaker of the Parliament, Sheikh Hassan Sheikh Adan, had quarrelled with the President over questions foreign troops and status of the capital. They were later impeached for talking to the UIC.

² One businessman, Bashir Rage, was linked to the ARPCT while the other, Abuker Omar Adane, to the UIC. Both came from the same sub-clan, Abgal.

The UIC took over Mogadishu and Jowhar after heavy fighting that started in March 2006. The UIC militia, being better armed, trained, commanded and motivated, made short shrift of their various warlord opponents. The UIC won considerable support by making the city safe, disarming warlord's militias, eliminating roadblocks and reopening the port and airport. The UIC benefited from their victory over the ARPCT by being the only group organised enough to consolidate the change in circumstances and by raiding the arsenals of the defeated Alliance.³

Across much of southern and central Somalia, business groups and others opposed to clan rule or the TFG, particularly Mogadishu Hawiye leaders who felt excluded from key posts, called for the UIC to replace their unpopular administrations. The UIC started establishing committees to attempt to govern, led by a new generation of younger leaders, including the moderate Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the head of the executive committee.

Starting in mid-2006, the TFG and UIC held talks, sponsored by the Arab League and reached some agreements. It seemed at the beginning that a conflict between the TFG governing overall and the UIC's role was not inevitable. The UIC did not directly challenge the authority of the TFG President.

Reversal Of Fortune: The UIC faced many challenges. Its actions became increasingly unpopular with the population and those of its hardliners with the TFG and its international backers. The UIC had never governed before, indeed, its various Courts had little experience of working together and its leaders lacked political experience. The UIC was an unsteady coalition of very different religious hues, including Sufists, Salafists, traditionalists, Brotherhood, Islamicists and Jihadists. The increasingly restrictive and authoritarian tendencies of some courts started to draw resistance from the population and different socio-economic groups, particularly for their strict interpretations of sharia, restricted the rights of women, the media and civil society. The bans on qaat production and charcoal exports (lucrative, but environmentally very damaging) drew the opposition of those who relied upon these industries for their livelihoods.

The UIC has its hardline elements, some of which are said to be linked to Al Qaida and assassinations in Mogadishu. The forceful annexation of the port of Kismayo in the Juba Valley cost it significant popularity. The UIC began to appear a threat to the TFG. Dahir Aweys headed the UIC's Shura (advisory committee) of 90 members. While Dahir Aweys denies the allegations of being a terrorist, he clearly opposed and called for a jihad against Ethiopia, supporting again Ethiopian insurgents (Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front). In this he was supported by Eritrea, a country close to war with Ethiopia.

Aden Hashi Farah Ayro was one of Hizb al-Shabab (the youth) militia's key leaders. He was prominent among the hardliners and had been linked to political assassinations in Mogadishu and the murders of international aid workers (on 3rd May 2008 a US missile strike killed Ayro). Another leader, Hasan Abdullah Hersi "al-Turki," was in the forefront of taking Kismayo. As well as Dahir Aweys, the US has put Hizb al-Shabab on its terror lists. Hizb al-Shabab leaders

³ This is what Aideed had done when Barre fell.

such as Sheikh Muktar Robow have welcomed this recognition of their anti-American credentials and importance.⁴

The talks between the TFG and UIC broke down in late 2006 and the UIC started to surround the TFG in Baidoa. Ethiopia became increasingly concerned by the radical Islamicist groups close to its borders. In the end, Ethiopia responded to the hardliners' actions and threat to the TFG by launching an offensive against the UIC on 24th December 2006. Elements of the UIC, particularly Hizb al-Shabab, stood their ground and the Ethiopian and TFG troops put them to rout in 3 decisive battles. Following these defeats with heavy casualties, the clans, business communities and moderate religious leaders sealed the collapse of the UIC by withdrawing their support from the courts in reaction to what they saw as the irresponsibility of the hardliners, the cost of the war and the fear of a return to the chaos of the early nineties. These groups and their leaders demanded that the UIC return its weapons and fighters. Many of the UIC leaders and hardliners fled to the south and to Eritrea, though now they have regrouped and have been launching attacks across south and central Somalia against the TFG and their Ethiopian allies.

AMISOM: In 2007, the African Union (AU) authorised the AMISOM peacekeeping mission, with an extensive set of tasks, including: supporting dialogue and reconciliation; protecting the TFI's; assisting with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation plan, which involves security sector reform; and improving security conditions to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Intended to be a force of 8,000, it has only in 2008 reached the strength of 2,500. A battalion of Burundian troops has joined two battalions of Ugandan forces, which are protecting the TFG in Mogadishu. A lack of troops, vehicles and equipment has limited the role AMISOM can play and it has concentrated on protection duties within Mogadishu.

TFG: Early 2007 saw both increased divisions within the Transitional Federal Institutions and increased opposition to these institutions, which was delaying the Transitional Federal Charter's implementation. In July and August 2007, the National Governance and Reconciliation Committee, chaired by ex-President Ali Mahdi Mohamed, organised the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC). 2,600 delegates attended, including from the clans, women's groups and the diaspora to try to reconcile opposing groups. This Congress called for peace, disarmament, free and fair multiparty elections and allowing unelected people to be in Cabinet.

Certain opposition groups boycotted this Congress, and held their own Congress for the Liberation and Reconstitution of Somalia. This included representatives of the Union of Islamic Courts, a number of current and former parliamentarians led by the former Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan (profile in Appendix II), clan leaders, civil society and diaspora. The Conference formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS, also known as the Asmara Group for its eponymous meeting place), agreed a plan of action and elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (profile in Appendix II) Chairman of the executive branch and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan Head of the 191 member Central Committee.

⁴ In December 2007, Abu Zubeyr became the leader of Hizb al-Shabab, while its other leaders are divided by territory: in Galgaduud, Aden Hashi Farah Ayro; in the south, Sheikh Hassan Turki; and in Hiraan adn Bakool, Mukhtar Robow Abu-Mansour.

Following a political crisis and internal and external opposition to him, Gedi resigned on 7th November 2007. His shortcomings (eg inability to get along with most influential Hawiye clan leaders and the perception of him being wholly Ethiopia's man) meant that he became a part of the problem than the solution. Following the recommendation of the National Reconciliation Congress, the TFP changed the Transitional Federal Charter to allow the President to appoint non-parliamentarians to Cabinet. President Yusuf appointed Nur Hassan Hussein "Adde" (profile in Appendix II) as Prime Minister. Hussein is also a Hawiye and was the former Secretary-General of the Somalia Red Crescent Society for 16 years. He appointed a cabinet of 73 members. This was criticised both by groups that felt they were not adequately consulted or represented and by communities that over time felt that this cabinet did not live up to the NRC's calls for great efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and merit based appointments.

On 6th January 2008, PM Hussein appointed a new, streamlined cabinet with only 23 posts, half from within, half from outside parliament. He set his government's priorities as reconciliation, security and humanitarian assistance and access. He has also made repeated appeals to all Somalis for dialogue and reconciliation to resolve their problems and to participate in a peaceful transition to a democratic regime. In the main, he has made a positive start, not least as he has established relations with influential Hawiye leaders, while running an efficient administration.

Return To Violence: Following the defeat of UIC forces in 2006-7, 2008 has seen a regrouping of and renewed offensive by elements loyal to the former UIC, the Muqawama militia, militia and warlords from sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family opposed to the TFG and Ethiopian presence and the Hizb al-Shabab. While the former groups have a primarily nationalist agenda, the last one, Hizb al-Shabab, has an international agenda, foreign members and support. All of these groups organise joint operations and share resources. Their offensive has led to increased fighting in Mogadishu and raids across southern and central Somalia.

As noted above the fierce fighting ensuing from these raids has displaced large numbers of civilians, generated large numbers of civilian casualties and led to human rights abuses by forces from all sides. The TFG and Ethiopian forces, as well as their opponents, have sustained significant casualties. It is not clear how long Ethiopia will keep its troops in Somalia, but TFG forces are not currently strong enough to allow them to withdraw. At the same time, there is considerable popular opposition to the Ethiopian presence.

Those opposing the TFG seem to hold a range of different positions. Even within the UIC there is a variety of views, ranging from more moderate positions open to the idea of dialogue (the important and influential ARS seems to be one such group) and intransigent views that oppose vehemently the TFG, its Ethiopian allies and the idea of any peacekeepers (eg Hizb al-Shabab).

The Transitional Federal Institutions: The Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) constitute the recognised governance structures of Somalia: Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the President. The Parliament has 275 seats with appointments are made at the clan level in order to balance the distribution of power and influence among the main clan families (4 main clans families selected 4/5th of the members). The Somali National Reconciliation Conference in 2004 elected the President and Prime Minister. The Transitional Federal Charter (the transitional constitution) provides for a federal system with four levels of governance: 1) The Federal Government; 2) state governments (two or more, based on free will); 3) regional administrations; and 4) district administrations.

As the conflict continues, there is a risk of the TFG and TFI's dividing along interest driven lines. The legitimacy and therefore success of the TFI's will depend on their ability to act as truly federal, representative institutions, acting in the interests of all Somalis. The current insecurity, lawlessness and human rights allegations against TFG forces and their Ethiopian allies are eroding dangerously this legitimacy.

As the various TFG forces suffer considerable casualties, desertions further deplete their ranks.⁵ In responses, various their commanders start recruiting replacements chosen for their loyalty and often along clan lines. Commanders and TFG leaders often conduct operations their own militias and TFG forces, blurring the distinction between the two, particularly as many wear the same uniforms. This is particularly a problem for the Somali Police Force, which works closely with the Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Dheere, and his militia. There is a risk that the TFG forces start to disintegrate and serve individual politicians, commanders and warlords rather than the TFG and the Somali people. Some commentators have argued that units are operating increasingly independently and sometimes fight each other.

Arms Embargo: The major arms markets in Somalia are receiving major numbers and types of arms that arrive from the regional states, across land and water. Arms also come from deserting soldiers in need of money. Of considerable concern is that in 2008, arms embargo monitors have stated that large numbers of arms are coming from TFG and allied international commanders. Stocks seized from combat are alleged to be sold back and forth between the TFG side and the opposition via the various arms markets.

Somaliland And Puntland Dispute: Despite the collapse of the national government, the establishment of the governments in Somaliland and Puntland has led to relative peace and stability in northern Somalia, an area which has not seen major conflict since the early nineties. This is now being threatened and is causing significant population displacement and humanitarian problems. In April 2007, for the first time since October 2004, the Somaliland and Puntland armies clashed contesting claims to the areas of Sool and eastern Sanaag. Their forces clashed again in July, September and October 2007, further fracturing the communities there.


Only after independence in 1960 did the former British Protectorate of Somaliland and the former Italian colony unite to form the Republic of Somalia. Somaliland's concern is not to see its borders compromised as its territorial integrity is an important part of its claim for independence. Increased fighting will make reconciliation more difficult. Splitting off even one of the more stable territories of Somalia will threaten the viability and future stability for a revived state of Somalia, which the TFG are in the process of trying to construct. While in 1998, Puntland declared its status as an autonomous region, with a president, parliament and judiciary and Garowe as its capital, it sees itself as an integral part of Somalia.

Language and clan had been important unifying factors in Somaliland. In May 1991, following the collapse of Siad Barre's regime earlier the same year, Somaliland, whose capital is Hargeisa,

⁵ The Somali security forces include: the heavily armed Somali National Security Agency under General Mohamed Warsame Darwish, which is closely associated with the President; the Somali National Army under General Salah Hassan Jama "Liif," also associated with the President and clans from the North; the Somali National Police under Commissioner General Abdi Qeybdiid and has 7,000 personnel, at least half of whom have received international police training. Mohamed Dheere, the Mayor of Mogadishu and Governor of Banadir, has also his own militia and commands the Mogadishu elements of the Somali National Police.

declared independence, which the international community has never officially recognised. Somalilanders ratified a constitution in 2001, which included a multi-party political system, and voted in 2002, 2003 and 2005 in local, presidential and parliamentary elections respectively. Somaliland has demonstrated an impressive degree of progress and self-help in establishing stability and alleviating poverty, a marked difference from the rest of the country. Despite these positive trends, there are still troubling allegations of human rights abuses and restrictions on political freedom. Most recently, the President of Somaliland extended his mandate for a year, putting off regularly scheduled elections.

Somaliland and Puntland have long contested the border regions of Sanaag and Sool between them, particularly because these fall within the old colonial boundaries of Somaliland, but are predominately populated by the Dhulbahante and Warsangeeli.⁶ These groups had representatives in both the Somaliland and Puntland administrations and their own local administration that tended to be more effective than the administrations that both Somaliland and Puntland tried to establish. Leaders of Somaliland and Puntland generally avoided visiting both Sool and Sanaag. In the various rounds of Somaliland elections, the Harti in Togdheer, Sool and Sanaag areas had very low participation rates. There are push and pull factors to this political marginalisation, but it partly reflects Harti opposition to the Somaliland secessionism.



Political and genealogical divisions in northern Somalia; © M.V. Höhne.

The visit of the Somaliland President Daahir Rayaale Kahin to Laascaanood, in the contested area, in December 2002 led to the competition between the two regions to become violent, triggering shooting between the two sides. The sub-clans of the contested areas are themselves divided between the two different regions and various leaders have switched sides on a number of occasions.⁷

⁶ Somaliland is dominated by the majoritarian Isaaq clan family, but is also home to Dir clans (the Gadabuursi and Hiisa sub-clans in the northwest) and the Dhulbahane and Warsangeeli in eastern Somaliland, sub-clans of the Harti, a clan of the Darod clan family. Both Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, former President of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the first President of Somaliland in 1991, and Mahamed Ibraahim Egaal, who replaced him in 1993 until his death in 2002, were from the Isaaq clan family. In 2002, Daahir Rayaale Kahin, a Dir and the Vice President, became President.

⁷ Ahmed Abdi Habsade, a prominent Dhulbahante politician, was first the Speaker of the Somaliland lower house of parliament (Golaha Wakiilada) and then Minister of Interior in Puntland. He then took a position independent of the two. He comes from the Farah Garaad one of the two main branches of the Dhulbahante, which feels left out by

Piracy: Piracy is a major problem in the waters off Somalia, both for ships carrying aid supplies, particularly food, and commercial vessels. Pirates both plunder the cargo and ransom the crews. In 2007, pirates seized 25 ships. In April 2008 alone, pirates seized a UAE cargo freighter, a Spanish fishing boat and a French luxury yacht. French commandoes freed the yacht hostages, while a large ransom was paid to free the kidnapped crew of a Spanish vessel. Pirates are often impoverished fishermen who claim to have no other option in the face of food shortages. In May, pirates captured one German and one Turkish vessel.

iii) PEACE PROCESS

On 12th March, the new Prime Minister, Nur Hassan Hussein, declared again that the TFG is “ready to reconcile with any Somali citizen,” that negotiations could take place at “any location” and suggesting that these be mediated by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Following this, from 10th–15th May 2008, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS, which includes former leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts) attended talks in Djibouti organised and mediated by the UN. They agreed both a joint declaration and met again on 31st May as the next stage in the process to resolve the current crisis peacefully. The two sides had not had talks since 2006. On 9th June, the TFG and the ARS signed a peace agreement, which includes a cease-fire within 30 days, withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the deployment of a UN peace keeping mission.

The Ethiopian intervention put the TFG in now in Mogadishu and in a much stronger position than they had been initially and broke the control of the Islamic courts. The subsequent insurgency has made the situation much more unstable. The agreement between the ARS and the TFG reflects the willingness of moderate Islamic and Hawiye leaders to find a peaceful solution, though extremists, such as Hizb al Shabab, are opposed to any dialogue.

As the UN SRSG has pointed out, Somalia has a number of important factors in its favour, often lacking in conflict countries, namely a common language, religion and culture. Critical to the success of the SRSG’s approach has been encouraging the widest possible participation, including the UIC opposition, the business community and the diaspora.

Clan dynamics have become more stable since the anarchy of the early 90's. Somalia has a resilient economy. There are direct flights to across the region and traders can acquire all types of merchandise from around the world for those with money. Internet cafés are available, telephone calls are cheaper than most other places on the continent and families can transfer money around the globe easily. The ports receive food and consumer goods destined for the markets of Kenya and Ethiopia. The cattle markets also serve the region.

the appointments of the Puntland Vice President, Hassan Daahir “Afqurac” who is from the other main branch, the Mahamad Garaad. These groupings have further fragmented. In July 2007, certain Warsengeli leaders in Sanaag said that they were seceding to form the state of Maakhir, as they say that there was a lack of consultation by the TFG when signing an oil exploration deal. In September 2007, some leaders in Sool have talked about creating a state called Daraawiish. While there are shifting permutations of alliances, tension between Somaliland and Puntland grows.

II: UNDERLYING FACTORS

i) Conflict Dynamics

Among the complex factors driving the conflict in Somalia, the UN, in its 14th March 2008 report to the Security Council, identified the following as the most critical to address:

- The complete collapse of the central Government and the absence of a recent tradition in good governance and the rule of law;
- The manipulation of clan conflicts and the prominence of the clan structure in most aspects of coexistence, including power-sharing;
- The impact of factional conflicts on the political process, especially where they are linked to economic interests;
- The threats posed by the security sector, including 100,000 ex-combatants and militia and a steady flow of weapons despite the United Nations arms embargo;
- The fierce competition for resources, including access to water, grazing grounds and arable land, which in turn has produced multiple layers of displacement;
- The influence exerted by neighbouring countries on Somalia, including through military engagement that supports opposing sides in the conflict;
- The global counter-terrorism strategy which has a clear impact on the dynamics of the conflict as indicated by the origins of the Transitional Federal Government and the challenges to its legitimacy;
- The lack of accountability for funds provided to the TFG;
- The erosion of legitimacy of the TFG and its allies caused by the severe and widespread human rights abuses;
- The lack of accountability, for past and current crimes, which reinforces a sense of impunity and fuels further fighting;
- And the dire humanitarian situation which exacerbates the conflict and has generated more than 1 million internally displaced persons.

ii) Clan, Class And Political Islamicism

While clan divisions are often presented as the fundamental explanation for conflict and the intractable political situation in Somalia, the reality is more complex than that. Clans present the mechanism that leaders and socio-economic groups use to organise political and economic activities and mobilise militarily to maximise their interests. Thus, to understand clans and the Islamic courts, one must understand group interests. For example, during the late nineties, the power of warlords diminished compared to the early nineties, because many business leaders and clan elders saw a greater interest in having stability and reducing warlord power.



Clan Background: Like most political identity groupings (national, linguistic, ethnic), clans are imagined communities (in the Benedict Anderson sense, not illusionary or false, but a felt sense of association with others one may never meet). The Samaale clans (Darood; Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq), the Sab (Rahanweyn and Digil) and Cushitic (Shebele and Gabwing) are different branches of one common Cushitic tree. For populist purposes, some portray the Samaale clans as pure Somalis most associated with traditional pastoralism, while other groups are inferior (“Langaab”) and associated with other professions (from hunting to hairdressing).

Clan families extend back for 30 generations, clans for 20 and Diya groups for 4-8 generations (Diya is the blood-money paid by a group to compensate other groups for wrongs done by a member of the group) Diya groups vary in numbers between hundred to several thousand. Clans have very practical roles in facilitating collective action, acting as a community that provides help and protection and facilitating inter-clan relations. Groups negotiate Xeer (contracts) bilaterally with each other to govern non-kinship relationships. According to Xeer, groups compensate each other for offences at a rate denominated in camels, for Diya (blood money for a homicide) this is traditionally 100 camels, for dalliil (insults) this is generally less.

Within a clan, individual males retain considerable decision-making power. Leaders are generally charged with ending conflicts by negotiation or force and elders in the Shir (council) make strategic decisions. Distinctions between male elders in the Shir are only the prestige accorded to military prowess, wealth, piety, rhetoric or wisdom.

Ethnic Groups

Somalia's Clan Families and Major Subclans



Clans In Conflict: President Siad Barre's (in power after his coup in 1969 until 1991) policies during the eighties of turning Somalia into a police state and "divide-and-rule" approach to clans transformed the social role of clans into militarily important organisations. Barre destroyed all other civic organisations (eg trade unions), leaving only clans as an enduring organisational structure and means of providing in confidence in exchanges. In opposition to Barre, the Somali National Movement (SNM) turned to clans to mobilise fighters after its multi-clan army suffered heavy losses in 1988 and had to be turned into a federation of clan militias. Following 1988, the SNM became a primarily Isaaq movement, while Hawiye fighters joined the 2 branches of United Somali Congress (USC) led respectively by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi and army officers from Ogadeen clan formed the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

When Barre's regime collapsed, these large clan coalitions led by warlords fought for power and control of resources (including cities and ports) in the political vacuum, but were fundamentally unstable alliances. Hence in 1991 and 1992 they fragmented and USC groups fought other USC groups and SPM other SPM. At same time, groups from different clans started allying with each other, creating two main inter-clan forces. The international community's intervention froze the political situation temporarily as international actors gave seats at the conference table on the basis of clan, which prolonged the life of these large unstable coalitions. Leaders fought within their clans to increase their influence in negotiations with the international community and their role in any eventual government, which would bring with it the rents of statehood. These negotiations faced the critical problem that those at the table could generally not speak with authority for the fractious and shifting alliance they purported to represent.

Economic Interests: Understanding the underlying socioeconomic groups in Somali, which have their own history and particular interests, is key to understanding the rise and relative decline of the warlords commanding the large clan based alliances in the early nineties, the subsequent increase in stability and the Islamic Courts movement. Clans are the means that groups use to realise their interests and organise politically and socially, though naturally clan associations affect the perceptions of interests and interests the perception of clan. The nature of Barre's regime, the divide-and-rule policies and his use of state resources and privileges created conflicts of interest between groups in different regions.

In southern Somalia, there are the minority groups (Digil, Rahanweyn, Shebelle, Gabwing/Gabaweyn and Bantu groups) who farm along the rivers. Many of them lost their lands mainly to clansmen from Darod and Hawiye from northern Mogadishu who had state power and set up irrigated farms and banana plantations. This occurred during different periods (late colonial, post-independence and nineteen eighties). This turned many from these minorities into landless agricultural workers. In 1991-2, they supported the USC of General Mohamed Farah Aideed, because they hoped to recover lost land. The USC saviours actually turned out to be just a new set of occupiers. They were in turn were pushed out by Darod militias, who also revenged themselves upon the landless minority groups.

In the very large and important pastoral sector, which during the eighties provided 75% of Somalia's foreign income, there are a number of different economic groups. There are the trading agents and brokers concentrated in the Berbera port who control the trading networks that extend across Somalia and into Ethiopia and Kenya. There are also the herders, though now the trading networks own most of the livestock. Barre tried to control this economic system, but never succeeded, though he did establish government commercial agents. He also privileged and

redistributed in favour of his own Marehan clan over the Hawiye in central Somalia, through the drilling and assigning of water wells, grazing enclosures and seizing of cattle. This sharply raised inter-clan tension.

There are also tensions are those between pastoralists and agrarians over land, which worsening climatic and environmental factors are exacerbating. Again, such differences of interests often overlap with clan differences or groups turn to clans as a way of protecting their interests.

In the Bay and Bakool area, the Rahanweyn people, marginalised under Barre, formed the Rahanweyn Resistance Army to protect their interests. In Mogadishu, one of the important fault lines of conflict of interests is ownership of property. Many associates of Barre's regime still claim legal title to property that has now been occupied by others.

One of the vital sources of income helping people in Somalia is remittances. There is a complex system of international brokers that facilitates this. Again, in a stateless economy, other forms of trust must exist for this to work, so again people turn to clan or religious based networks to channel funds.

Somaliland in the early nineties escaped much of the violent chaos of the rest of the country for a variety of reasons. The intra-clan fractions fragmented almost completely allowing the Isaaq clan livestock traders to dominate and stabilise the region. These traders regulated and resolved resource disputes. This allowed for the creation of a new state in this region, based on a shared colonial history and within pre-established borders. Finally, as the international community did not recognise Somaliland, there were no statehood rents to fight for.

Islamicism And The Islamic Courts: While Somalia is almost entirely Islamic (mostly Sufists, but with growing Salafist influence coming mainly from Saudi Arabia), political movements defining themselves primarily religiously have not historically been a major force, despite the long period of statelessness and protracted conflicts. Fundamentalist movements have also not developed major followings. The rise of the Islamic Courts is due to a propitious set of historical, political and economic circumstances. Within the Union of Islamic Courts, there is, as within any religious organisation, a range of different political and religious positions.

In the early nineties, when there was a great deal of violence and many civilians were killed for their clan associations, some turned to Islam as a way of escaping this. However, even the mosques of Mogadishu were not safe from the violence. Different types of Islamicist and Islamic political groups established themselves, but with limited followings. During the nineties, using international connections and finance, some Islamic philanthropic financial services and charities also set up (eg al Islaah).

In the mid-nineties, an Islamicist organisation, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (profile in Appendix II), established its own militia force and took over the Gedo area in the Upper Jubba Valley, after having failed to displace the clans in Bosaso and Merca. To do so, it had to work with the clan structure, allying itself with the Gabwing who had been dispossessed by the Marehan, but it set up a non-clan administration. This administration was praised for bringing stability to the area and treating the population fairly. Many sources have said that Al-Itihaad was linked to various Ethiopian anti-government guerilla and terrorist movements and attacks and to al-Qa'ida, though Dahir Aweys continues to deny this. Over time,

it fell out of touch with local clans and in 1996, the Ethiopian army overran its headquarters in Luuq, among those killed were 23 foreign militants. This was the effective end of al-Itihaad.

Mogadishu has not had since 1991 a single public authority running it. By the late nineties, a mixture of warlords' militias, businessmen's private security firms, neighbourhood civil defence militias and clan-based Islamic court militias guarded different neighbourhoods. To reduce crime and create stability, local businessmen financed the clan based Islamic Courts that elders oversaw and Sufi clerics ran. They proved successful in bringing stability, law and order to small clan neighbourhoods.

In 2000, the Courts established a Sharia Implementation Council to facilitate inter-clan court issues, such as prisoner exchanges. Dahir Aweys became its Secretary General. In 2004, there was a Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) with a Supreme Council of Islamic Courts headed by Sheikh Shariff Sheikh Ahmed, a traditionalist Sufi and considered a moderate, who had helped set up a Court in his neighbourhood after the kidnapping of a small boy. Of the 13 clan based courts, 11 were considered moderate, but two were linked to radical militias who had been accused of assassinations.

iii) Regional/Global Factors In The Conflict

Ethiopia, Eritrea And Other Regional Actors

Ethiopia: Ethiopian foreign policy is concerned about three sets of threats. The first is strategic challenges posed by other regional powers and the potential emergence of a hostile Islamicist state. The second are immediate threats posed by neighbouring states. The final set include the threats posed by internal insurgencies. Somalia is an issue which cuts across this three concentric rings. Ethiopian intervention in Somalia should be understood as a strategic response to deal with these different types of perceived threats.

Some opponents to the country and to its foreign policy interventions have characterised it as a Christian state in pursuit of sea access and territorial expansion and a pawn of the US in the war on terror. This is rather simplistic analysis that overestimates US influence and underestimates Ethiopian interests and strategy. While Ethiopia is religiously tolerant (Muslims make up some 30-40% of its population and hold public office at all levels), the Government is concerned about Islamicist opposition internally and the possibility of having a hostile, hardline Islamicist state in Somalia. Somali is of strategic importance as Ethiopia lost its direct access to the sea with the independence of Eritrea.

Ethiopia has struck in Somalia militarily in 1996 and 1997, when al Ittihaad al Islaami was linked to attacks in Ethiopia. It saw its intervention since December 2006 as a response both to UIC hardliners' support to Ethiopian insurgency groups, particularly the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogadeen National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF – an Islamicist successor to al Ittihaad al Islaami), as well as to support the TFG against the UIC. The Oromo and Ogadeen people are found on both sides of the Ethiopian border and hardline elements of the UIC have called for recovering parts of Ethiopian territory that were once part of Somalia (Somalia and Ethiopia had three wars in the sixties and seventies). Thus, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's response should be understood both in the context of Somali's strategic importance and domestic political pressure.

Ethiopia-Eritrea: The tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia remain high since the 1998-2000 war. This helps distract attention from the internal political problems facing both governments and keeps both countries in a high state of mobilisation. Eritrean President Isseyas Afeworki is particularly frustrated that the international community has not forced Ethiopia to demarcate the border, despite an international ruling awarding Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia's reluctance reflects Zenawi's concern about the domestic political reaction. Eritrea has drastically restricted the operations of the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMEE in its territory.

As well as his opposition to Sudan, Afeworki has supported opponents to Ethiopia, hosting them in Asmara, including the OLF, ONLF and the UWSLF. He has also supported the UIC and played host to the Somali opposition, the Asmara group. Experts suggest that Eritrea's support for the UIC included surface-to-air missiles; ammunition, training and advisors. In return, Ethiopia has been charged with supporting the Eritrean opposition umbrella group, the Eritrean Democratic Alliance.

Regional Actors: Most of the regional states have their interests and are more or less active on the Somali question. While the development of a regional strategy for water use via the World Bank sponsored Nile Basin Initiative has helped reduce tension between Ethiopia and Egypt, rivalry for influence in the Horn of Africa continues. Ethiopia opposed the Egyptian sponsored Somali peace process at the beginning of the millennium. Kenya played host to the peace process that spawned the TFG, which Ethiopia and Djibouti heavily supported. Many of the Gulf states are said to be supporting the UIC. Yemen has been supportive of peace process initiatives. Many of these regional actors support different groups within Somalia.

The War On Terror: The US Government has a variety of interests in the Horn of Africa and Somalia. It has been providing humanitarian aid and supporting the peace process, the TFG, and AMISOM. This will be discussed further in the next section. Ethiopia is an important US ally in the region and the US provided support for the Ethiopian intervention. Counter-terrorism is one of America's main foreign policy objectives in the region. Particularly since 11th September 2001, it views the lack of governmental control in Somalia as a major security problem as this creates an area in which terrorists can move and operate with impunity. The US has identified Somalia as a preparation site for the August 1998 Kenya and Tanzania US embassy bombings.

To counter terrorism and terrorists, the US military established a major base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The US had supported the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism to help in this fight. As explained earlier, the UIC defeated this group when extending its power. The US had initially welcomed the stability brought by the UIC, but the UIC's unwillingness to address the question of terrorists in its midst lost it this support.

The US has also launched periodic air and missile strikes against armed groups and individuals in Somalia that it has linked to Al-Qaida. The most recent strike killed Adan Hashi Farah Ayro, after a previous strike had wounded him. Ethiopia is also a front-line ally in the fight against terrorism.

The US is keen to interdict Al-Qaida in Somalia. Both Ethiopia and the TFG have stressed that there are strong links between their opponents and Al-Qaida. These are largely denied by their opponents, who also say that a number of these strikes have killed civilians. Given the vested interests of the parties, the truth of the claims, denials and counter claims is far from evident. It is also unclear whether various actors are exaggerating claims to gain the support of others.

III: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND AID

i) On-Going International Support

Peace Process: There are a number of international actors involved in supporting the search for a solution to the current crisis and responding to the humanitarian emergency. Key partners established the International Contact Group, which includes the EC, Sweden, Italy, Norway, the UK, the US, the AU, the World Bank and the United Nations and meets on a regular basis to coordinate international support to the TFG, for the peace process and for humanitarian relief.

EU: The EU has been playing an important role in Somalia peace and development processes. It has closely engaged in the IGAD led peace process, the Khartoum dialogue and the consolidation of the TFIs. In June 2007, the Commission appointed a Special Envoy for Somalia who is currently based in Nairobi and directly engaging with the TFIs and other actors in order to drive the peace process forward. First the French followed by the Danish navy have been protecting international humanitarian and commercial shipping against attacks by pirates.

UN: The UN SRSG, Ould-Abdallah, has in addition to brokering and mediating the talks between the opposing sides, has been coordinating international support and bringing together the various special envoys. For the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC), this was done via the International Advisory Committee and in coordination with the National Governance and Reconciliation Committee⁸. He also plays an important role in the International Contact Group. UNDP provided \$8 million in technical and financial assistance to the NRC, with assistance on gender issues from UNFPA.

In October 2007, the international community agreed to developing a harmonised approach under UN leadership, which includes: .1) developing an international plan of action including with external actors to the conflict; .2) engaging a national base, including the TFI's, the opposition, civil society, the private sector, diaspora and others; .3) putting into action the what was agreed at the National Reconciliation Congress; .4) reforming and stabilising the security sector; .5) and improving international coordination.

AMISOM: Mandated by both the AU and the UN, the AMISOM has only 31% of its authorised strength of 8,000. This essentially limits it to providing protection to the TFG in Mogadishu. The main constraint is finding countries willing to contribute troops. So far Uganda has contributed the bulk of the force and Burundi has contributed a battalion. The US has provided considerable support to AMISOM, particularly bilaterally to Uganda. The EU Africa Peace Facility has provided €15 million AMISOM and further support is being considered under the Stability Instrument to support the AU Strategic Management and Planning Capability for AMISOM. Overall, the US and EU (including member states bilaterally) have each given approximately US \$51 million.

International Community Development Assistance: In 2005, international and Somali partners agreed to carry out a Joint Needs Assessment and prepare a common development plan. The UN and World Bank then coordinated the preparation of the five year Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), based on this needs assessment. Denmark, the European Commission, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom agreed and adopted this

⁸ The later is chaired by Ali Mahdi, a former USC leader.

approach and wrote an EU + Norway country strategy for the 2008-13, for implementation of the RDP. The EU is the largest single donor in Somalia. The RDP's objectives are:

- Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance
- Strengthening essential basic services and social protection
- Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth to expand employment and reduce poverty.

This is a MDG oriented approach that includes a focus on vulnerable groups (especially women and IDP's), varies by region according to the differing development needs and adheres to the Fragile States initiative and OECD/DAC principles for donor coordination and improving the effectiveness of international assistance.

In August 2002, the EC adopted a "Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007" (SISAS) with a dual objective: to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and promotion of a peaceful, equitable and democratic society, particularly to improve:

- Civil society representation of common interests at local level;
- Local community access to sustainable basic social infrastructure;
- Local communities access to sustainable productive resources and services.

Under SISAS, the EC implemented the 4th Rehabilitation Programme (€50 million), the 5th Rehabilitation Programme (€100 million) and the Somalia Recovery Programme I (70 million). Approved in July 2007, the Somalia Recovery Programme II provides an essential bridging package to allow EC funded operations to continue until EDF 10.⁹

Under EDF 10, the EC will continue to focus on: governance and security; education and economic growth; and rural development.¹⁰ Somalia is a target country for the food security thematic programme, with an initial allocation of €12 million for the period 2007-2010. Resources from the Non-State Actor thematic programme shall be allocated to promote the creation of appropriate space and opportunity for civil society and the private sector to contribute to policy decision making and strategic priority setting.

It is hard to identify all of the bilateral aid given the TFI's. As part of the commitment from the League of Arab States, Yemen and Algeria have contributed funding, as had Saudi Arabia, Kenya and China.

Challenges: A central challenge for all donors providing assistance to the assistance to Somalia and particularly the TFI's is of transparency of how the funds are used, who the recipients are and what the results of the funded activities are. The Monitoring Group on Somalia assessing the arms embargo identifies cases where there may have been double funding of initiatives by

⁹ The Joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers in May 2007 (Decision No 3/2007 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 25 May 2007) approved SRP-II and the additional resources by amending Decision No 3/2001 on the allocation of resources to Somalia from the Eighth and Ninth European Development Fund. The SRP II anticipates many of the areas of intervention under the EU + Norway Joint Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2008-13 for Somalia. It also paves the way for innovative interventions in the education sector and rural development and pastoralism.

¹⁰ In addition to resources from the European Development Fund, there have been projects financed by other budget lines, such as the Banana Budget Line and Mines Budget Line.

different donors. Increased transparency of TFI utilisation of funds and responsibility of politicians and officials is important both for the effectiveness of these institutions and continued international support. Given the on-going conflict and the large war economy, it is extremely important to ensure that aid is not used to finance conflict.

Governance: International partners are supporting the improvement of governance by existing and new Somali institution, particularly the Transitional Federal Institutions, local governance structures and rule of law and security organisations. The main donors include the EC, DFID, Norway, Italy, Sweden, Denmark and USAID. Different organisations use this funding to help build local capacity.

UNDP is assisting institutions at both the Federal and the local levels: the Transitional Federal Institutions; the executive; the constitutional process; diaspora provided technical assistance; civil service strengthening; local governance and reconciliation structures; and law enforcement, the judiciary, DDR, human rights organisations and mine action. UNHABITAT is supporting the local administration; ILO is providing assistance to intensive local employment activities; the World Bank; and AWEPA and NDI are supporting the Transitional Federal Parliament.

Education: UNICEF is providing 368 school tents to locations across the country, supporting the building of 22 schools in the north east, providing desks and benches for 3,000 students and equipping schools with educational material for the benefit of nearly 400,000 students.

Humanitarian Assistance: From 2003-2006, funding for Somalia from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) has totalled € 29.5 million, additionally in 2006 EUR 5 million were provided for food aid assistance to the victims of the drought from the food security budget line. ECHO has focussed its support on health, nutrition, water and sanitation, livestock, food security and support to the internally displaced.¹¹

European Commission humanitarian aid helps about 960,000 of the most vulnerable people in Somalia, with various projects which include funding hospitals, helping people displaced by fighting to meet their basic needs, feeding malnourished children, providing clean water, supporting agricultural and pastoral recovery with seeds, livestock and veterinary support.

Health and nutrition: Health projects funded by the Commission's Humanitarian Aid department directly helped about 245,000 people in 2005, of which some 60,000 were given in-patient treatment. Life-saving health and nutrition programmes include war surgery, therapeutic feeding and cholera treatment.

¹¹ From 2003-2005, funding for Somalia from the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) totalled €19.5 million. The main areas of intervention are health and nutrition, water and sanitation, livestock and food security to assist about one million beneficiaries at present. The main goal is to maintain - and where possible, improve - the health and nutritional status of beneficiaries.

ECHO funding decisions for Somalia:

2003 – € 1.35 m
2004 – € 9.15 m
2005 – € 9 m
2006 – € 10 m

UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO) are focused on reducing the mortality of children under the age of 5 by 15% in the next 2 years with a target group of 1.8 million infants and 1.6 million women. UNICEF and WHO conduct immunisation days, including for polio and measles. UNFPA supports maternal health clinics and trains nurses. UNICEF provides anti-malarial treatment to maternal health centres. WHO and UNOPS help rehabilitate health facilities and build TFI health capacity.

Food security: Providing support to some 680,000 people in 2005, ECHO-funded projects ensure milk supply and preserved livestock numbers through veterinary treatment and vaccination. In addition, improved irrigation for riverine farmers and the distribution of seeds increased crop production. Fishing equipment was distributed to coastal and riverside fishing communities which enabled families to raise their incomes. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) leads the coordination group, which has a programme to rebuild the livelihoods of displaced populations (including restoring assets, eg livestock to pastoralists).

Water and sanitation: ECHO funds partners' work to increase the quantity and quality of water and sanitation for about 22,000 people. Nation wide, the rehabilitation of urban and rural water systems has increased the access to safe water for 30,000 people. UNICEF is training local committees to manage the new systems, to increase education about sanitation and hygiene, build facilities in schools and chlorinate water sources. WHO has worked to contain diarrhoea and cholera outbreaks in south-central Somalia.

Displacement And Shelter: UNHCR and the UN Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT) work on providing emergency shelter, improving the settlements of internally displaced people (IDP's) and finding permanent shelter.

HIV/AIDS and Gender Based Violence: The UN agencies work on advocacy, education, counselling and treatment with national multi-sectoral AIDS commissions, with the support of UNAIDS and the Global Fund. With the on-going conflict, rape and gender based violence count among the most common human rights violations. UN and humanitarian agencies are working to raise awareness and improve prevention and response, but a much greater national response is required and for military forces to prosecute offenders.

ii) Future Scenarios, Needs And Options

The UN has identified a number of key outcomes in its 14th March Secretary General's Report:

- *Outcome 1:* viable political process (foster and sustain structured dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition; manage regional political, security and economic interests in support of a political process)
- *Outcome 2:* minimum level of security (build Somali security capability; plan, prepare and deploy an international presence to stabilize conditions in support of a political process)
- *Outcome 3:* strengthened federal institutions (accelerate capacitybuilding for the Transitional Federal Government/transitional federal institutions and help demonstrate progress in the transition; assist the Transitional Federal Government in facilitating economic recovery and service delivery; foster national cohesion through strengthened federal institutions)
- *Outcome 4:* established local governance (support local reconciliation and governance institution-building, including participation of women and youth; link local governance with

rule of law institutions, locally and federally; build capacity for local government, support land dispute resolution)

- *Outcome 5*: humanitarian needs met, economic recovery and basic services provided (provide impartial humanitarian assistance; provide basic services on a recovery basis including health and education; strengthen existing and explore alternative livelihoods; involve business community in developing economy of peace)

On 14 March, the Secretary-General presented proposals for a broader UN strategic perspective for Somalia and contingency peacekeeping plans. The strategy comprises three pillars—political, security and programmatic—and envisages four phases and related activities around those three pillars, including:

- first, facilitate UN support for political reconciliation by gradually relocating UN staff to south-central Somalia (options for security for UN personnel are still being developed), strengthen AMISOM and reach agreement on an agenda for reconciliation talks. (The Secretary-General also recommended that the Council strengthen the mandate and capacity of UNPOS, authorise a “coalition of willing partners” to secure key areas and perhaps establish a maritime task force);
- secondly, after political dialogue is established with initial support from 60-70 percent of Somali actors, move UNPOS to Mogadishu and table a proposal for Ethiopian withdrawal;
- thirdly, after a broad-based political agreement, including a code of conduct on use of arms and a phased Ethiopian withdrawal, begin deployment of an 8,000-strong impartial stabilisation force to complement AMISOM; and
- fourthly, when political agreements and the security situation are consolidated, and there is clear support from local actors for UN deployments, begin deployment of a 30,000-strong UN peacekeeping operation.

Options For The European Parliament: To support the outlined approach above and the peace process and to respond to the humanitarian and development needs, the European Parliament could take the steps below:

- Call upon Member States and the Commission to support the peace initiatives of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and ensure their activities are coordinated by his office, so the international community speaks with a single, effective voice;
- Increase awareness of the situation to encourage international re-engagement and support, including via hearings and seminars (possibly jointly with the US Congress or Senate);
- Ask the Council to examine the feasibility of the EU providing an interim stabilisation force (a Battle Group or other force) and increasing the operational capability of the AMISOM with the provision of equipment, technical assistance and airlift support;
- Call upon Member States to support the creation of a UN coordinated international maritime force to protect humanitarian and commercial ships from piracy, as France and Denmark have already been doing, and help enforce the arms embargo;
- Suggest that Member States and the Commission increase support for the reform of the security sector to address one of the fundamental issues for sustainable peace;
- Invite a mix of parliamentarians and clerks from the Transitional Federal Parliament to Brussels for a seminar for an exchange of parliamentary experience and skills with the European Parliament, supported by the External Policy Directorate General;

- Call for more regional engagement, including by the AU and the Arab League, to address the situation by supporting democratic dialogue nationally and by involving neighbouring states in a parallel regional dialogue.

APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS (Source: UN security Council)

20 March 2008	The Secretary-General's Special Representative Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet briefed the Council. Ould-Abdallah argued that the Council should consider, alongside AMISOM, a "strong interim multi-national presence."
14 March 2008	The Secretary-General presented proposals for a broader UN strategic perspective for Somalia and contingency peacekeeping plans.
12 March 2008	The Transitional Federal Government said it was "ready to reconcile with any Somali citizen," and that negotiations could take place at "any location" under Ould-Abdallah's mediation.
3 March 2008	The US launched strikes at an alleged al-Qaeda target in southern Somalia, reportedly an al-Shabaab commander.
20 February 2008	AU Commissioner Alpha Konaré presented proposals for a UN assistance package from AMISOM.
20 February 2008	The Council adopted resolution 1801 , which, inter alia, renewed the Council's authorisation for AMISOM for six months and affirmed the Council's intention to meet to discuss further action on Somalia.
15 February 2008	The Council heard a briefing by the Secretariat, where the preliminary findings of the Secretariat's recent fact-finding mission to Somalia were presented. Somali and AU representatives made an urgent plea to the Council at an open meeting, calling for future UN takeover of peacekeeping responsibilities in Somalia. AU Permanent Observer Lila H. Ratsifandrihamanana also called for UN assistance to AMISOM in the meantime, noting that the AU plans to hold a high-level meeting to refocus international attention on Somalia and mobilise support for the political process.
8-9 February 2008	Four grenades were thrown at the UN compound in Mogadishu. No casualties were reported.
Early February 2008	Denmark took over naval anti-piracy patrols from France for two months, providing protection for UN food shipments, the World Food Programme reported. The new Somali Prime Minister, Nur Hassan Hussein, appears to have initiated dialogue with various stakeholders including opposition groups, but details remain unclear. The Prime Minister has seemingly indicated his willingness to talk to the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia.
15 January 2008	The sanctions Committee heard a briefing by the Monitoring Group on its recent interim report. The Group continued to note mounting violations of the arms embargo as well as the rise of the al-Shabaab, which appeared to receive regional and international assistance.
Mid-January 2008	The AU renewed AMISOM for six months. After significant delays, a Burundian contingent of about 630 troops was reportedly deployed in recent weeks to reinforce AMISOM. It is unclear if and when pledges from Nigeria and Ghana will materialise. Funding reportedly stands at about 5 percent of AMISOM's budget of \$622 million.
Early January 2008	Somali Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein announced his new cabinet. The regional situation further deteriorated with political instability in Kenya and the dangerous standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
17-19 December 2007	The Secretary-General's Special Representative Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah presented a bleak picture of Somalia after 17 years of crisis and urged immediate action on two tracks to address political and security issues. The Council responded to Ould-Abdallah's briefing with a presidential statement setting a deadline of 8 February for the Secretary-General to report on the issue.
16 December 2007	Prime Minister Hussein dismissed his entire cabinet after parliament rejected the new line-up.
24 November 2007	The transitional parliament confirmed the appointment of Nur Hassan Hussein as prime minister. Hussein, a Hawiye in accordance with the existing power-sharing formula and former Somali Red Crescent senior officer, is reportedly considered a neutral and conciliatory figure.
19 November 2007	The Council responded to the Secretary-General in a statement which insisted that contingency planning should continue as part of an enhanced UN integrated strategy, while recognising the need for greater support for AMISOM.

mid-November 2007	The Somali parliament adopted legislation to allow non-parliamentarians to be appointed to cabinet positions, a move considered essential for ensuring a more effective cabinet with widespread support.
7 November 2007	The Secretary-General's latest report said conditions for successful UN peacekeeping in Somalia did not yet exist. Instead, it suggested a multinational force to increase security and allow for Ethiopian withdrawal. (Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah suggested in mid-November that justice measures, including referral to the International Criminal Court, also be considered.) The Secretary-General also urged the Council to consider measures on the regional dimensions of the Somali crisis.
29 October 2007	Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi resigned before parliament.
Mid-October 2007	TFG security forces arrested and detained for five days the head of the World Food Programme (WFP) office in Mogadishu , leading to a halt in WFP food distribution in the capital.
17 September 2007	TFG officials and many clan leaders met in Jeddah under Saudi Arabian auspices to sign the National Reconciliation Conference's outcome. The meeting also called for the deployment of an Arab-African force under UN aegis to replace Ethiopian troops and reinforce peacekeeping in Somalia.
Early September	The opposition held its own meeting in Asmara under Eritrean facilitation. The "Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia" was then established. Its central committee would include the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), with 40 percent of the seats, former MPs with 25 percent and the diaspora with 16 percent. The Alliance vowed to fight Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops in Somalia, and criticised the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for taking sides.
30 August 2007	The National Reconciliation Conference wound up its work , after weeks of negotiation under persistent insurgent attacks. It reached agreement on an outcome document that included provisions for social reconciliation and the preparation of a roadmap to elections in 2009, in fulfilment of the Transitional Federal Charter.
20 August 2007	The Council unanimously adopted resolution 1772 authorising the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to continue its operation for another six months. The Council also stated its intention in resolution 1772 to take unspecified measures against those threatening the peace process, the transitional government, AMISOM, or undermining stability in Somalia or the region.
25 July 2007	The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) stated that the reconciliation conference was open to all, including rebel legislators based in Asmara and insurgent fighters. It seemed, however, that the TFG had not satisfied concerns that the agenda was sufficiently open or the safety of delegates could be assured.
18 July 2007	The AU Peace and Security Council adopted a communiqué on Somalia renewing AMISOM for six months and appealing for transition to a UN peacekeeping operation. It also called for a UN assistance package for AMISOM.
15 July 2007	A reconciliation conference opened in Mogadishu after two postponements. About 1,000 delegates attended but it was then suspended and marred by security problems.
28 June 2007	In a private Council debate, Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi reiterated calls from the TFG for a transition from AMISOM to a UN operation. Gedi renewed TFG pledges for an all-inclusive reconciliation conference.
19 June 2007	The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) announced an amnesty for insurgents-except for those involved in international terrorism-and the release of prisoners.
14 June 2007	Under Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe briefed the Security Council on his trip to Somalia. He reportedly underscored that the Somalia situation requires an increase in international troops on the ground so that Ethiopia can withdraw, greater Transitional Federal Government (TFG) contact with the opposition and a more constructive role by neighbours.
early June 2007	Under Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe visited Somalia.
early June 2007	International Contact Group agreed on an action plan to support efforts on reconciliation and improvements to African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)'s funding mechanism.
late April 2007	A major offensive by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops to stabilise Mogadishu began.

February 2007	The Council authorised African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).
December 2006-January 2007	Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces overran the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).
October- November 2006	The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) encircled the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) at its sole outpost, Baidoa. Ethiopian troops began amassing along the border.
25 September 2006	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Somalia called for exemptions to the arms embargo at a Council meeting. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of Kismayo.
18 September 2006	President Yusuf suffered an assassination attempt.
13 September 2006	The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council formally endorsed IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)'s mission plan.
5 September 2006	The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) reached an agreement on joint security forces. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) adopted a revised IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) mission plan.
29 August 2006	The Contact Group met in Stockholm.
21 August 2006	The new 31-member cabinet was appointed.
7 August 2006	A compromise among President Yusuf, Parliament Speaker Aden and Prime Minister Gedi led to the dissolution of the 42-member Prime Minister's cabinet.
30 July 2006	Prime Minister Gedi very narrowly survived a no-confidence vote.
21 July 2006	The Contact Group called on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) to resume talks and to make them more inclusive.
13 July 2006	The Council expressed support for the TFI's and willingness to consider the African Union (AU)'s request for an exemption to the arms embargo.
5-9 July 2006	A joint fact-finding mission made up of the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arab League visited Somalia to assess the possibility of deploying troops to the country.
22 June 2006	The first round of talks between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), facilitated by the Arab League, took place in Khartoum.
15 June 2006	At its first meeting, the Contact Group expressed support for the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) framework and for dialogue.
14 June 2006	The National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP) was adopted by the Transitional Federal Parliament.
13 June 2006	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) decided to make a list of individuals "involved in illegal use of arms" and to apply individual sanctions (such as assets freeze and travel bans) against "all warlords."
early June 2006	The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) had seized control of Mogadishu and Jowhar from the coalition of warlords known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism.
September 2005	Somaliland held internationally monitored elections.
June 2005	The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) moved to Jowhar.
May 2005	The African Union (AU) authorised IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM).
April 2005	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) decided to send troops to Somalia.

10 October 2004	Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected president and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established.
July 2002	The Panel of Experts was requested.
April 1995	UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established.
November 1994	The Council decided to terminate UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) by March 1995.
February 1994	UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)'s troop levels were decreased.
October 1993	18 US Rangers were killed and their bodies mutilated, while 75 more were wounded. The US announced withdrawal from Somalia by March 1994.
June 1993	Pakistani troops were attacked, 24 were killed.
March 1993	UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established.
December 1992	The Council authorised United Nations Task Force (UNITAF).
April 1992	UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) and a Sanctions Committee were established.
January 1992	The Council imposed an arms embargo.
1991	Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence.

**APPENDIX II:
PROFILES OF KEY POLITICAL FIGURES (Source: BBC)
ABDULLAHI YUSUF AHMED, PRESIDENT OF THE TFG**

Somalia's President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was chosen by the parliament set up in 2004 after years of peace talks in neighbouring Kenya.

However, he has not been able to achieve his goal of bringing peace to the country for the first time since 1991. He has long been an ally of neighbouring Ethiopia and a foe of Somalia's Islamists. In December 2006, he asked Ethiopia to help him oust an Islamist group that had taken power in the capital, Mogadishu, and in much of southern Somalia. But this foreign intervention has been deeply unpopular at home and he has not been able to wipe out the Islamists. They continue to stage attacks on government and Ethiopian targets, who have responded by shelling residential areas. Some 60% of Mogadishu's one million residents have fled their homes. Mr Yusuf has survived several assassination attempts. In Somalia's clan-based politics, he has always suffered the disadvantage of not having a power base in the capital. He is from the Darod clan family (Majerteen sub-clan of the Harti), based in the northern Puntland region, while the Hawiyes dominate the capital. He has always named a Hawiye prime minister but this is not enough for some elders from this clan. Some gunmen from Hawiye militias have joined the ranks of the insurgents. Born in December 1934, Mr Yusuf is a military strongman and former president of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. An army commander in the 1960s who studied in Italy and the former Soviet Union, Mr Yusuf was jailed for refusing to take part in the military coup led by fellow officer Siad Barre in 1969. In prison, he spent time with the late Somali warlord, Mohamed Farah Aideed. Mr Yusuf was released in 1975 and three years later, he headed the first attempt to overthrow the Somali dictator. The attempt failed and Mr Yusuf was forced to flee to neighbouring Kenya. From there he led a guerrilla movement aimed at unseating Barre, obtaining support from Ethiopia - which at that time was at war with Somalia. However, he fell out with the Ethiopians over their claim to Somali areas, and was jailed in Addis Ababa in 1985. Mr Yusuf was only released when Ethiopia's Soviet-backed regime fell in 1991. Since then he has received backing from Addis Ababa. In the 1990s he returned to his native Puntland, and soon emerged as the region's pre-eminent leader. Mr Yusuf sought to escape the anarchy that characterised Somalia since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, and declared the region autonomous in 1998. He was a member of an Ethiopian-backed coalition of warlords that blocked previous attempt at restoring order. As a result of this opposition, the authority of the Transitional National Government (TNG) formed in 2000 was undermined. In 2001 he was deposed in Puntland, but recaptured the territory a year later - some say thanks to backing from Ethiopia. While in power in Puntland, he chased away the al-Itihaad al-Islamiya Islamist militant group, which included Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Mr Aweys, accused of having terrorist links by the US, was one of those ousted from Mogadishu in December 2006 and remains one of Mr Yusuf's bitterest opponents. Mr Yusuf's approach to leadership has been described as authoritarian - and many of his opponents in Puntland have been sacked, jailed or even killed. One of his friends said: "You're either with the colonel or you are an enemy". He is a non-smoker and non-drinker and is married with four children. In the 1990s, he needed a liver transplant and is still not viewed as being in robust health.

PRIME MINISTER NUR HASSAN HUSSEIN, "NUR ADDE"

After a long search, President Abdullahi Yusuf has opted for a seasoned humanitarian worker to replace Mohammed Ghedi as the prime minister of Somalia.

Col Nur Hassan Hussein - also known as Nur Adde - was the eventual compromise candidate selected from a long list of politicians and technocrats whose names were being considered for the position. The appointment needed careful analysis by President Yusuf as he needed to kill two birds with one stone: to impress the Hawiye clan, while also retaining control of his fragile administration. Col Nur Adde hails from the Mudulood sub-clan of the Abgal, itself part of the Hawiye clan which dominates the affairs of Mogadishu and the central regions of Somalia. The 69-year-old former military officer began his career

in the Italian colonial police force in Somalia in the early 1950s and served in a special unit to protect tax revenues called the "Guardia Di Finanza". Nur Adde studied law at the Nation University - Jamacadda Ummadda - in Mogadishu and later attended several police academies in Italy and the US, where he specialised in criminal investigation and international law. With this experience and training he rose through the ranks to become the deputy chairman of the so-called Salvation Court - a military-court - which tried tax evaders and other financial crimes suspects during former President Siad Barre's rule. After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, Nur Adde became the chairman of the Somali Red Crescent society, a post which he still holds. He is widely credited for professionalising the organisation and turning it into an effective tool to tackle some of the humanitarian disasters Somalia has suffered in the last 17 years of anarchy. Despite this uphill task, Col Adde has managed to steer clear of the political minefield - a trait that political observers argue may be his greatest asset as President Yusuf struggles to improve the image of his transitional government. Foreign diplomats believe he could be a safe pair of hands for the job, given his experience working with international partners during his career as manager of a relief aid organisation

PROFILE: ALI MOHAMED GHEDI

He was portrayed as a man with no political skeletons - an intellectual with a clean slate who could foster reconciliation between the warring clans of Somalia.

But many wondered whether Mohammed Ali Ghedi was politically skilled enough to be the prime minister that could end a long-running civil war - and in his three-year stint he failed to achieve peace. He first became known as a campaigner in the reconciliation process as the founding member and president of the Somalia NGO Consortium, an umbrella group of non-governmental organisations in Somalia. But whereas some painted him as an intellectual, not a politician, with no military background, others claimed he was his father's son with a history steeped in intelligence, military service and close links to the current Ethiopian President, Meles Zenawi. The 56-year-old owed his position to his bloodline: the son of a colonel in the Somali National Security Service (NSS) under the reign of Siad Barre, born into the Abgal subclan of Somalia's most powerful clan, the Hawiye. He was hand-picked as prime minister by President Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf (who is from Somalia's second biggest clan, the Darod) at a time when he did not even have a seat in Somalia's parliament-in-exile. It was hoped he would be able to unite the Mogadishu Hawiye factions behind the transitional government. But he never managed this, and whilst in office survived a number of assassination attempts and votes of no-confidence. Sceptics portrayed Mr Ghedi as a puppet of the United States and its ally Ethiopia. Numerous sources pointed to links between Mr Ghedi's father and Ethiopia's president Meles Zenawi, claiming that in the mid 1980s, Mr Ghedi's father was assigned as coordinator between the Somali government of the day and Meles Zenawi, the then head of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). It is alleged that Mohammed Ali Ghedi, who completed his military service in the 1970s, was recruited by the NSS while in secondary school and worked for them at college, reporting on his fellow students. After graduating in 1978 from the veterinary school at the University of Mogadishu, Mr Ghedi had a two-year scholarship at the University of Pisa before returning as a lecturer and subsequently a departmental head at the Veterinary School in Mogadishu where he served until the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991. When civil war broke out, Mr Ghedi went into exile, mostly in Ethiopia and Kenya where he served as a consultant in various regional livestock bodies in East Africa. His official biography stressed that he was not linked to any armed group during the war and was not a military man. But some sources say that at the time of the power struggle between notorious Somali warlords Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi in 1991-1992, Mr Ghedi was first linked to Ali Mahdi before the two men fell out, after which Mr Ghedi criticised him publicly at a news conference.

For whatever reason, the Hawiye clan apparently distrusted Mr Ghedi as much as the president and the Ethiopians, and it became clear he could not persuade them to stop backing the Islamist insurrection. And this in the end meant he was on borrowed time. Diplomats and analysts say that unless the Hawiye are allowed a say in who replaces Mr Ghedi, there will be no respite from the current violence which has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee Mogadishu.

SHEIKH HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is one of the leaders of the Islamist group which controls much of southern Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu.

The United States says it will refuse to deal with him - he has been on the US list of people "linked to terrorism" since shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Mr Aweys has been named to head the Union of Islamic Courts' Shura, a consultative body, while Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, previously chairman, now heads the executive committee. It is still not clear which man is more powerful. A former army colonel, Mr Aweys was put on the US list because he used to head al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, an Islamist militant group accused of having links to al-Qaeda in the 1990s. Mr Aweys, 61, however, strongly denies the US allegations. "It is not proper to put somebody on a list of terrorists who has not killed or harmed anybody," he told the AFP news agency. "I am not a terrorist. But if strictly following my religion and love for Islam makes me a terrorist, then I will accept the designation". I met him in 2004 in his large, well-maintained family house set down a labyrinth of dirt tracks in a middle class Mogadishu suburb, over the road from the mosque where he preaches. Sitting cross-legged on the floor, talking softly and calmly and often smiling through his red, henna-stained beard, the small, elderly man did not give the impression of being a terrorist mastermind. Children were happily running around the house and courtyard, until Mr Aweys shooed them away while I interviewed him. Afterwards, he tried to convert me to Islam but I managed to avoid this by asking him to pray for me. He moved around quite openly in Mogadishu, albeit in a convoy of armed guards, including a technical - a truck with an anti-aircraft gun mounted on the back. But in lawless Mogadishu, such extensive security is not exceptional for those who can afford it. BBC Mogadishu correspondent Hassan Barise says that despite being on the US list, he has been able to travel abroad quite freely - to Saudi Arabia and Dubai, without being arrested. He has always denied allegations that he was running training camps for Islamist fighters in Somalia. "No-one here is fighting against the US," he said in 2004, insisting that he is merely a Muslim scholar, who believes that only Sharia law and Islam offer the solution to Somalia's problems. However, he agreed with those who say that worldwide, Islam is under attack by the US and its allies and supports "the Mujahideen who are fighting back". After al-Itihaad was defeated in the 1990s, he started to play a key role in the emerging Islamic courts, being set up by businessmen desperate for some kind of law and order in a city ruled by warlords. Although these courts imposed such punishments as amputations for thieves and stoning to death for serious crimes such as rape and murder, they were warmly welcomed by residents of north Mogadishu, who felt safer than those who lived in warlord-controlled but lawless south Mogadishu. In the past two years, the gunmen who enforced rulings from the separate clan-based Islamic courts joined forces, becoming Somalia's strongest militia. Mr Aweys was always the courts' spiritual leader, although Sheikh Ahmed was officially the group's chairman. Many observers were surprised at the speed with which the Islamic courts militia defeated a coalition of the warlords who had controlled Mogadishu since 1991. Some credit Mr Aweys with organising the fighters' training and strategy, although he was not in Mogadishu during the battles, staying in the central Galgudud region.

Earlier this year, a UN report said that he had been getting significant military aid from Eritrea - a claim Eritrea has denied. Eritrea may be supporting the Islamists because of its long-standing rivalry with Ethiopia, which is seen as being close to the weak, interim UN-backed government based in Baidoa, about 200km north of Mogadishu. Mr Aweys has a long personal history of fighting Ethiopia. Reuters news agency reports that he was decorated for bravery during Somalia's war against Ethiopia in 1977. Ethiopia later helped the man now interim president, Abdullahi Yusuf, defeat al-Itihaad forces in the 1990s. However, at an early stage in the fighting, Mr Aweys captures Mr Yusuf and put him in jail. When Mr Yusuf was elected president in 2004, Mr Aweys said he would support the new Somali leader, even if he pursued those linked to al-Itihaad, as long as he ruled the country according to Islam. "The good of the Somali people is more important than my personal interests," he said. However, Mr Aweys' public promotion could set the stage for renewed conflict, with the US and Ethiopia again backing those opposed to Islamist rule.

SHEIKH SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED

It was the abduction of one of his 12-year-old pupils that prompted Somali schoolteacher Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to take a stand against the warlords who had ruled the capital, Mogadishu for the last 16 years.

He helped found the Islamic courts, which rose to take control of the capital and large parts of south and central Somalia for the past six months until being driven out last December. He surrendered to Kenyan security forces three weeks after his group was routed from Somalia by government troops backed by Ethiopia. When the boy, Abdulkadir, was kidnapped in 2003, amid a wave of abductions in Mogadishu, the freelance gangs who abducted him asked his parents for a huge ransom. Mr Ahmed was disturbed by the fact that the kidnapping took place in the CC area dominated by his own clan. Mr Ahmed started campaigning within his own people in CC, where with the help of the local community, they finally managed to establish an Islamic court after three days of meetings. He was elected chairman. The court subsequently secured the release of young Abdulkadir and other abductees, as well as several looted vehicles. Once the CC Islamic Court was up and running, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and others began campaigning to fight the general banditry which was prevalent throughout the capital. The then five Islamic courts united and he was chosen to become the chairman of the Union of Islamic Courts. Mr Ahmed studied geography and Arabic at Sudan's Kurdufan University at Dalanji in the mid-1980s. He returned home to Jowhar in 2002, at a time when Abdulkassim Salad Hassan's government was trying to establish control of Mogadishu. He worked with Mohamed Dhere, the warlord and his fellow clansman who was then in charge of Jowhar, against Mr Hassan. Mr Ahmed became chairman of the regional court in Jowhar but the alliance with Mr Dhere did not last long and he fled Jowhar for Mogadishu where he started teaching at Jubba Secondary school. During the six months they controlled Mogadishu, the Islamic courts were divided between moderates and hardliners, with Mr Ahmed viewed as the moderate leader. Before the end of Islamist rule, the hardliners seemed to have gained the upper hand and Mr Ahmed also toughened his rhetoric, especially over the presence of Ethiopian troops alongside government forces. At one point, he declared a Jihad (holy war) against Ethiopia and urged all Somalis to join the battle. A few weeks later, however, he was on the run before giving himself up to the Kenyans. Nevertheless, the US and the UN are urging the government to seek reconciliation with moderates such as Mr Ahmed

SHARIFF HASSAN SHEIK ADAN

The ousted speaker of Somalia's transitional parliament, Shariff Hassan Sheik Adan, has a reputation for honesty, as well as for being independent-minded.

MPs voted to impeach him after he held unauthorised talks last year with the Union of Islamic Courts. He also dared to go to the capital, Mogadishu, when it was under UIC control, without the permission, or indeed knowledge, of the president or prime minister. The government spokesman said he had no mandate to reach a deal. He has also strongly criticised Ethiopia's intervention on the side of the government to oust the Islamists. Indeed, he said that parliament's decision to remove him was invalid because of the Ethiopian presence in the country. His relations with President Abdullahi Yusuf seem to have come full circle. In 2005, the pair were bitterly divided, with Mr Adan leading opposition to Mr Yusuf's plans to set up his government in Jowhar, saying the capital was not safe. Mr Adan insisted that the government must be based in Mogadishu, despite the dangers. Eventually a compromise was reached, with the government moving to Baidoa and relations seemed to have improved. But now they are rivals once more. The 60-year-old businessman is also known for his commitment to reconciliation and relief aid work. Mr Adan first entered politics in 2000 as a member of the short-lived Bay regional government, which collapsed after a year. Four years later, the father of 22 children, entered national politics - during the last stages of the long-running Somali peace talks in neighbouring Kenya. Before his election to the post of speaker, Mr Adan, who has three wives, was mainly based in Somalia. He travelled frequently to Kenya and Dubai, where he has business interests; and also to Egypt, Australia and the United States, where some of his children live. After finishing his secondary school education in Mogadishu in 1977, Mr Adan began to export animal hides. He built this into a successful import and

export business - trading in livestock, food and building materials. His company, Al-Ahli, transported food for the World Food Programme and Unicef, and he took on the post of United Nations Development Programme facilitator for a year in 1994. Sheikh Aden who is not a gifted speaker, gave a lack-lustre campaign address ahead of his election as speaker of parliament in 2004, but his rousing acceptance speech surprised everyone. The MPs who voted for him said they chose him because of his reputation for honesty.

**APPENDIX III:
RECENT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON SOMALIA**

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Somalia

European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2007 on Somalia

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Somalia,
 - having regard to the previous statements made by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, and by Commissioner Louis Michel,
 - having regard to the Statement of Concern regarding the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia, signed by 40 international and national NGOs,
 - having regard to the plan for national reconciliation put forward in Resolution 1744 (2007), adopted by the UN Security Council on 20 February 2007, in the aftermath of Ethiopia's victory over the Union of Islamic Courts,
 - having regard to the forthcoming EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon on 8 and 9 December 2007,
 - having regard to Rule 115(5) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas at least 80 people have been killed in the recent fighting between the insurgents of the Union of Islamic Courts and allied Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops,
- B. whereas Somalia has not had a functioning government since the overthrow of the Said Barre regime in 1991, and whereas since then the political situation has been one of anarchy, marked by inter-clan fighting and banditry,
- C. whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that at least 100 000 people have been displaced as a result of recent fighting between the Union of Islamic Courts and allied Ethiopian and TFG troops; whereas this fighting has resulted in the death of numerous civilians; whereas the safety of the remaining population is a matter of grave concern,
- D. whereas the worsening security situation in the capital of Somalia, namely Mogadishu, has prevented national and international NGOs from coping with an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and responding to emergencies,
- E. whereas, according to the Food Security Analysis Unit, approximately 38 000 children under the age of five among the rural population are estimated to be acutely malnourished and 10 000 are estimated to be severely malnourished and at risk of death if they do not receive appropriate care,

- F. whereas cases of cholera have been confirmed in the region; whereas, therefore, urgent measures to provide safe water and sanitation facilities for internally displaced persons must be taken in order to contain the spread of the disease,
- G. whereas according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Somalia, about 450 000 people have been displaced as a result of fighting in 2007, bringing the total number of displaced persons in Somalia to more than 850 000, including about 400 000 displaced persons since the civil war began in the 1990s,
- H. whereas out of a population of 10 million inhabitants, approximately 1.5 million Somalis are in need of international aid,
- I. concerned by the prolonged civil war in Somalia and its implications for the peace and reconciliation process in that country as well as for the security and stability of the Horn of Africa as a whole,
- J. whereas Ali Mohamed Gedi, the Somali Prime Minister, has resigned after a feud with the President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed; whereas this has aggravated the political impasse in the country,
- K. whereas the insurgents of the Union of Islamic Courts boycotted a reconciliation meeting sponsored by the transitional government last month; whereas the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, has said that Ethiopian troops will withdraw once African Union peacekeepers arrive in Mogadishu,
- L. whereas insurgents of the Union of Islamic Courts have ruled out all political contact with the TFG for as long as the Ethiopian army is present in Somalia; whereas prolongation of Ethiopia's intervention is further complicating the situation in the region, as is other countries' alleged support for the Union of Islamic Courts – with specific reference to Eritrea,
- M. whereas the perpetrators of most of the killings of individual journalists in 2007 remain unknown and whereas, to date, Somali Government officials have consistently failed to condemn the killings, much less investigate, arrest, or prosecute anyone in connection with them,
 - 1. Strongly condemns the serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law committed by all parties to the conflict in Somalia; calls for an immediate end to hostilities; demands that all warring factions refrain from indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and calls for an independent panel to investigate war crimes and human rights violations;
 - 2. Recalls that the international community and all parties to the present conflict have a responsibility to protect civilians, to allow delivery of aid and to respect humanitarian space and the safety of humanitarian workers; demands therefore that the right conditions be immediately created for an adequate response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia;
 - 3. Warns that, unless strong measures are quickly taken by the international community to stabilise and gradually improve the situation, there is a clear risk of the Somalia conflict growing into a regional war affecting the entire Horn of Africa;

4. Calls on the international community to step up and sustain diplomatic efforts to end the ongoing violence and propose a standing mechanism for the purposes of negotiating and monitoring an immediate ceasefire;
5. Calls on the TFG to engage with key Somali stakeholders in a consultative process leading to the appointment of a new Prime Minister; urges all Somali stakeholders to renew their efforts towards political dialogue and to remain focused on resuming the process outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic of 2004; stresses that successful dialogue and reconciliation is critical to ensuring free and fair elections in 2009 and establishing lasting peace and stability in Somalia;
6. Calls for an end to all foreign military intervention in Somalia;
7. Calls for a strengthening of the role of civil society – particularly women – in the process of national reconciliation;
8. Welcomes efforts by the African Union to assemble a peacekeeping force to help with the process of national reconciliation but deplores the fact that so far only 1600 soldiers out of the 8 000 that the African Union had agreed to send have actually been deployed; calls therefore on the African Union to encourage its member states to honour their commitments to contribute to the peacekeeping force; calls in this connection on the EU to increase its efforts to provide the requisite political, financial and logistical support to the deployment of the African Union peacekeeping troops, as well as to take all other steps conducive to the facilitation of the peace process;
9. Calls on the international community to strengthen diplomatic efforts towards peace and stability in Somalia and to avoid simplistic perceptions of the terrorist threats in the Horn of Africa, at times used to divert attention from internal problems and pave the way for foreign military intervention;
10. Reiterates its call on the International Somalia Contact Group, consisting of the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Tanzania and others, to encourage positive political developments and engagement with actors inside Somalia, with a view to supporting the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions, establishing effective governance and stability and addressing the international community's concerns regarding terrorism;
11. Calls on the international community, and the EU in particular, to increase the provision of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and people in need;
12. Urges strict and renewed application and monitoring of the arms embargo against Somalia imposed by the UN in 1992, for which scant respect is paid; calls for the violators of the Somalia arms embargo to start being held accountable;
13. Stresses in particular the urgent need for journalists to be protected and condemns the TFG's systematic harassment of journalists, its closure of media outlets and its failure to investigate the killing of journalists, all of which have deeply damaged independent reporting in Somalia; calls on the TFG to investigate these attacks as well as to cease its own harassment of the media;
14. Calls on the EU-Africa Summit to give urgent consideration to the grave situation prevailing in Somalia;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Secretaries-General of the African Union, the UN and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the Government of Ethiopia and the Pan-African Parliament.

P6_TA-PROV(2007)0180

EU partnership in the Horn of Africa

European Parliament resolution of 10 May 2007 on the Horn of Africa: EU Regional political partnership for peace, security and development (2006/2291(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the EU strategy 'The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership' (The European Strategy for Africa), adopted by the European Council of 15-16 December 2005,
- having regard to the Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus' (The European Consensus on Development) signed on 20 December 2005¹,
- having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, of the one part, and the Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000², as amended by the Agreement amending the Partnership Agreement, signed in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005³ (the Cotonou Agreement), in particular Article 8 thereof,
- having regard to the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, adopted by the European Council of 15-16 December 2005⁴,
- having regard to the Commission's Communication entitled 'Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa' (COM(2006)0601),
- having regard to its resolutions on Darfur, in particular those of 15 February 2007⁵, 28 September 2006⁶, 6 April 2006⁷, 23 June 2005⁸ and 16 September 2004⁹,
- having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1706(2006) proposing a 22 000-strong

¹ OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1.

² OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.

³ OJ L 209, 11.8.2005, p. 27.

⁴ 5319/06, 13.1.2006.

⁵ *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA(2007)0052.

⁶ *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA(2006)0387.

⁷ OJ C 293 E, 2.12.2006, p. 320.

⁸ OJ C 133 E, 8.6.2006, p. 96.

⁹ OJ C 140 E, 9.6.2005, p. 153.

- peace-keeping force for Darfur,
- having regard to the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria, on 5 May 2006,
 - having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, which addresses the impact of war on women, and the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa of 26 October 2005;
 - having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is binding and applicable without exception,
 - having regard to the outcome of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 12-13 February 2007,
 - having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2006 on Somalia¹,
 - having regard to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 14-15 December 2006,
 - having regard to the Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on Sudan/Darfur of 5 March 2007,
 - having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2006 on aid effectiveness and corruption in developing countries²,
 - having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0146/2007),
- A. whereas, at the Second EU-Africa Summit, to be held in Lisbon in 2007, the Heads of State and Government are to approve a Joint EU-Africa Strategy which would represent the EU's commitment to transforming the EU Strategy for Africa into a Joint EU-Africa Strategy; whereas Parliament has so far not been included in the consultation,
- B. whereas the above-mentioned Commission Communication on the Strategy for Africa builds on the concept of the interlinked security and development issues, stating that there is no development without lasting peace and there is no lasting peace without development, and further aims to serve as a guidance in the formulation of Country and Regional Strategy Papers,
- C. whereas the European Strategy for Africa is aimed at setting up a comprehensive, long-term framework for EU relations with the African continent, with the primary goal of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and promoting sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa,
- D. whereas Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement provides a framework for conducting a political dialogue on specific political issues of mutual concern or of general significance

¹ *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA(2006)0322.

² OJ C 293 E, 2.12.2006, p. 316.

to the parties, and provides that broadly based policies to promote peace and prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts are to play a prominent role in this dialogue,

- E. whereas Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement entitled 'Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution' stipulates that the parties shall pursue a comprehensive, integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution with a particular focus on building regional, sub-regional and national capacities,

Security dimension

- F. whereas the Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world as well as being one of the poorest, with a systematic insecurity in which conflicts and political crises feed into and fuel one another, with difficult inter-State relations, unstable, disputed, underdeveloped and insecure borders, with States providing refuge, rearguard bases, military support and diplomatic recognition to groups fighting wars in neighbouring States,
- G. whereas the root causes of conflicts are generally human rights violations, the absence of democracy and the rule of law, bad governance and corruption, ethnic tensions, inefficient administration, organised crime and drugs and arms trafficking and the uncontrolled and illegal proliferation of SALW, as well as poverty, unemployment and social, economic and political injustices and inequalities, rapid population growth and poor or bad management and/or exploitation of natural resources,
- H. whereas the conflicts in the Horn of Africa have taken on regional dimensions with the involvement of neighbouring and other countries, and also an increasingly broader international dimension,

Regional frameworks and external actors

- I. whereas the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a central part of the political and security architecture and crucial to conflict prevention in the Horn and is the only sub-regional organisation of which Somalia is a member,
- J. whereas the African Union (AU) is developing capacities to engage in conflict mediation and peace-keeping and whereas the African Peace Facility is one of the most tangible aspect of EU cooperation with the AU,

Development dimensions

- K. whereas the chronic instability of the region undermines its political, social and economic development and represents one of the main impediments to achieving the MDGs,
- L. whereas the countries of the Horn of Africa belong to different regional economic organisations and initiatives such as the East Africa Community (EAC)¹, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)² and the Nile Basin Initiative³,
- M. whereas the problems of the region are exacerbated by the regional impact of population

¹ EAC members are: Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.

² COMESA members are: all the countries in the Horn of Africa are members with the exception of Somalia.

³ Nile Basin Initiative members are: Burundi, DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

growth, climate change and related pressures on natural resources, mainly oil, and by the friction generated by competition for the water resources of the Nile and the high proportion of nomadic pastoralists, bound largely by ethno-linguistic ties rather than political borders, who are among the most marginalised groups in the region,

- N. whereas poverty-related diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, are a major cause as well as a consequence of the considerable poverty in the region,
 - O. whereas in most countries in the region fewer than 50% of children are enrolled in primary school,
 - P. whereas women and children are the most vulnerable people during conflicts and are easily exposed to any kind of violation of basic human rights, including violence, ethnic rape, torture and genital mutilation, and whereas they suffer from diseases to a greater extent than men and are denied access to education and natural resources,
1. Deplores the fact that neither the European Parliament nor the parliaments of the African countries, nor the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, nor civil society representatives, were duly consulted at any stage in the formulation of the EU-Africa Strategy, which calls into question the democratic legitimacy of the common commitment;
 2. Recalls that conceiving a sustainable approach to the establishment of lasting peace in the Horn of Africa requires the conjunction of all existing EU instruments and legal frameworks for Africa; calls for full implementation of Articles 8 to 11 of the Cotonou Agreement;

Security dimension

3. Stresses that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa must be addressed through a comprehensive, conflict-sensitive, regional approach that will enable the formulation of a comprehensive response to the regional dynamics and conflict systems;
4. Takes the view that the EU's action with regard to the Horn of Africa must address not only security concerns but also the structural causes of conflicts connected to social, political and economic exclusion, as well as strengthening security and justice;
5. Stresses that, while addressing security concerns and pursuing counter-terrorism policies, the EU must not neglect human rights and humanitarian law; urges Member States to bring to light and denounce any 'international renditions' of persons arrested in the region on suspicion of terrorism;
6. Calls on the Council and the Commission to take resolute steps to counter impunity in the region, arms trafficking, human rights abuses, violations of ceasefires and attacks on civilians, peace-keepers and humanitarian workers, and to support the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC);
7. Stresses that long-term peace in the Horn of Africa will also depend on the EU's commitment to democracy and human rights in the region; calls on the EU to publicly condemn the repressive regimes in that region; expresses its deep concern about the repressive backlash in Ethiopia - the seat of the AU - against opposition leaders, journalists, human rights activists and ordinary people that has taken place since the rigged elections in 2005;

Peace-building regional approach

8. Calls for consolidation of the EU presence in the region through the appointment of an EU representative for the Horn of Africa, a person to be entrusted with the coordination of EU initiatives for the region to serve as the main EU interlocutor for all Horn of Africa States and submit regular reports to Parliament;
9. Encourages the Commission and the Council to make further progress in establishing an EU Delegation to the AU based in Ethiopia, in addition to the Commission's Delegation in Ethiopia;
10. Calls on the Commission and the Council to start a consultation process with the other stakeholders involved in the region, namely the UN, AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, USA and China, on the initiative of convening a Comprehensive Security, Peace and Development Conference to deal with these security concerns of all Horn of Africa States simultaneously; points out that such an initiative should serve as a starting-point for launching confidence-building measures for the populations and in the States of the region;
11. Strongly believes that, in its efforts to address the crisis in the Horn of Africa region, the EU should first and foremost seek African solutions, that is, solutions to be achieved with the involvement of the regional organisations in place, AU and IGAD; emphasises, however, the need to strengthen these organisations through capacity and institution building, and particularly through the African Peace Facility, in terms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution;
12. Recalls that improving Africa's ability to prevent, manage and resolve African conflicts, requires concrete measures to support the implementation of the AU's Peace and Security Agenda, by providing technical support, expertise and institution-building assistance to the African Standby Force and to the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department;
13. Recalls the important role of regional initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism in curbing corruption and promoting good governance; emphasises the need for African countries to implement these initiatives and for the Commission and the Member States to provide technical and financial assistance for this purpose;
14. Calls on the Member States to promote a legally binding international instrument on the tracing and marking of SALW and ammunition and to support regional initiatives to combat the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition in developing countries;
15. Welcomes UNICEF's initiative in organising an International Conference in Paris (on 5 and 6 February 2007) on child soldiers, and underlines the need to put an end to the illegal and unacceptable exploitation of children in armed conflicts;
16. Stresses the need to end illicit trade in and tighten controls on the circulation of SALW; welcomes the adoption on 6 December 2006 by the UN General Assembly of a resolution entitled 'Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms';
17. Calls on the Commission and the Council to enhance and to extend to other countries/regions the existing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives;

18. Stresses the need to foster the role of national and international NGOs, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), grassroots movements and other non-State actors in peace-building and conflict prevention;

Development dimension/Axes of regional integration

19. Emphasises that the objective of reducing poverty by achieving the MDGs and putting the Millennium Declaration into effect must be prioritised and clearly reflected in all relevant EU policies for the region, but believes that the MDGs should not be seen as a technical issue which will be resolved simply by providing more money without identifying and tackling the underlying causes of poverty;
20. Strongly believes that the States of the Horn of Africa have, in addition to shared security problems, a common development agenda which require common efforts to be made and the mobilisation of the political leadership and the societies in these countries; stresses the fact that these concerns can be fully addressed only through conflict-sensitive joint actions aimed at finding common solutions;
21. Stresses the fact that organising initiatives and regional cooperation around clearly identified issues of common concern such as refugee flows, border control, food security, natural resources, energy, the environment, education, infrastructure, arms control and gender equality would serve as a solid basis for positive political dialogue among Horn of Africa States;
22. Urges the Commission to pay due attention to the needs of the region when drawing up not only the Regional and Country Strategy Papers for the ACP countries but also the Thematic Strategy Papers and the Annual Action Programmes under the Development Cooperation Instrument¹;
23. Calls on the Commission to promote better coordination among its departments and the Member States, in order to harmonise the interventions in areas such as the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership and the EU Governance Initiative and to ensure coordination in these areas with the UN, USA, China and other international actors;
24. Expresses its concern at specialists' predictions stating that Africa, although it contributes the least in greenhouse gas emissions, will suffer the most from global warming due to its underdevelopment and poverty; underlines the need for the international community to support the region so that it may be in a better position to adapt itself to the severe repercussions of climate change;
25. Recalls that the sustainable management of natural resources, including the exploitation of water and access to and use of energy sources must be an integral part of development plans and of strategies for fighting poverty and preventing conflict in the Horn of Africa region;
26. Takes the view that EU support is needed for the sustainable land management and desertification programme through the thematic programme on the environment and sustainable management of natural resources, as well as for the ACP-EU Water Facility, in order to increase the environmental protection of water resources;

¹ Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OL L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

27. Invites the Council and the Commission to seek dialogue with China, taking into consideration the fact that China has intensified its political and economic involvement in Africa, investing heavily in infrastructure and development projects in countries such as Sudan;
28. Calls on the Council and the Commission to encourage EAC, COMESA and the Nile Basin Initiative to share information on their respective roles and activities among themselves and with the Horn of Africa States and key actors in the region; stresses the positive experience of EAC, COMESA and the Nile Basin Initiative in areas such as border control, efforts to combat trafficking in and the proliferation of SALW, the EAC Customs Union, promotion of trade and investments (COMESA) and cooperation for sustainable use of waters of the Nile basin;
29. Welcomes the EU's intention to work with various partners to address the question of migration, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the proposal to provide additional support to host communities, States and the relevant organisations working in the field to prevent south-south migration and refugee crises;
30. Considers the involvement of local communities in economic activities, in rural as well as in urban areas, to be of crucial importance in order to endorse their socio-economic position in post-conflict societies;
31. Stresses that the fight against HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, as well as neglected diseases and female genital mutilation, must be one of the key strategies for eradicating poverty and promoting economic growth in the Horn of Africa States; emphasises that EU action must be designed in such a way to target disadvantaged and vulnerable groups;

Country level

Sudan

32. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to fully assume their responsibilities and make every possible effort to protect the people in Darfur from the humanitarian disaster resulting from the continuing violation of the ceasefire by all parties, and in particular the violence directed against the civilian population and the targeting of civilian assistance;
33. Expresses its serious concern about the developments in Darfur and calls on the Sudanese Government to prevent exactions by the Janjaweed militia; urges the Sudanese authorities to facilitate without further delay the deployment of a joint international AU and UN force in the region, and calls for the setting of a starting date for its deployment;
34. Deplores the fact that, according to the UN sources, thirty NGOs and UN compounds have been directly attacked by armed groups, and twelve relief workers killed, in the last six months;
35. Calls on all parties to the conflict to fulfil their duty to respect humanitarian law and to ensure the full, safe and unhindered access to relief personnel of all people in need in Darfur and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to IDPs;
36. Calls for implementation of the UN Security Council sanction regime by means of targeted economic sanctions, including travel bans, asset freezing and the threat of an oil

embargo; calls for equipment to be made available for the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Darfur established by UN Security Council Resolution 1591(2005);

37. Stresses the need for, and calls for, early implementation of the decision by the government of Sudan and the UN regarding the deployment of the AU/UN joint force in order to increase security and improve the protection of civilians;
38. Urges the international community, especially the UN, the EU and its Member States, the US, China, India, the League of Arab States and the AU, to launch peace talks to improve the content of the Darfur Peace Agreement and make it acceptable for all parties and thus increase the parties' ownership of the Agreement;
39. Stresses the fact that failure to resolve the conflict in Darfur would have serious consequences not only for the East Africa region but also for other relatively stable parts of Africa, namely Central Africa and the region of the Great Lakes;
40. Urges the international community not to focus on the Darfur conflict to the exclusion of other conflict situations in Sudan and, in particular, to recognise the fragility of the peace in Southern Sudan resulting from the slow progress made in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the high risk of destabilisation due to North-South tensions, inter-tribal conflicts and the widespread ownership of arms in society;

Somalia

41. Condemns foreign intervention in Somalia and calls on the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its army from the country; endorses the deployment of an AU peace-keeping force under an inclusive political agreement between the warring parties, leading to the creation of a government of national unity able to encompass that part of the Union of Islamic Courts which is open to a process of peace and reconciliation and the clan chiefs absent from the current government;
42. Takes the view that the AU peace-keeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM, should be framed within a broader political process supported by the population that has a clear mandate, good capacity, clear objectives and an exit strategy;
43. Welcomes the EU's support for AMISOM but stresses that the EU's contribution must be conditional on the launch of an inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation by the Somali authorities, addressing promptly the challenges of reconciliation, institution building and providing peace for the Somali people;
44. Stresses the central role of an all-inclusive political dialogue that will lead to reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country; welcomes the commitment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia to call a broad reconciliation conference (National Reconciliation Congress) involving clans, religious communities, civil society, business communities and political leaders; points out that the way forward must be the establishment of a credible, all-inclusive government;
45. Calls for a reassessment of the role of the International Somalia Contact Group, which involves the EU, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, UN, AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, Norway, the United States, Kenya and Tanzania, established in May 2006 as a forum for coordination of the international community's activities in Somalia in order to focus efforts on issues of governance and institution-building, humanitarian assistance to

displaced persons and populations in need, and on improving regional stability and security;

46. Calls on the Somali TFG to rescind the state of emergency and reinstate the speaker of parliament as a precondition for the implementation of the process of national reconciliation;
47. Emphasises the urgent need for the TFG to establish representative authorities for key municipalities, including Mogadishu and Kismaayo, in order to provide political stability and manage local security over the short term, and to abandon the principle of forcible disarmament, especially in Mogadishu, and instead negotiate a plan for voluntary disarmament;
48. Considers that the Somaliland request for independence should be examined as part of the over-arching security agenda for Somalia;

Ethiopia

49. Calls on the Council and the Commission to put pressure on the Ethiopian Government to disclose the total number of persons detained throughout the country, to allow visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross and to allow all detainees access to their families, legal counsel and any medical care that their health may require, and also to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners, i.e. journalists, trade union activists, human rights defenders and ordinary citizens, and fulfil its obligations with respect to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law;
50. Calls on Ethiopia to accept the demarcation and delimitation of its border as set out by the UN Boundary Commission;

Eritrea

51. Urges the Council and the Commission to take action with regard to the Eritrean Government to release all political prisoners, bring prisoners with specific charges against them to a speedy and fair trial and disclose the place of detention of all who are detained in secret prisons;
52. Encourages the Eritrean President to maintain frequent contacts with EU representatives and various Member State ambassadors to Eritrea;

Uganda

53. Calls on the Council and the Commission to facilitate the peace process in Northern Uganda, which calls for all parties to the conflict to demonstrate a genuine and continuous commitment to the peace process, to respect the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and to put an end to hostile and inflammatory propaganda;

54. Calls for the launch of a true reconciliation process, with those responsible for war crimes being recognised as such; emphasises the central role of the ICC in bringing to justice those indicted on charges of war crimes; calls on the Council and the Commission to support local processes for alternative justice and reconciliation to take place in Northern Uganda as well as between Northerners and the rest of the country;
55. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Member States of the European Union and to the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

APPENDIX IV: BIBLIOGRAPHIC SOURCES

- <http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org> series of papers:

Class And Clan

Alex de Waal, Class And Power In Stateless Somalia, 20th February 2007

- UN agencies

- UN Security Council

- BBC

- European Commission