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Abstract

The political situation in Lebanon remains unstable with several potential trouble spots in its relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, conflicts in the Palestinian refugee camps and the clashes between the government and the Hezbollah in 2008. Further to the Doha Agreement on a national unity government in 2008 a new electoral law will govern upcoming elections. In March 2009 the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon for the prosecution of criminal acts relating to the assassination of Rafik Hariri opened and already has taken its first decisions. The economy slowly recovered after the Doha Agreement. The EU supports the reconstruction of the country with \$486 million and the ENP Action Plan for Lebanon envisages €187 million until 2010

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Political Context

Lebanon's political system is based on the **1926 Constitution**, the extra-constitution **1943 'National pact'** and the **1989 Ta'if Agreement** that ended 15 years of civil war. According to those agreements **power is shared between confessional groups** based on their perceived population strength, with power divided largely between representatives of the Christian, Sunni Muslim and Shia Muslim communities. The president is always a Maronite Christian, chosen by parliament for a single six-year term. The army commander Michel Suleiman was elected to the office in May 2008. The prime minister is a Sunni Muslim: since June 2005 the post has been held by Fouad Siniora. The third most powerful role, that of parliamentary speaker, is held by a Shia Muslim Nabih Birri since 1992.

Current Lebanese politics is dominated by two political blocs that formed around the 2005 election period. The majority, "**March 14 Movement**" is predominantly Sunni but with significant Christian participation. The oppositions key components are the "**March 8 Movement**" comprising the predominantly Shi'ite Hezbollah and Amal and the Christian Free patriotic Movement. Christians seats are divided between the two blocs, although in 2005 the Free Patriotic Movement gained around 70% of the Christian vote. The defining feature of the two political blocs is their **alignment with or against Syrian influence**, with March 14 instead aligned with Saudi Arabia and the West.

In 2005, connected to the anti-Syrian demonstrations ("Cedar Revolution") the parliamentary elections (observed by an EU mission) resulted in the formation of a **government of national unity**, and the Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon. But the national unity government broke down as a result of the assassination of pro-government MPs, disagreements about the composition of the cabinet and the role of the international investigation into the assassination of Rafik Hariri. In the aftermath of the war with Israel in 2006, Hezbollah and Amal left the government and formed an opposition. This led to political stalemate, with key institutions becoming dysfunctional. Parliament was not convened, multiple attempts to elect a new President failed and all judicial appointments were delayed.

The situation became worse in May 2008 when the **political stalemate** manifested itself violently in the streets of Beirut and other parts of the country when the Siniora government issued an order to put the Hezbollah communication network under the authority of the state. Hezbollah and affiliated groups took control of part of Beirut in response to the decision, which was rescinded. This eighteen-month stalemate came to an end with the Doha Agreement in May 2008.

The Doha Agreement

The agreement, signed on 21 May 2008 under the auspices of Qatar and the League of Arab States, added a layer of **political compromise** to an already complex legal-political framework. It comprised three key issues: the election of Michel Sleiman as president, the formation of a new government and the adaption of a new electoral law - which were implemented within a few months:

- **Sleiman** was elected as **president** in May 2008.
- A government of **national unity** was formed on 11 July 2008 (its composition is detailed in the appendix). According to the government structure as agreed in the Doha deal, **Hezbollah has a blocking minority**.
- The **new electoral law** (adopted in September 2008) did **not change the principal features of the old electoral system**, which is one of the **key causes of political and social instability in the country**. Lebanon uses a majority system along with multiple seat districts and collective votes, whereby the elector has the right to vote for a number of candidates equal to the number of seats in the constituency in question. Seats in a constituency are allocated on the basis of a **quota system relating to religious and ethnic communities**. Over the years, the Lebanese have experimented with all sorts of electoral districts without ever satisfactorily resolving the problem of fair representation for the different groups that make up its population.

The law reduced the size of constituencies, which now largely coincide with administrative districts (qada). It also calls for the **elections to be held in one day**, rather than over several days. The legislation also includes new clauses **regulating the role of the media** publicity in elections, which had been totally banned under the previous law.

Several proposed reforms were not taken up in the law, such as a mixed electoral system combining majority and proportional voting, a modern and transparent mechanism of election monitoring, a 30% quota of female candidates on electoral lists, lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, and the right to vote for Lebanese citizens living abroad. These had been part of an ambitious proposal drafted in 2006 by the "**Boutros Commission**" with the support of EU and UNDP. The Commission's proposal was to be debated in summer 2006, but the war with Israel and the institutional deadlock in Lebanon put the bill on ice. The adopted law thus further promotes representation **based on communitarianism and patronage** and circumvents the main obstacle to adoption of genuine electoral reform, namely disagreement over constituencies.

Investigations by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Lebanese Government requested the United Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal to try all those who are alleged responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The **Special Tribunal for Lebanon opened on 1 March 2009** in The Hague. The Canadian judge **Daniel Bellemare** became the tribunal's prosecutor. Due to security reasons, names of the eleven judges, four are Lebanese, seven internationals, will be not announced.

End of April 2009, the Special Tribunal ordered the release of four Lebanese generals, who have been jailed since 2005 suspected in the assassination. The generals are the former head of the pro-Syrian presidential guard, Mustafa Hamdan, security services director Jamil Sayyed, domestic security chief Ali Hajj and military intelligence chief Raymond Azar. In Lebanon this decision was welcomed and interpreted as proof of the independence of the Tribunal. Some experts expect implications on the elections as strengthening the 8 March alliance.

Meanwhile, Zuhair Al Siddiq, a former Syrian intelligence officer, was taken into custody in the UAE accused of being involved in the killing of Hariri.


National Dialogue

In an approach to rebuild alliances and repair relations between the strongly divided blocks, a number of political groups have started to hold talks. In this context, the meeting of Saad Hariri and Hassan Nasrallah in late 2008 was a remarkable step. A more formal approach to reconciliation is the **National Dialogue** initiated by President Michel Sleiman. In this framework, rivalling political leaders have started discussions on the formation of a military expert committee to study all party's proposals for a "national defence strategy" that will tackle the **issue of Hezbollah's weapons**. On the recent fifth round of talks on 3 March 2009 the participants decided to postpone defence-strategy talks until after the elections.

Lebanese-Syrian relations

Formal diplomatic ties between Syria and Lebanon were established during a presidential summit on 15 October 2008, implying a **normalisation of relations between Lebanon and Syria** and the first formal Syrian recognition of Lebanon's independence. The first Lebanese ambassador to Damascus Michel Khoury took office April 2009. Some issues remain to be solved: Lebanon and Syria will have to decide on a 1991 treaty that binds together their foreign and defence policy. The border between the two countries is yet to be fully demarcated, notably in the disputed Shebaa Farms region. To this end, Presidents Sleiman and Assad announced the reactivation of a concerted demarcation task force.

The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon



The question of the Palestinian refugee camps – a defining factor in Lebanese politics since 1948 – came to prominence again in summer 2007, when the Lebanese Army went to war on the Sunni Islamist faction known as Fatah al-Islam in the **Nahr Al-Bared camp**, which had been home to 30 000 people prior to the conflict. On 20 May 2007, the army decided to bombard the camp in retaliation for a Fatah al-Islam attack on a military base.

Looming beyond this conflict is the question of security in the camps, where more than 300 000 Palestinians live in deplorable conditions, and

which are, in many cases, breeding grounds for fundamentalism. Under a deal struck in 1969, **the Lebanese Army is not entitled to enter the camps**, and the **Palestinian groups themselves are in charge of security** there. To tighten security in the camps, the Lebanese authorities are relying on help from Fatah, the Palestinian faction of Mahmoud Abbas. Lebanon has traditionally maintained close ties with Fatah, as opposed to Syria, which is closer to Hamas. In the case of Nahr al-Bared, Prime Minister Siniora has stated that once the camp has been rebuilt the Lebanese police will assume responsibility for security there in cooperation with the Palestinian community.

Palestinians in Lebanon are to a great extent **deprived from social and civil rights**. They cannot obtain citizenship and are not entitled to work in the 70 top professions and trades; they may not own property and have only limited access to government-run schools. Most of them thus depend entirely on aid from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). At one time the Lebanese Government had a plan to dismantle the Palestinian camps and settle their inhabitants in Lebanon permanently. However, the reconstruction of Nahr Al-Bared with international aid, including €28 million from the European Commission, appears to indicate that the status quo will prevail.

Lebanon as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Following the 1975-1990 war, Israeli troops remained in southern Lebanon until 2000. The two countries have never signed a peace contract. The war in 2006, which cost the lives of over 1,000 Lebanese, marked a low point in the relations. A positive step in Lebanese-Israeli relations came in mid-July 2008, when Israel agreed an **exchange of prisoners** and remains of combatants with Hezbollah, bringing an end to a long negotiation facilitated by the United Nations. The bodies of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah in 2006, were transferred to their home country in return for the bodies of Hezbollah fighters who had been buried in Israel, and the liberation of five Lebanese prisoners – including the longest-held detainee Samir Kuntar, who had been convicted of murdering five Israeli people during the war in 1979. In May 2009 Israel finally handed over maps of where it dropped cluster bombs during the 2006 war. These maps should have been immediately made available by Israel after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1701. Dozens of people have been killed and several hundred wounded in throughout southern Lebanon, particularly south of the Litani River, by Israeli munitions left behind by the 2006 war.

Application of Resolution 1701



The ninth report (in March 2009) by the UN Secretary-General on implementation of Resolution 1701 is negative about the disarmament of Lebanese militias. The Gaza crisis overshadowed attempts at making progress on the resolution of this issue. In an earlier report it was stated that **Hezbollah has not only reconstituted its military capability but has actually increased it** since the 2006 war. This confirms that UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army have been unable to stop the inflow of weapons from Syria. However, the report is positive in the aspect that in 2008 all conflict parties have largely respected the Israeli-Lebanese Border, the so-called Blue Line, and that the cessation of violence continued.

Hezbollah accepted Resolution 1701, but its interpretation of that document is a 'passive' one: it will refrain from any offensive action, but will keep its weapons until the Lebanese Army is capable of defending the country against Israeli attack and until the occupied Shebaa Farms have been handed back – a precondition for any discussion about disarming its fighters. It asserts the rights of the "resistance" to fight for the liberation of the disputed Shebaa Farms areas "by all available and legitimate means".

The Shebaa Farms issue

'Shebaa Farms' is the name given to an area currently occupied by Israel, at the intersection of the Lebanese, Syrian and Israeli borders. The Lebanon/Syria border, defined in an agreement between Britain and France in 1923, has never been accurately marked out on the ground. After the Israeli Army withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000, a **question arose as to whether the Shebaa Farms were part of Lebanese territory or part of Golan**. In the aftermath of the summer 2006 war, Israel said it would await the opinion of the UN on the question before any talk of withdrawal. In a report from September 2006, the UN Secretary General also stated that the transfer of the Shebaa farms from

Syria to Lebanon required a precise geographical scope of the area. UN map-maker Miklos Pinter completed his report in November 2007, provisionally defining the Shebaa farms area, but not the international borders. Since then, the United Nations are waiting for Syria's and Israel's official response to the provisional definition.



A seven-point programme put forward by Prime Minister Siniora after the 2006 war proposed that the Shebaa Farms be placed under UN control. Egypt has asked the UN to request that Israel withdraw from the Farms, and to replace the Israeli occupying troops with UNIFIL soldiers. Israel, however, wants bilateral talks and Hezbollah has let it be known that it would not regard the presence of

a UNIFIL force as an end to the occupation of Shebaa.

In July 2008 Hassan Nasrallah announced that **Hezbollah's goal was to liberate not only the Shebaa farms, but also the neighbouring areas of Kfar Shuba and Ghajar**, from which Israel had failed to withdraw its troops after the 2006 war. Thus, Hezbollah would still have a justification for its military capabilities even if the Shebaa farms were handed to Lebanese authorities.

Member States' involvement in UNIFIL

Following the conflict in summer 2006, Security Council Resolution 1701 increased the strength and expanded the remit of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which had been set up by the Security Council in 1978 (see Resolution 426) with a traditional peacekeeping mandate. As well as fulfilling its original brief, UNIFIL was now empowered to monitor the cessation of hostilities, support the Lebanese armed forces and help to facilitate humanitarian aid access to civilians and the safe, voluntary return of internally displaced persons. UNIFIL has **no remit to disarm Hezbollah**; its task is to further a process of reconciliation and internal political dialogue following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon.

EU High Representative Javier Solana has, on more than one occasion, highlighted the crucial role that Member States have played in troop preparation and in the deployment of the international peacekeeping force. At present the forces are under Italian command and the position of the personal representative of the SG for Southern Lebanon is held by the Norwegian Geir Pedersen. However, the **member state's contribution was not made in the context of either a European Defence Policy or a Common Foreign and Security Policy initiative**.

UNIFIL and the Lebanese army are not in total control of Southern Lebanon, which is a notoriously difficult terrain to secure completely. This was evident again when rockets were fired into Israel from this area in early January 2009. Hezbollah has denied its involvement; many assume that militant Palestinian factions bear responsibility for the attacks. Lebanese security arrested a number of suspects which are of Palestinian origin.

Economic situation

The Lebanese **economy is small, open and largely based on services**. Beirut remains a significant regional banking centre; and the country has also fostered a high-end tourism industry mostly for wealthy guests from the Arab Gulf. Also external transfers by Lebanese living abroad contribute between 20 to 25% to GDP. Lebanon's substantial trade deficit is financed by large net invisible and capital inflows, including remittances from the large expatriate population. The heavy, recurrent **budget deficits** are driven by weak government control over most state spending. Before the military conflict broke out in 2006, the Government had set itself the targets of reducing the national debt from 175% of GDP (2005 figure) to 138% and cutting the budget deficit from 8% of GDP (2005 figure) to 3% by 2010. The **conflict in summer 2006** took a substantial toll on the Lebanese economy. It cut short the economic growth that had been experienced in the first quarter of the year; it put further pressure on the already

GDP per head	10,506 \$
Real GDP growth	4.2 %
Consumer Price Inflation	12 %
Net public debt	186.8 %
<i>(Estimations: Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2008)</i>	

fragile public budgeting system and balance of payments; and it set back discussion of how to implement reforms. After May 2008, when the **Doha Agreement** offered a perspective of stability, booming consumption **increased the government revenue** by 16%. On the other hand, expenditure rose by 14.5% due to high oil prices. **Consumer price inflation** peaked in 2008 due to a rise in world commodity prices, but is expected to decline in 2009. Privatisation of state assets notably the two mobile-phone operators and the state-owned Electricité du Liban remain a key challenge as well as fiscal consolidation. In 2009 The Economist Intelligence Unit projects a larger budget deficit of 10.7% GDP, as the expected economic slowdown erodes tax revenue, while spending is expected to rise on the back of higher salaries and election costs, only partly offset by lower energy subsidy costs.

EU - Lebanese relations

The European Commission is running an **assistance programme for the parliamentary elections on 7 June 2009** under the **Instrument for Stability**, in coordination with other donors. The programme supports the Ministry of Interior and the Election Campaign Supervisory Commission in the implementation of the electoral reforms. The Commission's uses an EU budget of €4 million mainly for technical assistance and equipment that meets international standards. Recommendations of the **2005 EU election observation mission** were partly included in the new electoral law.

The **European Commission co-organised the conference on the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared** which took place in **June 2008 in Vienna**. The UNRWA and the Lebanese Government had called jointly for 445 million USD, the donors who met in Vienna promised a total of 112 million USD, 10 million of which was pledged by the PLO. The EC will contribute a total of **€28 million** through ECHO (€13.5 million), the Instrument for Stability (€6.8 million) and the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (€8 million). This aid is destined for the UNRWA, to enable it to finance the biggest construction project it has yet undertaken.

Following the 2006 war, the **Paris III International Conference on Support for Lebanon** was held on 27 January 2007. It produced pledges of aid to a total value of \$7,613 million. The **European Commission** announced that it would contribute **\$486 million** over the period 2006-2010, while individual Member States pledged a total of \$1,136 million. **The European Investment Bank**, for its part, announced a number of grants and loans **totalling \$1,248 million** to inject additional cash into the financing of private-sector industrial activities, tourism, IT, services, health and education. The EC aid breaks down into **financial aid per se** – initially for socio-economic and political reform, economic recovery in Lebanon (local development, reconstruction, reinstatement of infrastructure and help for SMEs), the clearing of landmines and removal of unexploded bombs, and assistance to Lebanon's Palestinian refugees – and **macro-financial aid**, in the form of grants and loans. Lebanon is further eligible for support from the **European Neighbourhood Policy investment fund**, which aims to help attract finance for infrastructure, to promote investment and to support reform in key sectors in the EU's neighbour countries.

The **European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) EU-Lebanon Action Plan**, agreed in autumn 2006, has been the first step in a thoroughgoing reform

process that aims to modernise Lebanon's institutions, strengthen the rule of law, improve governance and oversight of the public purse and promote stability and economic development. **The total allocation** from the ENP instrument over the Plan's five-year timeframe (2007-2010) will be **€187 million**. The Action Plan's grants have later been integrated in the allocation of Paris III. As the Action Plan supports the outcomes of the conference, the priorities expressed by the Lebanese government during the conference have determined which elements of the Action Plan were followed first.

In **January 2007** the European Commission was able to make a start on projects under the Action Plan. In the course of that year, €50 million in EU aid was allocated to Lebanon for priority reforms with the Plan framework and for reconstruction. **The ambitious reforms foreseen in the Action Plan were, however, impeded by a number of political and structural constraints**. Out of 10 planned sub-committees for specific sectors, only six have so far met, and, with the exception of the Economy and Finance Sub-committee, they have not managed to take practical action. The political crisis made it hard to see projects through, particularly in the fields of institutional reform and good governance. Another obstacle to the implementation of institutional reforms has been the clientelist character of the Lebanese political system. The **absence of an overall reform plan of the Lebanese government** is explained by the political and economic weaknesses of the state. This has also prevented it from giving firm commitments to either its citizens or its partners. As the first year of the Plan's intended implementation ended, few of the activities envisaged were even on the agenda. A progress analysis completed in July 2008 recommends a redefinition of the Action Plan's objectives, in order to allow for short-term tangible success. The study suggests that the first priority should be to strengthen the institutions.

On 10 November 2008, the General Affairs **Council of the European Union** adopted a conclusion welcoming the Doha Agreement, the National Dialogue and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Syria. In the conclusion the EU also offers support for the Lebanese border management.

The recent **EU-Lebanon Association Council** took place in Brussels on **25 February 2009**.

Relations with the European Parliament

In a resolution adopted on 10 March 2005,¹ the European Parliament classified Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation. It does not appear, however, on the list of terrorist organisations kept by the EU or on that of the UN.²

In the aftermath of the Lebanon war in summer 2006, former EP President Borrell visited Lebanon in September 2006. An ad hoc delegation under the leadership of Véronique De Keyser to assess the situation after the conflict did not go ahead until April 2007.

¹ 473 votes in favour and 33 against, P6_TA(2005)0076: Parliament states in the resolution that it 'considers that clear evidence exists of terrorist activities on the part of Hezbollah and that the Council should take all necessary steps to curtail them'.

² The name of Hezbollah's head of information services, Imad Fayiz Mughniyah, was, exceptionally, included in the list the European's council adopted in 2005. In February 2008, Mughniyah died in a car bomb blast in Syria.

In the recent years the EP saw the visit of major representatives of the Lebanese political: PM Siniora (Strasbourg, September 2006), Saad Hariri (Brussels, March 2007), Michel Aoun (Strasbourg, September 2007), representatives of the March 14 Alliance (Brussels, November 2007), Amine Gemayel (Brussels, February 2009).

The last interparliamentary meeting was held in Brussels on 24 and 25 September 2008. The Lebanese delegation met with President Pöttering and the heads of the delegations to the Mashreq countries, Israel and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

On 22 May 2008 the EP adopted a resolution welcoming the possibility of movement on the Lebanese institutional crisis since the conclusion of the Doha Agreement.¹ Once the institutional logjam had been broken, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou visited Lebanon again, representing President Pöttering in the Lebanese Parliament on 25 May 2008 on the occasion of the election of President Sleiman.

Three days later the EP hosted a workshop, jointly organised by its Foreign Affairs Committee and the Delegation for Relations with the Mashreq Countries, on the subject of 'Challenges and perspectives related to the institutional and electoral reforms [in Lebanon]'. Experts invited to take part included Dr Ziad Baroud, a member of the Boutros Commission on electoral-law reform and incumbent Minister of Home Affairs.

President Pöttering paid an official visit to Lebanon in early August 2008 focusing on the challenges for the new government of national unity, the need to strengthen Lebanon's legitimate state institutions and its army, normalisation of relations between Lebanon and Syria and the necessary role of the European Union in bringing lasting peace to the region.

A Lebanese delegation participated in the recent EMPA meeting in Brussels on 16-17 March 2009 in Brussels.

¹ P6_TA(2008)0228

APPENDIX

Composition of the new Lebanese Government (11 July 2008)

- Prime Minister: Fouad Siniora (Sunni Muslim, unchanged)
- Deputy Prime Minister: Issam Abou-Jamra (Greek Orthodox Christian, new)
- Defence Minister: Elias Murr (Greek Orthodox, unchanged)
- Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants: Faouzi Salloukh (Shi'ite Muslim, unchanged)
- Finance Minister: Mohammad Chatah (Sunni, new)
- Home Affairs Minister: Ziad Baroud (Maronite Christian, new)
- Minister of State for Administrative Development: Ibrahim Chamseddine (Shi'ite, new)
- Telecommunications Minister: Gebrane Bassil (Maronite, new)
- Information Minister: Tarek Mitri (Greek Orthodox, change of portfolio)
- Justice Minister: Ibrahim Najjar (Greek Orthodox, new)
- Minister for Public Works and Transport: Ghazi Aridi (Druze, change of portfolio)
- Minister for Youth and Sport: Talal Arslane (Druze, new)
- Minister for Education and Higher Education: Bahia Hariri (Sunni, new)
- Minister for Displaced Persons: Raymond Audi (Greek Catholic Christian, new)
- Minister for Energy and Hydroelectric Resources: Alain Tabourian (Armenian, new)
- Labour Minister: Mohammad Fneich (Shi'ite, change of portfolio)
- Agriculture Minister: Elias Skaff (Greek Catholic, new)
- Health Minister: Mohammad Khalifé (Shi'ite, unchanged)
- Social Affairs Minister: Mario Aoun (Maronite, new)
- Industry Minister: Ghazi Zaaiteer (Shi'ite, new)
- Tourism Minister: Elie Marouni (Maronite, new)
- Culture Minister: Tamam Salam (Sunni, new)
- Environment Minister: Antoine Karam (Maronite, new)
- Minister for the Economy and Trade: Mohammad Safadi (Sunni, change of portfolio)
- Minister of State: Ali Kanso (Shi'ite, new)
- Minister of State: Khaled Kabbani (Sunni, change of portfolio)
- Minister of State: Jean Oghassepian (Armenian, change of portfolio)
- Minister of State: Waël Bou-Faour (Druze, new)
- Minister of State: Nassib Lahoud (Maronite, new)
- Minister of State: Youssef Takla (Greek Catholic, new)

Distribution of seats in the Lebanese Parliament

Official results of the Lebanese legislative elections of June 2005			
Alliance	Seats	Political party	Seats
Anti-Syrian bloc	72	Future Movement (Saad Hariri)	36
		Progressive Socialist Party (Walid Jumblatt)	16
		Lebanese Forces (Samir Geagea)	5
		Qornet Shehwan: Lebanese Phalangists and National Liberal Party (Dory Chamoun)	6
		Tripoli bloc	4
		Democratic Renewal Movement	1
		<u>Democratic Left Movement</u>	1
		Independent	4
Pro-Syrian bloc	35	Resistance and Development bloc (Amal, Nabih Berri)	15
		Loyalty to the Resistance bloc (Hezbollah, Mohammad Raad)	14
		Syrian Nationalist Social Party	2
		Others	4
Aoun Alliance	21	Free Patriotic Movement	14
		Skaff bloc	5
		Murr bloc	2
Total			128

Distribution of parliamentary seats after the Doha Agreement

- Maronite Christians: 34 seats
- Greek Orthodox Christians: 14 seats
- Greek Catholic Christians: 8 seats
- Orthodox Armenians: 5 seats
- Catholic Armenians: 1 seat
- Protestant (Evangelical) Christians: 1 seat
- Christian minorities: 1 seat
- Sunni Muslims: 27 seats
- Shi'ite Muslims: 27 seats
- Druze Muslims: 8 seats
- Alawite Muslims: 2 seats