



DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B - Policy Department -

STUDY

Ways and means to enhance ACP parliaments' role in the formulation of the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and parliaments' oversight of the utilisation of the European Development Funds (EDF), especially in the context of budget support

Contents:

The aim of this study is provide a concise and readable set of analysis and recommendations towards enhancing the role of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of Parliaments in the formulation of the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and the European Parliament's (EP) oversight of the utilisation of the European Development Funds (EDF), with particular reference to budget support. The policy recommendations provided within this study are made within the existing constitutional orders in force, and aim to improve oversight and governance of the EDF and direct budget support monies through inter-institutional and political cultural measures.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Parliament.

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DG EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B, POLICY DEPARTMENT

Bristol, 23 March 2005

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This note has been prepared for the information of Members of the European Parliament. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Parliament.

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1. Introduction

1.1 The aim of this study is provide a concise and readable set of analysis and recommendations towards enhancing the role of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of Parliaments in the formulation of the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and the European Parliament's (EP) oversight of the utilisation of the European Development Funds (EDF), with particular reference to budget support. The policy recommendations provided within this study are made within the existing constitutional orders in force, and aim to improve oversight and governance of the EDF and direct budget support monies through inter-institutional and political cultural measures.

1.2 This study will explore and analyse the three main thematic issues within the external development policy of the EU towards the ACP countries: the formulation of the CSP, the implementation and oversight of the CSP by the ACP Parliaments and the European Parliament and the European Parliamentary oversight of direct budget support. The study uses information provided by the institutions of the EU, reports written by NGOs on this issue and academic literature.

1.3 This study's recommendations are listed in the conclusion to this study. These recommendations are built upon the general conclusions that: ACP Parliaments are not sufficiently engaged in the work of the EDF but that this can be changed without affecting the constitutional orders in force; that the EP is institutionally prevented from exercising effective oversight of the EDF and that is runs contrary to the policy of the EU as regards other regions and that direct budget support should be the preferred mode of delivery for the EDF because it is highly efficient and also because it produces important political cultural changes in both recipient countries (and the EU) that will lead to positive social changes in the recipient countries.

2. What is the ACP?

By way of background the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) was created in 1975 with 46 governments signing the Lome I convention. There have been three other 'Lome Agreements (1975-2000) which have altered the terms, but not the underlying ethos of co-operation. In protracted negotiations between 1998 and 2000 77 ACP governments negotiated and signed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000 – 2020) which came into force in April 2003.

2.1.1The Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement enshrines three collective concerns of the EU and the ACP States' which are: Development Cooperation, Trade, and Political Dimensions (which focuses on capacity building and good governance.)

The Agreement specifies three further *areas of support* in addition to the 'thematic or crosscutting issues' to be promoted within all development initiatives of gender, environment and institutional development, which are:

- Economic development (including, for instance, support for structural adjustment),
- social and human development (including, for instance, promotion of social dialogue) and

- regional integration and cooperation (an area where the EC has developed an expertise and comparative advantage).¹

The ACP-EU partnership was the first major initiative established under the agreement and put in place the idea that political dialogue should be at the heart of this policy area. The ACP-EU partnership was established to make efforts to achieve the three over-arching initiatives more credible². At the EU's insistence the concept of 'good governance' was included as a 'fundamental element', whose violation, in itself, could not lead to a suspension of EU aid but could be a contributory factor towards suspension³. It was agreed however that serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery, could trigger a consultation process, possibly leading to a suspension of aid (as a measure of last resort).⁴ This is an element of conditionality on aid that is analysed on pages 18/19 of this study and which can be used to further enhance the role of member governments on the ACP-EU body.

2.1.2 ACP-EU Joint Institutions - Governance

The provisions for governance established by the Cotonou Agreement have come in three guises, and all performing different roles with different institutional actors contained within. These three official joint institutions oversee ACP-EU cooperation. There are also several other organisations directly or indirectly linked to the implementation of the Agreement.

ACP-EU cooperation is formally steered by three 'official' bodies, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA).

2.1.3 The ACP-EU Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers and Committee of Ambassadors are two intergovernmental bodies overseeing the execution of joint activities between the ACP and the EU. The Council of Ministers is made up of members from the Council of the EU, representatives of the European Commission, and a member of the government of each ACP country and is the principal institutional authority. The President of the Council alternates between the European Union and the ACP and meets - as a rule - once a year. As with all intergovernmental institutions the Council of Ministers is affected by the more general influence of national and therefore governmental indicators of esteem and leverage, such a the weight of financial contribution and influence and links with external intergovernmental organizations. Analysts have long written that this gives disproportionate influence to governments who able to donate large sums of money and who have strong international links.

That a function of EU external development policy has two intergovernmental institutions overseeing it is not necessarily surprising if development policy is to be seen as a function of the EU's broader external relations policy although it should be noted that the EP has always sought to maintain the distinction between Development and Foreign Policy. Despite there

¹ ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: The Cotonou Agreement at a Glance (2). Maastricht: ECDPM

² Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

³ The EU had initially favoured a position that good governance would become an essential element and therefore could constitute suspension. Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

⁴ ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: Innovations in the Cotonou Agreement (4). Maastricht: ECDPM.

being no foreign policy dimension to the ACP-EU partnership (i.e. the EU is not using EDF monies to engineer foreign policy outcomes, aside from conditionality) Development Policy looks set to remain within intergovernmental instruments because of the role member governments play in directly financing projects and programmes.

2.1.4 *The ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors*

The Committee of Ambassadors supports the Council of Ministers in executing its responsibilities and in completing tasks delegated to it by the Council. The Committee also monitors the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The Committee consists of, from the EU, the Permanent Representative of each EU Member government and a representative of the Commission and, from the ACP Parliaments, the head of mission of each ACP state to the EU, with an alternating chairmanship between the ACP and the EU. This structure mirrors the role played by the Permanent Representations of Member Governments. It also reinforces the analysis that the joint activities associated with the ACP-EU bodies are governed by a predominantly intergovernmental culture – one that this study later concludes does not assist the effective oversight and scrutiny of the monies allocated through the EU budget.

2.1.5 The Joint Parliamentary Assembly

The Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) exists to strengthen regional integration and foster co-operation between national Parliaments. Its formal role is to; promote democratic processes through dialogue and consultation; facilitate greater understanding between the peoples of the European Union and those of the ACP states and raise public awareness of development issues; discuss issues pertaining to development and the ACP-EU partnership; adopt resolutions and make recommendations to the Council of Ministers with a view to achieving the objectives of the Agreement.

The Assembly is composed of an equal numbers of EU and ACP parliamentary representatives and meets twice a year in plenary session, alternately in a European Union and an ACP country. EU and ACP parliamentarians have suggested that one way of improving participation in the joint forums is to arrange regional or sub-regional meetings. There is very little evidence of these meetings taking place, although this study concludes that greater efforts should be made in this regard. The Assembly is in regular contact with opinion formers, stakeholders and end-user groups within the EU (through ECOSOC) and the ACP countries to assess, in a non-formalised fashion, whether the objectives of the Agreement are being attained.¹ These processes seem to point towards a laudable political culture of outreach programmes and soft-checks and accountability over these programmes, but without a formal oversight or the ability to initiate programme change, a significant hamper to the involvement of the EP in this area.

2.2 What is currently in place for EP Oversight of EDF?

¹ ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: The Institutions (6). Maastricht: ECDPM.

The Cotonou Agreement runs for twenty years (2000-2020), but within this timeframe there are three marker points where every 5 years a 'financial protocol' has to be agreed and appended to the agreement. This protocol indicates how much money the EC will put at the disposal of the ACP countries over the next five years and is therefore a very significant part of the support provided under this policy area.

Unlike funds for cooperation measures with other development regions the funds for cooperation with the ACP countries do not come from the EU's general budget. There is a separate funding mechanism for the ACP, known as the European Development Fund (EDF) and EU member governments affirm their individual contributions to the Fund. Because each Member Government is responsible for negotiating and allocating individual monies for the EDF the EP does not have any direct oversight of the Fund. MEPs are involved in dialogue with ACP country representatives in the limited context of the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly which, as discussed above has a series of informal checking and consultative mechanisms. MEPs can also contact EC delegates in the context of ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors, ACP-EU Council of Ministers and ACP country NAO-EC (National Authorising Officer) Delegate meetings, although in practice there is virtually no contact at the NAO-EC level. This offers a very limited opportunity for directly elected MEPs to influence the bureaucratic and political actors involved in allocating monies to the EDF and monitoring the effective implementation of development funding.

Negotiations began in 2004 to 'budgetise' the EDF and so bring it into line with other EU funding mechanisms for cooperation with all other developing regions.¹ If these negotiations are successful, the EDF will be part of the EC budget as a whole rather than being a separate Fund. This will automatically improve the ability of the EP to oversee the allocation and implementation of monies and projects associated with this activity.

The Cotonou Agreement focuses aid contributions on national development strategies and sectoral policies. This focus has resulted in a restriction of the number of project aid initiatives funded and a similar restriction of development focussed sectors benefiting from EU funding. Such a change has resulted in a change to the delivery of EU development aid and the Cotonou Agreement actively promotes the use of 'budget support'. Budget support is the direct payment by the EU into the budget of an ACP country to specific sectors which are jointly negotiated and set out in the CSP. The benefits of direct budget support are described as being stronger local ownership of the funding and the resultant projects, a means by which to achieve greater impact of the funding through locally directed application of this money and in improving the sustainability of the assistance provided.²

Successful 'budgetisation' of the EDF, in the context of direct budget support as a tool of aid delivery, is likely to streamline the delivery of this aid and make the process of funds disbursement more transparent and efficient. The result will be budget-to-budget aid which in theory will be more easily distributed and therefore be seen as being efficient to both the European tax payers who ultimately have donated these funds, and the ACP public who are the ultimate end-users of such funds.

¹ ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade, "Draft Report on budgetisation of the European Development Fund" – Rapporteurs David Matongo and Thierry Cornillet, 23rd November 2004

² Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

3. CSP Formulation

3.1 *The role of the Country Strategy Papers (CSP)*

CSPs are the foundational documents which underpin the cooperation between the EU and any given ACP country. The CSP establishes an analysis of the recipient country's situation and priorities, as well as to identify a package of appropriate EC support measures. In theory, the CSP is prepared through extensive dialogue with different bureaucratic, political and end-user groups within the recipient country, but in practice this is rarely the case.

More specifically, CSPs – for any ACP Country - is governed by Chapter 1, Article 2 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Joint ACP-EU Participatory Agreement and therefore includes: an assessment of the country's political, economic and social situation; an assessment of its basic needs; an outline of the countries medium term development strategy; an outline of the activities of other donors in the country to ensure complementarity and coherence; response strategies detailing how the EC can contribute to the country's development; a definition of support mechanisms to implement the strategies; the National Indicative Programme (NIP) which is part of the CSP and compiled by each ACP country.

The NIP is an important document within this process. It provides all the performance indicators and benchmarking criteria that governs aid to a particular recipient country. The NIP describes the sectors and areas that will receive EC aid, explains how the aid will fulfil its stated objectives, provides implementation timetables, and specifies how state and non-state actors will be involved in the cooperation programmes. The NIP is subject to annual as well as mid-term and end-of-the-term reviews; this makes it an important process for the governance, oversight and accountability of EU development assistance to the ACP countries.¹

3.2 *How are CSPs formulated?*

Formally, CSPs are created through an extensive dialogue between the National Authorising Officer (NAO) (an official appointed by the recipient ACP government to represent it in all EC supported initiatives and to ensure that relevant projects and programmes are properly implemented and executed) and various national and sub-national political, NGO and end-user groups.² In reality analysts suggest that the document is written by the NAO with only a 'light-touch' consultation with end-user groups but mainly in consultation with the EC delegate to the relevant ACP country, and also often with a representative from the European Investment Bank.

The disjuncture between the theory and practice of CSP formulation is worrying; the current practice implies an absence of end-user involvement in the allocation of substantial amounts of EU development aid. The Cotonou Agreement inadvertently pre-empted this problem with a system of flexible 'programming', based on the following principles of: a flexible and regular review mechanism that makes it possible to continuously update the Country Support Strategy (CSS) - which is synonymous with the CSP - and the volume and direction of

¹ The Cotonou Agreement. A Users Guide for Non-State Actors ACP Secretariat, Brussels, Belgium. Copyright[©] 2003 ACP Secretariat.

resources allocated to programmes as part of an iterative review of need and the performance of development aid. The Agreement specified that this review process should be decentralised and therefore enshrined the idea that the CSP is an integral part of programming and dialogue between the EC and the recipient country.¹ The EP has a potentially strong role to play within this process. The JPA and the contact points developed within this body affords the EP a strong voice opportunity in holding to account EC development aid and placing vocal pressure on the review process to amend programmes if and when they are going awry or could be improved.

3.3 A role for National Parliaments in CSP formulation?

EDF programmes aim to alleviate poverty, suffering and provide opportunities for equal access to opportunities in recipient countries. The programmes serve an important function and impact on the civil society of a recipient country. One might expect, therefore, that national parliaments – representing civil society – would be involved in creating the CSP. Taking the example of participating African governments a study conducted by APRODEV², (the organisation of seventeen major development NGOs in the EU) examined the CSPs for 40 African States. Of these 40 the report noted that a "wide range of actors" were consulted, although it does not add a value judgment about the extent of this consultation or the impact the consultation had on the final CSP document but that only one country, Angola, specifically noted that it had consulted domestic Parliamentary committees when constructing their CSP. Such consultation might bring development ambitions more closely in line with the views of end-users, and therefore should be supported. It would not guarantee a more representative policy, however.

3.3.1 A larger role for national parliaments in CSP formulation?

There are a limited number of clear examples of 'good practice' regarding ACP parliamentary consultation and review in the formulation of CSPs. These include the case of Malawi that is outlined in Section 4.3.2 – a parliament that is beset by constitutionally enshrined weakness and which sits at the periphery of politics in that country – that demonstrated some positive initiatives in regard of formulating CSPs. It should be noted that national parliamentary involvement was not specified under the terms of Annex IV (Cotonou Agreement) unlike the involvement of non-state actors which was.

A possible outcome of the failure to note the importance of parliamentary involvement in this process is that whilst national parliamentarians are aware of the Joint Assembly and the ACP-EU efforts, they do not perceive that they need to be involved in this process, or indeed that they can be involved in this process. The APRODEV report demonstrates that the culture of involvement might be beginning to permeate African parliaments, but that this is at a very early stage.

Poverty reduction has a relatively well developed profile in development circles – it is the priority of many independent EU government development policies – and thus there is a greater awareness of the need for the involvement of elected representatives in drawing up

¹ ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: The Instruments (7). Maastricht: ECDPM.

²APRODEV, "Rapid survey of 40 ACP Country Support Strategies: What about civil society participation?" (September 2002)

poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), including reviewing priorities of the NIP of the CSP. The further development of this practice will be incremental given that building capacity for parliamentarian involvement is a key development concern for many states.

Improving recipient countries parliamentary involvement can be enhanced by the EP using the Joint Assembly as it currently stands to influence and pressure delegates from the ACP to improve consultation with Parliaments. Moreover, the engagement between MEPs and end-user groups in ACP countries through regional and sub-regional meetings is another important way MEPs can influence this process. The pivotal role of the NAO in the creation of the CSP makes influencing this actor in the process an important way of ensuring well-rounded consultation. The EP has well formed informal networks with the Council, the Commission but not with the NAO / recipient countries, which is limited to contact within EP missions. One of the conclusions of this study is that the link with the NAOs should be improved. Through these networks the EP can use its voice opportunities and levels of influence to encourage national parliamentary involvement, including perhaps using the regional and sub-regional meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly to discuss aspects of the CSP and thus enhance the role of national parliaments within their formulation.

3.4 *What policy areas do they influence?*

The policy areas that the CSP focuses on are documented in the NIP section of each country's CSP. (See Annex I).

3.5 Enforcement of the CSP

The enforcement end of the CSP and Joint EU-ACP actions is governed by Annex IV of the Conotou Agreement. More particularly, Chapter 1 Programming (National) Article 5 - Review Process states that: "(3) "the National Authorising Officer and the Head of Delegation shall:

a) take all necessary measures to ensure adherence to the provisions of the indicative programme (NIP), including ensuring that the timetable of commitments and disbursements agreed at the time is adhered to; and

b) determine any causes of delay in implementation and propose suitable measures to remedy the situation."

This firmly vests responsibility for the enforcement of the joint action and the CSP with the NAO, who is appointed by the recipient country and the Head of the EU delegation. Neither of these officials is directly accountable to either the host parliament, nor the European Parliament. These provisions are also drawn very widely and therefore offers an imprecise measure of success or failure, compliance and non-compliance with the measures.

Furthermore, Chapter 3 'Project Implementation' and within this 'Article15 - Project Identification, preparation and appraisal' puts in place provisions for projects agreed to by the ACP-EC Development Finance Cooperation Committee. Each project is subject to joint appraisal from the Committee and recipient country with the Cooperation Committee being pledged – under Article 15 to create general guidelines for such an appraisal.

3.5.1 *Rolling programming.*

The Cotonou Agreement introduces a system of 'rolling' programming in which progress in the implementation of the NIP is systematically reviewed. The programming exercise is the national (or regional) process of consultation between the EU and ACP governments (or regional bodies) in which the initial allocation of resources to a country (or region) is planned. It determines the priority sectors for support, the type of assistance to be provided and the most appropriate agencies for implementation. In keeping with the desire of the Commission to decentralise, the primary responsibility for the programming process falls on delegations, working closely with the partner government (the National Authorising Officer) and in consultation with non-state actors (although anecdotally this is an aspiration as opposed to reality). In cases of poor performance, programmes can be adjusted or withdrawn, with the attendant risk for the recipient government of losing the resources involved. These savings may then be redirected to better performing ACP countries. Theoretically speaking non-state actors can participate in performance reviews. This gives them a significant opportunity – that is under-utilised currently - to monitor the use of funds facilitated by the Cotonou Agreement.¹ ACP Parliamentarians and MEPs should also be included in this review process and therefore in an oversight function as interested and competent parties to this policy.

4. Implementation and the Review process

4.1 Current Review process

The performance criteria (listed 4.2.1) are currently reviewed by the ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation committee within an annual operational review, consisting of a stock-taking exercise, and summarizing the results of the dialogue with the recipient country and to review the operational programming perspective for the coming review period.² The current reviews cover the mid-term of the first generation of CSPs and highlights questions around whether the review process is rigorous enough and whether the local consultations have been effective. ³ This latter prescription, to review the operation programming perspective, is particularly prescient at the mid and end of the Financial Protocol's application period, with the annual review including a discussion of the CSS, leading either to a confirmation of the orientation of the strategy or suggesting appropriate adjustments; including adjustments to resource allocation. The parties have undertaken to respect specified time limits for completion of each review - the annual operational review shall be completed within a period of 60 days and this is extended by a further 30 days when the CSS is to also be analysed.⁴

4.2 *What role do national ACP parliaments have in monitoring or implementing ACP Work?* **4.2.1** *In theory*

The parliaments "oversee government policy in general, and the budgetary process in particular."⁵ This ensures separation of powers and counterbalances the power of the executive branch. This role is important as it provides a line of accountability to ensure the

¹ ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: Participating in Programming (9). Maastricht: ECDPM.

²http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/overview_en.htm

³ Dearden, S. "The reform of the European Union's development policy", EU Policy Network, 2

⁴ http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/overview_en.htm

⁵ ibid

effective and financially efficient execution of national policies in line with the agreed conditionality.¹ Parliaments are also responsible for ensuring that the government acts transparently and that any potential abuses being carried out by governments are restricted. Effective parliaments are therefore an essential part of what the EC describes as 'competent states' and furthermore national parliamentarians are important players in ensuring good national governance.²

Parliamentarians, because of their necessary link to sub-national areas and constituencies should play an essential role in establishing where there are development orientated priorities. Moreover, and particularly in the case of Burundi and to a lesser extent Rwanda their parliaments have played an important role in the re-establishment of the rule of law and post conflict reconstruction (within the NIP) when there was an absence of functioning government and the role of the state has been undermined and detrimentally affected by political instability. The example of Rwanda is not clear cut - the EU's Election Monitor Colette Flesch refused to validate the election results as 'free and fair' which undermines the positive role played by the domestic parliament in post-conflict state-building. Parliaments should be further involved in this process as part of a wider global expectation, that of the World Bank and other major institutions, to reduce poverty through the ownership of these issues and the strategies that underpin them by the recipient country. Again, because of the representative function performed by Parliamentarians they are ideally placed to take a leading role on these issues. Moreover, Parliaments are involved in the process of managing the national budget including, oversight and approval of expenditure on poverty reduction initiatives, monitoring and evaluation of their impact, and legislative activities.

One of the features of the Cotonou Agreement is that various stakeholders are involved in drawing up PRSPs (a change in the international community that has occurred in the last decade) and reviewing their implementation. According to a joint review of the PRSP process by the IMF and World Bank, parliamentary involvement in the formulation and oversight of PRSP - and more specifically CSPs - has been "the exception rather than the rule".³ This sentiment applies equally to CSP formulation; however, the study notes that there are promising exceptions to this general rule. Whilst the large number of countries that are yet to address this institutional deficit must qualify any commendation of best practice, Tanzania, Mauritania, Benin, Guyana and Ghana may be noted as countries that have made efforts to increase parliamentary participation in the PRSP process and oversight.

A World Bank conference on this issue of "parliamentary involvement in poverty reduction" in September 2003 highlighted Mauritania as a country that had a comparative level of parliamentary involvement during the design of PRSP.⁴ This includes MPs forming a working committee monitoring the PRSP process. Tanzania was noted for having 'involved members of Parliament in the discussion and presentation of the results from various regional

¹ ibid

² Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

³Frederick C. Stapenhurst and Riccardo Pelizzo "A Bigger Role for Legislatures" Finance and Development, A guarterly magazine of the IMF, Vol.39, No. 4, December 2002.

⁴ "Parliamentary Involvement in Poverty Reduction: Perspectives on the Past and Potential for the Future" Helsinki, Finland, September 15 – 19, 2003

http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/106193/helsinki%202003/pdf/pgpr0903_sharkey.pdf

workshops on poverty reduction issues.¹ Although it is difficult to ascertain whether this kind of 'evidence' is more than just the executive giving the appearance of parliamentary involvement. Furthermore, Benin and Ghana were also commended for encouraging national assembly review of PRSP implementation. Notably, however only four countries have had formal parliamentary votes on the PRSP: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal. Only in Niger was this representative of substantive participation and as the APRODEV paper notes, only Angola specifically mentioned parliamentary involvement with regards CSP and the NIP.²

The involvement of parliaments in these types of exercises helps them participate more effectively, and brings the monitoring of these activities closer to the ultimate end-users, the recipient country's public despite the formal channel of contact between the country and the EC is the executive branch (through the National Authorizing Officer, who is a government minister). The effect these efforts have are difficult to quantify – practitioners regard them as being useful however.

National parliaments do indeed have a useful part to play under the Cotonou Agreement, although not specifying the role of parliaments in detail, outside of the JPA, they hold debates on overall aid strategies, encouraging dialogue with non-state actors, and monitoring and maintaining budgetary control of project implementation. Parliaments can only be meaningfully involved in the ACP-EC cooperation process if they are given capacity building support and there role can be enhanced if they take further steps to:

• encourage national participation and dialogue on the Cotonou Agreement;

• ensure that citizens are involved in diagnosing and analyzing poverty;

• support a legislative framework conducive to national development and cooperation priorities;

- monitor the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement;
- take part in the international dialogue on the Agreement through the JPA.
- review the budget to check that it is correctly allocated;
- monitor the impact of programmes.³

4.2.2 *In practice*

Among other things the Cotonou Agreement emphasizes the need to strengthen the JPA as a democratic foundation for ACP-EC partnership, but it says little about the role of ACP national parliaments in this cooperation process. ACP parliaments are said, by their own parliamentarians, to lack institutional capacity to aid the work that could be usefully done to support the development agenda.⁴ These problems manifest themselves in the following ways: staffing and equipment are inadequate, parliamentarians sometimes lack facilities and

¹ Frederick C. Stapenhurst and Riccardo Pelizzo "A Bigger Role for Legislatures" Finance and Development, A guarterly magazine of the IMF, Vol.39, No. 4, December 2002.

² "Parliaments: the missing link in democratising national policy making" Bretton Woods Project, 5th April 2004, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=i-126-6edd9ada1734c6c195428944249fc1a0

³ Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

capacity, knowledge of technical issues is limited and there is little or no access to specialized, independent expertise. This problem has been further compounded, argue the "Utstein Group of bilateral donors", by governments deliberately excluding Parliaments in national consultations on development issues.¹ Without an appropriate agenda or adequate infrastructural support parliamentary work may have only a limited impact on the decisions taken by the executive branch.

Although the Agreement was ratified by all the ACP parliaments before taking effect in 2002, studies have shown that awareness amongst national parliamentarians' varies widely with it being, overall, largely unknown; with some parliamentarians being totally unaware of its existence.² This problem appears to have stemmed from an absence of specific dialogue and consultation between governments and their respective parliamentarians merely registered its existence. This phenomena is not restricted to the EU-ACP effort, for example the World Bank runs a Parliamentary Network that offers training courses and interparliamentary consultations and the Bank and UNDP have initiated a programme to raise awareness in Parliaments of development goals and programmes entitled 'Parliament, governance and poverty reduction', which is made up of three pillars:

- strengthening of parliaments' monitoring function (capacity of specialised committees),
- networking
- parliaments' role in reducing poverty.

As is evident from many CSP NIPs, parliamentary involvement is currently limited but ACP countries are aware of the need for democratic and parliamentary process in the formulation and implementation of development strategies. The EP can focus a relatively modest effort in encouraging and facilitating improvements to national parliaments' capacity and technical expertise available to ACP parliamentarians. This is even more relevant, "...In countries where legislatures have significant budgetary role, the national assembly has even greater potential to affect a country's adherence to established poverty reduction strategies through its allocation of resources to implementing ministries"³ From the point of view of accountability of implementation of funds, the EP would gain considerably through dialogue and support to national assemblies.

4.3 How can national ACP parliaments play a larger role in implementation and review process?

4.3.1 A larger role for national parliaments in CSP review

Within the annual, mid- and end-of-term reviews of the CSP there are clear opportunities for national parliaments to play a significant role. The mid-term review process, for instance, has three phases: Phase 1: Preparation, Phase 2: Local review, Phase 3: Resource allocation. In a table produced by Jonas Frederiksen for the European Centre for Development Policy

¹ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231 ² Corres Cwonzelle, "Parliaments and Developments The island as the select Whether it was the select of the select o

² Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

³ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p2

Management it is clear that a local level role for national parliamentarians has been conspicuously left out.¹ (See Annex 2)

National parliaments should be excluded from Phase Three as it would be inappropriate for them to have a role in directly appropriating further resource from the EDF. However, there is clear role for domestic parliaments – as one of the end-user groups of the EDF – in the Phase One preparation of the review, to make their role in the JPA meaningful and Phase Two the local review of the CSP. The European Parliament can make strenuous efforts through the JPA and its contacts with ACP Parliamentarians to instil the importance of national parliaments taking a more developed role in the CSP/NIP review process.

4.3.2 A larger role for national parliaments in implementation

An enhanced role for national ACP parliaments can most effectively emerge through the efforts of those bodies. Parliaments should ultimately create a framework that encourages debate and helps resolve disputes between parties and / or interested local user groups. Individual parliamentarians do, after all, perform a representative role between the institution of Parliament and the public. Despite the existence of the JPA, parliamentarians play only a marginal part in development programmes. Paradoxically, there is considerable emphasis on non-state actors, especially NGOs whereas elected representatives are only rarely involved in development programmes. This is a serious failing at a time when the importance of good governance is increasingly acknowledged. Given this state of affairs it is worth bearing in mind that parliamentary capacity can be encouraged through work between parliamentarians and NGOS. The media can also be used a valuable ally in promoting dialogue between parliament, regions, groups and individuals.

In encouraging participation by civil society, the private sector and economic and social partners, parliament must ensure effective interaction between (a) the NAO and the government departments concerned with the Cotonou Agreement and (b) non-state actors.² This builds on the criticism that NAOs have, thus far, been relatively remote figures who have consulted largely with high-level institutional figures rather than regional or sub-regional end-user figures.

The possibility of setting up a permanent structure within each national parliament to encourage discussion of the use of funding from the 9th EDF onwards has been discussed within end-user groups and the JPA.³ A proposal that has garnered a good level of support is the establishment of a special committee or working group with members representing several political parties and various development disciplines within the national parliament.

Support to national parliaments should come in the form of resources allocated for national and regional meetings of parliamentary committees and groups, for workshops on parliamentary involvement in CSP/PRSP formulation, implementation and oversight. There is good evidence that even when Parliament has a limited analytical capacity to deal with PRSP

¹ Jonas Frederiksen, "Mid-term Reviews: Performance-based partnerships in ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 5, October 2004,InBrief no . Maastricht: ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management

² Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

policies they can provide an important platform from which parliamentary and public awareness of the issues are built – as well as meeting elements of the conditionality imposed on direct budget support through improving transparency measures.¹

Cooperation should also extend between inter-institutional state – non-state actor cooperation in building capacity within the parliament for technical advisory roles and support. This has the effect of creating a useful knowledge bank of information, advice and policy support that helps bridge the expertise gap currently exposed in the role of the parliaments in the EDF work.² This strategy is supported through many ACP states' CSPs, so whilst there may currently be a democratic deficit in CSP formulation, implementation and oversight, there is reason to be optimistic; that at the five year review mark, some institutional capacity for further parliamentary involvement will have been established.

Angola and Malawi are two good examples of the institutionalisation of parliamentary working groups on development strategy formulation. In Malawi the parliament, which has very limited powers and influence within the constitution and is subject to extensive criticism for being part of a 'shadow democracy', did take some positive steps including taking receiving extensive civic testimony before the Budget and Finance committee: "In Malawi, Parliamentary interest in monitoring the PRSP provided the opportunity for a historic first. On May 6 and 7, 2002 four civil society networks representing more than 80 Malawian NGOs testified at a public hearing before the Parliament's Budget and Finance Committee. These NGO representatives, the first in Malawi's multi-party history to testify before parliamentary committee, presented documentation and testimony regarding the delivery of government services in key sectors of the economy including health, education and agriculture. MPs from the Agriculture, Education and Health Committees also attended the hearing. As a result, the Committee drew heavily on the findings of the networks' monitoring activities to table a 54 page Pre-Budget report and issue a post-Budget report tracking expenditures for established priorities."³

A large number of parliamentarians are already involved in sectoral issues or regional working groups, but without having connected this agenda to possible poverty reduction and explicit development agendas. Linking development agendas with these sectoral or geographical interests institutionalises the development agenda and poverty reduction initiatives. The corollary of this is that issue related committees would benefit from regional cooperation and inter-institutional dialogue, in forums like, for example, the SADC or within the ACP Assembly which can then be represented in the Joint ACP-EU Assembly.⁴ Capacity constraints clearly do prevent many national parliaments from taking a developed role in participatory integrations but they can incrementally enhance their role through successive CSPs and also through holding special commissions, hearings and other events that include

¹ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p2

² Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p4

³ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p15

⁴ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p9

and reflect the views of end-users and civic actors. This incremental change will be catalysed by inter-institutional consultation on parliamentary concerns at draft CSP stage, review of CSP stage and possibly budget review stage.

Greater involvement of parliaments in the CSP process can be achieved through a full examination of the full PRSP. For example: "A parliament is much more likely to approve a budget that reflects already agreed upon PRSP priorities if it has been involved in the initial priority setting process."¹ Review of the draft CSP between parliamentary representatives and EU representatives builds donor-recipient rapport and also builds capacity for genuine "ownership of the development strategy. Donor confidence and parliamentarian confidence through institutional dialogue at EU-ACP level is a capacity building tool to ensure effective and transparent implementation of development strategies.

4.4. Can practices of good governance and accountability of implementation be increased through inter-institutional practices?

The European Centre for Development Policy Management argues that relations between the national parliaments and the JPA could be enhanced, thereby strengthening the operation of the JPA itself.² Bringing national parliaments more effectively into the ACP-EU partnership merits further exploration, especially in terms of building extra expert capacity, as discussed above. Enhancing the capacity with ACP Parliaments should result in greater democratic accountability of ACP-EU Cooperation and possibly new opportunities to hold projects to account.

The current preference for direct budget support produces a requirement to monitor the distribution and use of the funds; particularly to ensure that there is no impropriety in the use of donated money. In this regard donors have a theoretical reliance on the recipient parliament's monitoring systems and therefore the parliament itself becomes the object of donor scrutiny.³ In practice donors have to exert pressure on recipient governments for audit evidence concerning donated sums. National parliaments can do more to ensure that JPA topics are viewed and overseen by an appropriate committee. The JPA, for its part, could usefully improve its dissemination of discussions, reports and minutes from its meetings to the plenary sessions and national parliaments.

ACP representatives are keen to see enhanced levels of interparliamentary dialogue as well as dialogue with the JPA and existing regional parliamentary assemblies (such as ECOWAS or the SADC Parliamentary Forum) on the main issues arising from ACP-EC cooperation. Moreover, there should be greater numbers of debates between ACP parliaments to facilitate more productive discussions in the Joint ACP-EU Assembly.⁴

¹ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p11 ² "What role can ACP parliaments play in implementing the Cotonou Partnership Agreement", Cotonou Newsletter

No 7, March 2003, European Centre for Development Policy Management

³ Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

Thematically specific dialogue would also be a welcome initiative. According to Hubli and Mandaville parliaments engaged in aspects of a PRSP process like, for example, determining the non-quantitative aspects of poverty, establishing legislative priorities, reviewing annual budgets, communicating with constituents about initiatives, or exercising expenditure oversight and project evaluation would have a valuable contribution to make to regional and pan-regional debates on poverty reduction and development goals. ¹ Specifically the work of national ACP parliaments in this regard could be discussed through representatives of the JPA and through parliamentarian-NAO dialogue, which is then addressed through NAO-EC Delegate dialogue. As the joint experience of many parliaments and parliamentarians grow the value of the exchanges they enjoy and the collective wisdom they garner also grows. With this comes the potential for pooling and sharing resources, officials and ways of working – greatly adding value to the monetary contributions being made in these countries. Other inter-institutional means are covered in Annex 3: "Supporting Global or Regional Parliamentary Network Activity" provided by Hubli and Mandaville.²

4.4.1. *Regional inter-institutional practices*

Other ACP countries and parliaments have shown interest in assisting with interparliamentary dialogue at a regional level. The ACP Secretariat facilitated an event for the national parliaments of the Pacific region, in September 2002.³ This event brought together representatives of parliaments in the region for a two-day meeting, on the same pattern as the national seminars. Further evidence of this can be seen through the efforts of the Belgian State Secretary for Cooperation who supported a 'series of awareness-raising seminars in Africa. Six seminars have since been organized for national parliaments in Niger, Benin, Burkino Faso, Senegal, Rwanda, and for the SACU region.

These efforts are undoubtedly a positive way of improving dialogue and spreading best practice between the EU and ACP countries. They should be supported and encouraged as a financially efficient way of improving the delivery of over-arching policy goals.

4.4.2. *Global inter-institutional practices (specifically ACP-EU initiatives)*

Donors, like the EU, have a long tradition of working with governments, but cooperation with parliaments is a relatively recent development and provides issues and working practices that are still being developed. Donors are increasingly aware, it seems, that parliamentarians play an important role in providing support for national parliaments. This in turn provides an important democratic validity in the recipient country.

EU-ACP initiatives

The partnership framework provided by the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) suffered from a 'democratic deficit', since cooperation between the ACP countries and the EU was organised in a highly centralised fashion. The Cotonou Agreement has done away with this approach, adopting the principle of participatory democracy and focusing on the need to strengthen the

¹ Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p17

² ibid

³ "What role can ACP parliaments play in implementing the Cotonou Partnership Agreement", Cotonou Newsletter No 7, March 2003, European Centre for Development Policy Management

JPA as the democratic foundation for ACP-EU partnership. Furthermore, Declaration III of the Final Act of the Agreement stresses the importance that is attached to the JPA's role 'in promoting and defending democratic processes through dialogue between members of parliament'.

The JPA has a monitoring role over the Agreement that is broadly to ensure the goals of the Agreement are achieved. Because the JPA is constituted from national ACP parliaments and the European Parliament meaningful debate can only occur when both sets of Parliaments have had similar discussions within their own institutional frameworks. Moreover, all parties have to be fully committed to oversight of the Agreement if monitoring is to be meaningful. With this commitment Corre argues that regional cooperation and inter-parliamentary dialogue will be improved.¹

5. EP Oversight of aid (particularly budget support aid)

5.1 Current EP Oversight of EDF

The current EP oversight of monies allocated by the EDF is minimal in the context of established national parliamentary practice. Currently the allocation of funds under the EDF is not subject to validation by the European Parliament. The Committee controlling the EDF is, analysts argue, dominated by the British, French and German governments who are the main contributors to this fund.

The Commission has stated on numerous occasions that it supports the 'budgetisation' of the EDF, this notably being the case in its recent Communication to the Council – in which it stated that it believed that the EDF funds were being used too inflexibly (8 October 2003). The Commission's view is not publicly shared by a number of the member governments who, we surmise, maintain this position because of the control they can exert over the EDF – in terms of where funding is allocated and to what end it is put. This gives the member governments a disproportionately large role in the development of the EU's external development policy and makes the discussion of the European Social Fund (ESF), ACP budget and funding a critical element of the debate surrounding democratic accountability in the EU. The Commission's paper of October 2003 illustrates this very effectively.

This disengagement from the main locus of authority in the Union is more acute for the policy governing co-operation with the ACP countries. Despite attracting a large financial contribution from the EU, the EU's contribution to ACP is excluded from the Annual Readings of the Budget by both the Council and the Parliament. These Readings have also become a forum for the debate of Union development policy and political priorities for the EU as well as dealing with resources. Therefore, in one of the more important functions of EU external policy-making one of the democratic instruments of the EU is not participating as actively as it could be. The relevant Treaty provisions specify that the policy should be subject to the co-decision procedure and similarly that the budget be co-decided; what is currently not in place is the budgetization of the policy. As a result the EP is sidelined, allowing the Member Governments to decide the levels of and broad allocation of resources once every five years; although the EP does ratify the EDF.

¹ Corre, Gwenaelle. "Parliaments and Development: The icing on the cake? What parliamentary capacity can mean for ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 9, October 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management

In sum, EP oversight of the EDF budget and the monies allocated to the ACP is underdeveloped at the current time. Inclusion in the Budget Readings, and was budgetized, would allow the EP to discuss the volume of funding.

5.2 *Current donor performance criteria*

The money donated by member governments through the EDF and largely controlled by the ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee is reviewed according to stated performance criteria. The review takes the form of an annual operational review in which 'Performance (is) assessed on the basis of a stock-taking exercise, summarize(ing) the results of regular dialogue with the recipient country and extend(ed) operational programming perspectives for the coming period'.¹

The current period from mid-2004 to mid-2005 is particularly important for the EU's Development Policy as this sees the mid-point general review of the first tranche allocated under CSPs. This review process provides a key test of the effectiveness of local consultation practices and the rigour of the review process itself. These reviews will include discussion of the strategy underpinning support, with the opportunity to amend this approach depending on the review findings, which may in turn result in an adjustment of the levels of support given to a particular recipient country.

The donor review criteria are:

- Progress in implementing institutional reforms. Relates to efforts of the country concerned in reforming its institutions to ensure respect for human rights and create a climate of democracy and rule of law / fight against corruption. Link to essential elements without creating a double conditionality.
- Country performance in the use of resources. Transparency and accountability in the management of resources and quality of budget management.
- Effective implementation of current operations: Efficiency in the implementation of Community assistance, quality of dialogue with the Community in programming and implementation, respect of timetables for implementation and reviews.
- Poverty alleviation or reduction. Public expenditure in social sectors and quality of anti-poverty strategies, in particular in the social sectors. Commitment to programmes for raising the status of women and enforcing labour and social standards.
- Sustainable development measures. Commitment to principles for environmentally sustainable management of the environment and natural resources.
- Macroeconomic and sectoral policy performance: Policies and institutional framework for fiscal balance, debt sustainability and external economic and trade balance. Policy and institutional framework for encouraging competition and private sector development.²

¹http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/overview_en.htm

² http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/overview_en.htm

The first of the current donor performance criteria – the imposition of 'Western' conditionality and norms is controversial both in the development sector and amongst analysts. Oft stated concerns surround the efficacy or indeed morality of making aid conditional on 'Western' norms but also that the somewhat subjective judgments concerning these factors has a very real impact on the recipient country's ability to secure future funding. Budgetisation of this issue would also introduce financial criteria and target setting that would serve to remove subjective political criteria from the allocation of funding for projects, which in themselves might serve to foster more favourable political or social conditions; in Stiglitz's words: conditionality may involve "the subordination of matters of substance to matters of process"¹.

Budget Support

6. Budget support as opposed to project aid?

The allocation of development funds has traditionally focussed on two distinctive activites: project aid – the funding of specific projects – which has involved the donor taking a role in the budgeting and implementation of that project and second; through conditional budget support – through providing support to the recipient government's budget which has normally entailed the imposition of conditionality on the allocation of the donated funds.²

The effectiveness of 'conditionality' is entirely reflective of the donors ability to monitor how effectively the donated money was used and whether it reached the intended end-user. This in turn produces an explicit focus on the recipient's policy output, which may miss measures and outputs that result in positive social change and alleviation of poverty.³ Cordella argues that inefficiencies may emerge 'if donors are forced to impose higher levels of expenditure for the more controllable components of the budget, because of their inability to monitor the actual final destination of other components'.⁴ This level of accountability is a matter of policy for donor countries – whether they rely on the recipient countries to spend the donated funds for positive or specified purposes or whether they wish to retain close control over these funds.

Conditionality comes in many forms – not just the specification of a minimum level of spending on one particular line of investment on the overall national budget. Conditionality has taken in other factors like, for example, the implementation of banking reforms, democratic or judicial reform and the introduction of transparency laws. Nevertheless, since implementing such reforms involves non-monitorable activities this produces inefficiencies – efforts should be focussed on those activities than can be effectively monitored."⁵

The Commission's advocacy of Budget Support is about making aid more effective and reducing the volume of associated project costs. According to the Commission's October 2003 report concerning budgetisation of EDF, the process of integrating EDF into the general budget is a significant move in achieving this goal. As such the process of budgetisation of

¹ Cordella T. and Dell'Ariccia, G. "Budget Support versus Project Aid", IMF Working Paper, WP/03/88

² Cordella T. and Dell'Ariccia, G. "Budget Support versus Project Aid", IMF Working Paper, WP/03/88

³ Cordella T. and Dell'Ariccia, G. "Budget Support versus Project Aid", IMF Working Paper, WP/03/88

⁴ Cordella T. and Dell'Ariccia, G. "Budget Support versus Project Aid", IMF Working Paper, WP/03/88

⁵ Cordella T. and Dell'Ariccia, G. "Budget Support versus Project Aid", IMF Working Paper, WP/03/88

EDF and the move to Budget support as opposed to project aid are part of the same process of making donor aid more effective and transparent.

Part of this overarching transparency agenda is getting the EDF into a normalised budgetary process. This includes providing annual budget statements and annual spending programmes that lapse at the close of the budgeting year; the problem of whether funding is interchangeable between projects. This means that the budget is allocated and used effectively, with monies being recycled – if appropriate – within a relatively short timeframe. The EP should play a significant role in advocating and lobbying for 'budgetisation' of this policy area as a move towards annual development budgets based on public money demands the validation from the one supranational institution directly representing the European civil society. The budgetisation agenda for the EDF also supports multi-annual reviews of this and other budget streams which conforms more closely to the budgeting processes of national governments and their activities – a norm the EU should aspire to.

Budget support from the EU is arguably more desirable than project aid funding. Budget support provides for greater levels of recipient buy-in to the aid. It allows host governments to fund projects, within limits and acceptable levels and governance, in their own way and utilising home grown project management and contractor skills. This has a very positive psychological effect of reinforcing positive patterns of behaviour and governance. This positive effect is carried over in several other respects as well – if the EP were to gain influence over Development Policy through Budgetisation, budget support would allow the Parliament to act as an peer-group interlocutor with recipient governments and Parliaments. Budget support, with appropriate monitoring is a more efficient means of funding because it removes the direct input expected in project aid.

6.1 *Ways of enhancing EP oversight of the use of EDF*

The principle way of improving EP oversight of the EDF falls outside of the remit of this study. The so-called 'budgetisation' agenda provides the most clear-cut improvement to oversight and scrutiny of this policy area; although it is far from certain that budgetization will happen. Key member governments are opposed to it and some ACP governments require assurances that budgetization will not result in cuts to the volume of EDF. The European Parliament has made its support for the Commission's 'Budgetization' initiative very clear by unanimously adopting the following statement:

"Section 9: Parliament Strongly deplores the lack of parliamentary accountability implicit in the absence of European Parliament participation in any aspect of decision-making over levels of EDF funding, programming or allocations by country, region or sector, and the restriction of its powers to an annual discharge; calls urgently for this democratic deficit to be eliminated;"¹

Budgetisation of the EDF would bring the EU-ACP initiatives fully within the political process of the Union and put the relationship between the ACP and EU on an equal footing with other regions. The influence of the JPA would therefore be enhanced – at the lowest

¹ European Parliament, Budgetisation of the European Development Fund (EDF)

^{(2003/2163(}INI)), 12 March 2004.

level, if only providing an enhanced voice opportunity - as MEPs would have a more direct contact with the process that decides on budget support aid and the review process of the implementation of that aid. This should have the effect of further legitimising this cooperation, as the EP should then be able to exert a greater level of authority from the authorisation of the expenditure up to the discharge.¹ Budgetisation would also bring ACP expenditure into a programme of annual review, as opposed to the five-year review programme it is currently run under. A yearly programme would provide additional legitimacy to the programme with progress being continuously monitored. Such improvements to legitimacy are not guaranteed, but are plausible.

6.2 Strengthening EP oversight of budget support without budgetisation

Another possibility is to look at enhancing the role of the European Parliament and the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly in ensuring control, accountability and transparency of funds utilised under the EDF. A paragraph in the Inter-Institutional Agreement and the Internal Agreement between the EU member states and the Commission about the role of the Parliament in approving EDF allocation guidelines might be one way to extend democratic control while maintaining a separate EDF. One way this might work is giving MEP representatives direct voting control over the allocation guidelines. Thus, increasing the European Parliament's role in ACP-EU cooperation does not necessarily have to be associated with budgetisation of the EDF.²

7. General Conclusions and Recommendations

The specific points and the arguments surrounding these have been brought out in the main body of this study. This section outlines the broad conclusions and recommendations that have been produced as a result of the research that has gone into this study.

7.1 Conclusions

- That ACP Parliaments are not sufficiently engaged in the work of the EDF but that this can be changed without affecting the constitutional orders in force.
- The EP is institutionally prevented from exercising effective oversight of the EDF.
- That direct budget support should be the preferred mode of delivery for the EDF because it is highly efficient but also because it produces important political cultural changes that lead to positive social change outcomes.

7.2 *Recommendations:*

• That the intergovernmental elements of the ACP-EU and EDF policy making processes should be down played as a point of principle – even if member governments are understandably keen to protect their competencies.

¹ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – "Towards the full integration of co-operation with ACP countries in the EU budget" 8th October 2003, 10

² Jonas Frederiksen, "Mid-term Reviews: Performance-based partnerships in ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 5, October 2004,InBrief no. Maastricht: ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management


- That the JPA be strengthened through enhanced, unified and standard reporting procedures establishing need within recipient countries and evaluating projects being undertaken.
- That 'budgetisation' continue to be supported as the most effective means to enhance the EP's oversight function and thereby reduce the democratic deficit and similarly streamline the delivery of aid to end-users.
- That National Authorising Officers (NAO) should be encouraged to make public the consultations they made in formulating the CSP. In particular the NAO should report on the level and volume of consultations with the relevant national parliament.
- That the EP and JPA take an informal role in assessing compliance and enforcements of CSPs as a means by which to exert discursive pressure on the process.
- That national ACP parliaments should link development goals and projects to subject specific and regionally focussed committees (e.g. Committee on Health Policy, or the Committee for the northern region of a country) to ensure enhanced consideration of these issues and scrutiny over EDF-funded programmes.
- That the EP should encourage the Commission or Member States to provide funding to ACP parliaments to help improve technical advisory capabilities within those recipient countries; this would help enhance the role of Parliaments in the review process.
- That there should be more regional and sub-regional assemblies and meetings organised by the JPA to create and share best practice amongst parliaments and end-user groups.
- The JPA should take steps to be more effective in collecting information, opinion and advice from national parliaments and in disseminating JPA debates and reports down to national parliaments. If this necessitates a larger staffing requirement then the EP should be prepared to find the resources for this.

Annexes

Annex I – Thematic reach of CSPs

- Infrastructure,
- Agriculture
- Health
- Education
- State capacity building
- Macro Economic Support
- Food
- Environment

Annex II - Jonas Frederiksen, "Mid-term Reviews: Performance-based partnerships in ACP-EU cooperation", InBrief No 5, October 2004,InBrief no . Maastricht: ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management



Annex III - "Supporting Global or Regional Parliamentary Network Activity - Hubli, K. S. & A.P. Mandaville (2004) ; "Parliaments and the PRSP Process", World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37231, p17

Network Activity	May be Supported by	
Regional conferences for legislators on PRSP best practices	 Pre-conference technical assistance to relevant committees or parliamentary sub-groups in- country Post-conference consultations with participants on application of shared experiences at home 	
Parliamentary Exchanges	 Selection of participants in positions to apply experience Pre-exchange briefings Post-exchange in-country strategy sessions on application of experience Technical and financial support for in-country programs based on experience gained out of country 	

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SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION

EXAMPLE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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Summary

Although migrants within the African continent number over 16 million, there has so far been very little research into the nature of this migration as most attention is focused on migration from South to North.

Migration in Africa is currently structured around the main urban centres with good links with the rest of the world, which are connected both to the secondary centres and to changing rural areas. South-South migration between countries is relatively difficult to classify because of its diversity and the rapid changes in national and sub-regional conditions. Whether voluntary or forced, this migration is of long standing and involves every sector of the population, men and women of all age groups. However, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration still applies when the accent is on the reasons that prompt people to leave home. Within each of those categories, it is possible to identify types of migration based on the purpose of the migration in the case of voluntary migration and the diversity and intensity of the crises in the case of forced migration.

In South-South migration, the relationship between migration and development seems more complex than with migration from South to North, in that the former does not generate any significant investment revenue. Such migration must be seen more as a resource, in other words as revenue integrated into local activity systems. It is also necessary, when taking action on a group of people, to have a knowledge of all the individuals in the group, in all the places they inhabit or are likely to inhabit.

Finally, migration within Africa cannot be studied without taking account of migration from South to North. Migration plans change constantly as individual circumstances change. Opportunities, crises or social and geographical changes might cause migrants suddenly to alter their routes.

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Introduction – MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION

According to Eurostat, the European statistics office, migration throughout the world has increased significantly over the past few years. In 2005, migrants numbered 200 million, nearly 3% of the world's population, and the number has doubled in the last 20 years (L. Van Eeckhout). Movements are becoming more varied and international and the profile of the migrants is changing. They now include people from every social class and occupation, increasingly from urban backgrounds. The media, academic researchers and political authorities have focused on the flow of migrants and asylum seekers from countries in the South to countries in the North. Although they are a minority among migrants from the South, all the emphasis is on migration 'in which the people involved, including those from the most modest backgrounds, are driven by ambition, by plans to better themselves' (C.-V. Marie). Because of the major social issues this migration raises, most of the research is carried out in the host areas and societies in the North. Very little is known about the varied nature of South-South migration, although such migrants outnumber those migrating from South to North.

1. Africa's place in international migratory movements

Sub-Saharan Africa occupies a marginal place in international migratory movements, at least in terms of numbers. In 2000, the number of migrants was 16.3 million, whereas the figure for the developing countries was 64.6 million (IOM 2005). Few people come from outside Africa to settle there (apart from groups of expatriates and Syrian-Lebanese, Indian and Chinese trading communities) and most migrants are individuals travelling within Africa. However, the migration figures need to be qualified. Firstly, so few figures are available that it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of continent-wide migration and, secondly, they are no more than estimates because of the deficiencies of national statistical systems and the large number of illegal border crossings.

However, Africa does have migration centres of an international scale. The 20 countries in the world with the largest numbers of migrants include three African countries: Uganda (mainly refugees), Côte d'Ivoire (migration of very long standing, due to the use of foreign labour) and South Africa (developed country on a continent-wide scale) (IOM). A significant number of migrants in Africa are refugees, representing 20% of all African migrants in 2005 (IOM, 2005)

2. Migratory movements within Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa has had a mobile population for centuries. The traditional nomadic migration of pastoralists and hunter-gatherers has gone together with the rural exodus, large-scale migration to the coast and then Europe for work, mass forced migration and migration to neighbouring areas because of drought and war. All the old types of voluntary and forced mobility, internal and international, are still continuing. Although people have for a long time been migrating from overcrowded rural and urban areas, opening up new farmland and contributing to urban growth, empty areas are being filled by land clearance and taken over by agriculture, often leading to conflicts over land.

Migratory movements within Sub-Saharan African have changed in the following ways: the trend is towards travelling greater distances and there is a wider range of departure, transit and

destination points. Furthermore, migrants are not just from the rural areas; they include people from the cities, from all socio-professional categories. More women are also involved; the migratory behaviour of women is not very different from that of men (whether they migrate on their own or with men, husbands, parents or friends), except in particular situations where they are more vulnerable than men (trafficking). Lastly, refugees mostly move to adjoining countries and they both leave and arrive in many countries in crisis (Sudan, Uganda).

Internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be studied without also looking at international migration to the North (Europe, North America) and the Arab world (North Africa, the Middle East), since the two types of migration are closely linked.

3. Migration/development in Africa

There has been very little research so far on internal migration within Africa, but the following are known facts. It is not the poorest who migrate; on the contrary, the very poor are confined to one place, unless forced to migrate. Migratory movements are not always synonymous with social breakdown or exile, except in the case of refugees and deportees. There are many reasons why people leave home. The four major factors in mobility are demographic growth, poverty, shrinking natural resources and conflict. In order to address the impact of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is necessary to understand the global dimensions of the phenomenon (economic, social and political), at different levels (local, regional, international), to appreciate how complex and variable is the connection, or lack of connection, between migration and 'development'.

In order to understand the global dimension of migration, we have decided to use a classification based initially on a simple standard distinction between voluntary and forced migration. Secondly, within each of those two main categories, sub-categories distinguish between types of migration: circular, temporary or permanent in the case of voluntary migration, refugees, deportees, forced repatriations in the case of enforced migration. This classification, which is necessarily simplistic, merely shows the limitations of the existing sources and the varying types of individuals concerned and movements. However, the interconnection between the reasons for migration and the types of migration makes it possible to go beyond a pure cause and effect analysis. Migratory movements, including forced migration, have a range of causes, rather than a single cause. Thus it is always possible to shift from one category to another in the course of the same migratory movement. The classification should be seen as a continuum reflecting a variety of migratory situations, rather than a set of unconnected categories.

Chapter I - VOLUNTARY MIGRATION

The category of voluntary migration encompasses a wide variety of types of migrant: men and women of all social classes and ages. However, most of them are under 40, i.e. of working age. A large proportion of them migrate to find work; whether or not their main reason for leaving home is economic, their aim is to work and earn money, with a view to either returning home or settling permanently in another country.

Voluntary migration has been a major factor in urban growth in Africa over the past 50 years, contributing to the development of centres of migration. Although urban growth was mainly in the larger cities between the 1950s and the 1980s, that growth has nevertheless slowed down in the last 20 years and it is the small and medium-sized towns that are now growing. The percentage of the total urban population living in the national capitals is tending to level

off above the threshold of 40% (S. Traoré and P.Bocquier). Although the major cities still play a fundamental role in migration, that role extends beyond Africa itself: those cities have become transit points within a global system, because of their size, their position on major air and sea routes and their facilities. Towns that are smaller but still attract people from all over the continent are essential connecting points between the rural areas or other towns drawing people from different parts of the country and the migration centres. Because urban growth and migration are closely linked, we need to define the various centres before discussing in detail the types of migration occurring in Africa.

4. Centres of Sub-Saharan migration

Centres of migration may be defined as places where flows of voluntary migrants converge and diverge. They can be considered the most stable elements in a constantly changing migratory pattern. However, their role in attracting flows of refugees is purely marginal. They have a role not only in Africa but also in Africa's relations with the rest of the world. They are countries and large cities with transport systems (particularly air and sea) and modern communications (efficient links to new information and communication technologies) which are arrival, departure and transit points for migrants.

The continental centres offer opportunities that are not available elsewhere in Africa. Usually in a location favouring international trade – they all have outlets to the sea – they are linked to the rest of the world. Their locations, combined with the development of transport and the new communication technologies, connect them with international migration patterns. Furthermore, these centres are the few areas that have developed industries and a modern services sector (banking, business), which draws people to them. However, only six countries fall into that category: South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya.

South Africa differs considerably from the other countries, in that it is much more developed and can attract migrants not just from Africa but from other parts of the world. Gabon and Nigeria are economically developed because of their oil revenue and their situations, making them important centres for migration. However, that could be jeopardised by the latent political instability in Nigeria and uncertainty about the future of Gabon after President Bongo. Moreover, both countries deport foreigners on a more or less regular basis. The Côte d'Ivoire is also a continental centre, but more because of its past; its present and future situations are uncertain.

Until the end of the 1990s, it was the major economic and migration centre in West Africa, one of the few countries to attract migrants from both Africa and other continents (French and Lebanese). It has one of the highest proportions of foreign residents in the world. At present, Abidjan is relatively stable and remains a centre of migration for the whole of Africa, but that could change with the serious economic crisis it has been suffering since the start of the war. Senegal is not only stable, but has a worldwide diaspora; it is playing an increasingly important economic role in the globalised world, through both foreign investment (the establishment of telephone call centres, for instance) and investment by Senegalese living abroad. Lastly, Libya has a special position in this group: connecting Sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe, it is emerging as a centre since it has been accepted back into the international community. With its growing economy and oil revenue, Libya attracts migrants from the southern Sahara and at the same time is gradually establishing links with Europe. However, its emergence as a transit and host country could be brought to a halt by the growth of illegal immigration to Europe and forced settlement by those migrants.

The regional centres connect with international migration through the continental centres. As national capitals with fairly buoyant economies, they generally attract large numbers from all over the continent. However, they do not have the resources to go beyond that, either because they are located in the interior of the country (Nairobi), or they are close to the continental centres (e.g. Accra, Douala, Cotonou).

The major transit centres, the last category, are a rather special case. Unlike the previous centres, they are not large cities or economic centres. These areas become centres because of migratory routes that acquire importance at a particular time. They are often on illegal immigration routes, where movement is restricted and requires short-term settlement (J. Brachet, 2005 (b)). This category includes, for example, small and medium-sized towns in the Sahara (Nouadhibou in Mauritania, Agadez in Niger, Dongola in Sudan).

These migration centres are the basic framework of voluntary migration. In turn destination, transit and departure points, they are part of the structure of the migratory routes, even if not the only components. Focusing on those centres can lead us to overlook the rural areas, in a continent where the rural population is in the majority. The distinction between migration from rural to urban areas, between rural areas, from urban to rural areas and between cities is too simplistic. In fact, it is clear from the types of migration that those categories are very fluid; at the same time, they show that rural areas also have a place in African migration.

5. Circular migration

Circular migration is undoubtedly the oldest form of migration (in the form of seasonal migration); it has been continuing since pre-colonial days. It is defined as 'a specific form of temporary migration, characterised by repeated movement between several places of residence¹' (F. Dureau and C.E. Florez).

Circular migration, unlike temporary migration, involves repeated movements between various places of residence, with the length of time spent at any of those places not predetermined. Even if the term 'residence' is always used, it refers not to a single place but to the idea of passing through.

This category covers people of working age, mainly men, who move between two or more places of residence. They take advantage of complementary areas and resources. This type of migration is particularly common in West Africa, especially between the Sahel and the urban areas on the coast (such as Dakar, Freetown and Lomé). For instance, circular migration by Nigerians to the city of Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) is mainly for the purpose of buying clothes, shoes, blankets and other goods that are cheaper on the coast than in their local area. Added to that are social factors that prompt young people to leave home temporarily to escape the supervision of their elders (F. Boyer). In the city, the migrants, who are semi-skilled or unskilled, are restricted to occupations that are poorly paid but require only a small initial outlay. The men work as itinerant vegetable and clothes sellers or small-scale coal merchants, the women as traders or maids. Moreover, they give up the work when they return home, so that they have no opportunity to better themselves in either the place they migrate to or the place they came from. Each time they return, they repeat the same economic pattern and start up their business again.

¹ Translated by the authors of this report

In West Africa, this migration has been going on for so long and is on such a scale that it might be described as institutionalised (C.Z. Guilmoto and F. Sandron). These movements have become the norm, accepted and supported by society as a whole (provided that the migrant stays within the agreement, i.e. that he returns). Migration has become a resource, in the same way as those created or exploited locally. Economically, circular migration is a form of dual activity, whose aim is not so much to save money as to find work and earn an income. Accordingly, circular migration does not generate any migratory revenue¹, precisely because it is just a resource.

Within this circular migration, traders are a separate category. They travel for their work, in other words they take advantage of differences in prices between two countries or the scarcity of goods in a particular country. For example, a trade in cereals and petrol has developed between Nigeria and Benin, through cross-border migration whose direction varies according to which country offers the most favourable customs terms (F. Galtier and Z. Tassou).). This category includes a large number of women, like the Mina women from Togo or the Nigerian Yoruba women who, taking advantage of a long tradition of trading by women, have established themselves as successful businesswomen and are nicknamed the 'Nanas Benz'. The female railway traders in Mali are another example. This business is based on transnational social and family networks (between Senegal and Mali) (D. Poitou, A.Lambert de Frondeville and C.M. Toulabor). Like the migration mentioned earlier, these movements are a resource, even an occupation; they are not aimed at building up savings.

Apart from the characteristics of the migrants and their reasons for leaving home, the feature common to all circular migration is that the movements become a resource. Although shortcomings in local production systems, especially in the rural areas, have encouraged the growth of this type of migration, it is also, and above all, rooted in a tradition and custom of very long standing.

For migrants, the institutionalised nature of circular migration is a form of safeguard. The risk involved is minimal, since the regularity of the trips ensures that they have a place to return to in town where they are accepted by the group and have a ready-made social and cultural circle.

6. Temporary migrants

Temporary migrants differ from other categories of voluntary migrants because of their varying socio-economic backgrounds and their ability to 'break away' from their communities: they leave home for their own benefit and not that of the group. Their aim in migrating, often ill-defined when they set out, develops as they are en route, according to what opportunities present themselves. Thus South-South migration can turn into South-North migration as the opportunity arises, and vice versa. Because of that, they travel by many different routes and the length of the migration varies considerably (between a few months and several years). Temporary migrants, who come from all social classes, from the richest to the poorest, are mainly young men (between 18 and 35) from urban backgrounds.

Although they migrate partly for economic reasons, that is by no means the main incentive. Building up a small amount of capital to set up a business or get married might be an aim for temporary migrants, but their primary purpose seems to be to pursue a personal ambition, to

¹ Revenue from migration includes all forms of transfer, material and non-material, that enable a group to subsist, other types of resources being relegated to second place.

become independent of their community. Thus the social and cultural aspects of temporary migration seem as important as the economic aspect (I. Bardem).

This migration has a limited impact on the regions they travel from and to, because the numbers involved are small. On the other hand, temporary migration affects the dynamic of some transit points where these flows converge and migrants stay and sometimes work, building up the resources to continue their journey. The main impact is on the labour market. Temporary migrants are cheap labour, prepared to take on any type of work that allows them to earn money to continue travelling (J. Brachet, 2005a). A significant proportion of these temporary migrants are women. They differ from men in that they are more vulnerable, especially when travelling across the Muslim Northern Sahel. Although some find legal employment (working in bars or as hairdressers), they are more likely than men to be forced into prostitution to earn money, cross a border or find accommodation, sometimes becoming involved in international trafficking or prostitution networks (V. Samarasinghe)¹.

These migrants, whether male or female, are unlikely to contribute to the development of the regions they come from, particularly since migrants of this type are acting individually and seeking independence. The aim of any action in the areas they leave has to be social rather than economic; in other words they need to be given the chance of independence in their local area and helped to achieve their aims in society without the need to travel.

7. Permanent migrants

This category is also very diverse. It includes men, women, old and young. Permanent migrants are part of the migratory pattern, in that they can offer accommodation and support to other migrants.

Migration, particularly economic migration, can only function if members of the group live in different places. Permanent migrants gravitate to the migration centres in particular and have played an important role in urban growth.

Labour migration has led to concentrations in industrial towns from Nigeria to South Africa, including the Côte d'Ivoire. Although these movements were enforced in the colonial period (forced and conscripted labour), particularly in the Côte d'Ivoire, in the 1960s and 1970s they began on a massive scale. These migrants were a factor in the development of the commercial sector, particularly the informal sector (A.C. Dossou-Yovo), the craft sector and small industries. In the Côte d'Ivoire and also in Gabon, the pattern is for nationals to be employed mainly in the public sector and similar jobs, whereas migrants – foreign or naturalised – are largely concentrated in the private sector.

This permanent migration has also shaped the landscape of the urban centres. For example, many towns between Ghana and Nigeria, from the savannah to the forest, have districts called zongos. Nowadays these are the districts where foreigners tend to live, but when they were first established they were home to traders from the Sahel, who resold goods that other people brought them locally. Because the social networks in the zongos are strong and close, they have become crossroads for migration. To some extent it is only possible to move in there because other people are moving on, and that movement only continues because other people have moved in. The most extensive research has been into the zongo district in Lomé (M. Agier).

¹ Because of their mobility, male and female migrants are more likely than others to be involved in prostitution and hence the spread of sexually transmitted infections and diseases across the continent.

Permanent migrants do not only go to the towns. Farmers are drawn to rural areas, particularly the areas where cash crops are grown (such as coffee and tea in East Africa, groundnuts in Senegal). Access to land is also a major factor in migration; this land migration is either in the context of movements organised by the State (irrigated Office du Niger areas) or on the migrants' own initiative (Burkina Faso coffee and cacao planters in Côte d'Ivoire).

The impact of that migration on the areas they leave depends on the maintenance of links between the places; money, goods and people can then move between them. These migrants can organise themselves to take joint action, either short term when there is a food crisis in their home area, for example, or more long term, by contributing to the building of communal facilities (such as places of worship, schools, dispensaries). For instance, Nigerian migrants from the west of the country have clubbed together in Cotonou and Abidjan to help their home village (H. Mounkaïla). However, this type of action is marginal in the case of South-South migration, because the migrants have low incomes.

On a more individual or family basis, migrants can transfer part of their income to their home area and/or invest in urban property outside their home areas. Their contribution to the local economy may be direct or indirect; for example, property investments help to create a dynamic building sector in cities such as Ouagadougou and Accra.

The connection between circular and permanent migration raises the question of the dispersal of the social group as a resource for the group and for all the places they settle in, which are linked together (Ma Mung, 1999). Not only do people move between the different places, so also do money and goods. Burkina Faso is a notable example; family groups migrate both within the country and to other countries, travelling between each of the places concerned and providing a mutual support system (J.Y. Marchal and A. Quesnel).

This pattern is also found outside Burkina Faso, in areas where migration is traditional and especially where several types of migration coexist: internal and international, of short and long duration. In view of this dual phenomenon of mobility and dispersal as a resource, two issues have to be considered in any future action:

- from the point of view of institutional development, any action needs to take account of the fact that the places concerned are numerous and widely scattered. Purely local action is likely to create imbalances that might exacerbate the situation with areas and population groups that are connected but are not included in the action. The social group cannot be defined in local terms;

- it is necessary to look at the economic and especially the social situations of the migrants to understand the reasons for the migration (forced or voluntary, role of the economy). In the latter case, it would be advisable to try and capitalise on the fact that this movement is a resource, rather than trying to put a stop to it.

8. Skilled migrants

The migration of skilled people between African countries is a specific type of permanent migration, differing in many respects from the types discussed up to now, particularly because it is organised and legal. South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are particularly attractive to the most highly skilled. The migration rate for skilled workers in Africa has risen steadily over the last few decades (in relation to the overall increase in the number of skilled people on the continent). However, the proportion of skilled migrants remains minimal compared with that of unskilled workers. This phenomenon, known as 'the brain drain' or 'the international movement of skills', occurs more in South-North migration than in South-South migration.

More skilled jobs are available in the North, backed by immigration policies that offer incentives (cf. in France the immigration bill tabled by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, in the United Kingdom the policy to encourage immigration by nurses and doctors from the developing countries, particularly former British colonies such as Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria).

However, the selective policies of European countries, which encourage immigration by skilled workers, can have the effect of increasing the shortage of skilled workers in Africa, especially in countries with good higher education systems. These countries would have to train a labour force that would not be available to them for their own development, since they are unable to offer salaries as attractive as those in the North. Investment in higher education would be to some extent wasted.

In Africa, mobility by skilled workers takes three main forms:

- Students who study abroad (in African university towns which are often also centres for migration and in the Arab world) and stay on after the end of their course. Some countries try to prevent this 'brain drain'; the government of Gabon, for instance, finances studies abroad (scholarships), but the students have to come back to Gabon to work.

- Students who study abroad and come back to their home countries after the end of their courses but then, when they are unable to find jobs, leave again to go to countries where skilled workers are more in demand or better paid, for instance to South Africa and some Arab countries which use skilled foreign migrants in various spheres.

- Skilled workers who work in their home countries and leave to go and work abroad. There are various reasons for this mobility: political crises or instability, economic crises/unemployment, job opportunities in the development field (e.g. NGOs, UN organisations). In the latter two categories, political crises and a high unemployment rate amongst graduates in the countries concerned are factors that encourage migration.

This migration by skilled workers has very varied effects on the home countries of the migrants and the countries they move to. It may be seen as either a 'drain' or a 'movement'.

- Drain: this is usually called a drain because the movement is unbalanced. For the home countries of skilled workers who emigrate, the manpower shortage in certain key economic sectors can be socially and economically damaging. Malawi for instance, according to the Nurses and Midwives Council, is facing one of the most serious shortages of nurses in Africa, with nearly two-thirds of posts unfilled in the public health service. In recent years, more qualified nurses trained in Malawi have gone to work abroad (particularly in South Africa) than are left in the country's hospitals.

Action in this area should focus in particular on strengthening capacity in certain key sectors, such as health and education, to enable countries to train qualified people and offer them employment of a high standard.

- Movement: in certain fields, including the development field (e.g. NGOs, UN, decentralised and bilateral cooperation) and higher education and research, the movement of skilled workers between countries is fairly balanced, sometimes establishing cooperation networks between their home countries and the countries they move to. In such cases, movement has a positive impact on both the home country and the destination country.

Chapter II - FORCED MIGRATION

Forced migration has for a long time been an important part of migration within Africa. It has occurred throughout Africa's history, with mass deportation and flight from raids by slave

traders, the levying of taxes, forced labour and forced farming during the colonial period, exodus in decolonisation wars and the national and international political conflicts that have become more and more frequent since the 1980s, and, lastly, natural disasters. 'Forced migration is increasingly common in South-South migration, often in regions with no longstanding migratory tradition' (O. Pliez).

Forced migration differs from voluntary migration in that it occurs in serious crises and is characterised by a breakdown in the functioning of a society and its living space. It is submitted to and not initiated or managed by the individual or the group. Thus, forced migrants are not leaving to seek a better life or carry out a plan to emigrate, but purely to survive a crisis when the only solution is to leave. Their situation is very unstable.

This category of migration includes all members of a group, men and women, young and old, from every class of society. Its characteristic is that people flee temporarily or permanently, often suddenly and in large numbers. At present, the largest forced migrations are caused by natural disasters (ecological migration), wars and persecution (refugees and displaced persons), forced deportations and repatriations, which we shall discuss in turn.

9. Ecological refugees

Twenty years ago, the UN identified a new category of forced migrants, particularly in the reports published by the UNEP, the United Nations Environment Programme. These are ecological refugees, or 'eco-refugees', who are not fleeing from violence and persecution but when the environment they depend on to survive has been damaged or destroyed. In the 1980s and 1990s, this category included people who had either had to leave their homes temporarily because of a natural disaster (earthquake, cyclone, flood) or industrial accident, or had been driven out permanently by infrastructure projects such as dams, or had been forced to emigrate because the balance between resources and humans had been destroyed.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, cyclical droughts threaten harvests, livestock and people. In the Sahel, invasions of locusts periodically devour the harvests. These disasters cause famine and exodus, but their effects are worsened by the inadequacy of preventive measures and local organisations and by political inefficiency. Firstly, anti-locust measures are systematically put in place after crises (financed in particular by the European Union), when it would be sensible, since it is possible to predict these crises, to introduce these measures before the locusts swarm rather than after they have caused havoc in rural areas. Secondly, the disorganisation of social structures, government bodies and commercial channels (currently, for instance, in Angola) prevents supplies being brought in from neighbouring regions. The effects of famine are also exacerbated by civil wars and other political conflicts. Lastly, food insecurity is sometimes created deliberately, because depriving people of food has always been the best way of controlling them, shifting them, even wiping them out (Darfur and Southern Sudan, for instance).

The largest group amongst the ecological refugees are pastoralists. They are the groups most vulnerable to environmental damage, whether it results from development projects (dams or ranches), drought or war. During the 1983-1984 drought, the nomadic Peul and the Tuareg in Niger had to abandon their usual routes to find grazing land towards the savannah in the South, which was occupied by farmers with whom they came into conflict. Edmond Bernus describes what he calls the drought exodus by the Illabakan Tuareg to the Maradi region in the south of Niger. When they moved into a region inhabited by Hausa farmers, it created tensions because of livestock thefts and the exorbitant prices of animal fodder. On the return journey, they let the herds roam through the crops: '...the nomads' revenge, away from any

control, on the farmers who had treated them badly and taken advantage of a situation that was in their favour' (Bernus, 1999). Although most of the Tuareg nomads returned home, this was not the case with the Peul from the Djelgodji region of Burkina Faso who fled to Côte d'Ivoire after they had had to sell their remaining livestock. Employed as herdsmen by stock farmers, they never managed to re-establish their herds (Boutrais, 1999). Pastoralists become ecological refugees when they are forced to migrate in search of grazing, leaving their local area permanently and having to give up the herds that are part of their identity. These migrations of last resort affect the most vulnerable and occur when all local solutions to the food problem have been exhausted.

At present the definition of migration for environmental reasons relates only to global warming, but the figures quoted are still enormous. 'Whilst the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that by 2025 one African in 10 could be living outside their country of origin, the Institute for the Environment and Human security (linked to the UN) estimates the number of people who will have to move as a result of desertification, floods and storms caused by climate change between now and 2010 at 50 million' (C. Fouteau).

Focusing on the threats from climate change obscures the other causes of environmental damage or destruction, in particular government action and warring factions. There are currently instances of the environment being taken over to prevent population groups using its resources. During the war in Mozambique, for example, anti-personnel mines were scattered around the border area, so that the people that were to be repatriated were unable to return. Under the new environmental protection policies, national parks and nature reserves are set up and their inhabitants driven out, thus becoming refugees from an environment that has been seized from them.

10. Refugees from violence and displaced persons

Wars are widely reported by the media and are the strongest image we have at the moment of Sub-Saharan Africa. Wars are going on in about 20 African countries, mainly civil wars, whether they are conflicts between groups for the control of resources, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or internal struggles for power, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia (M. Gaud.). There are unresolved crises in West Africa (Western Sahara, the Casamance region of Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Southern Sudan, Darfur, Ethiopia/Eritrea), the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi) and Central Africa (Angola, DRC, Central African Republic).

The causes of these conflicts lie in both the fragility of these new States, divided up by the colonialists, and in factors of instability, whether related to action by foreign, neighbouring or European countries or the superpowers, to economic recession or the hazards of the weather. Because of the violence, which is usually internal, civilians flee desperately to other places within the country (displaced persons) or to neighbouring countries (refugees). Most of the people fleeing stay nearby, usually in the countries bordering on the conflict zones.

Africa is second only to Asia in the number of refugees, asylum seekers, repatriated and displaced persons and other population groups affected by conflicts recorded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR helped over 4 million people there in 2004 (UNHCR statistics, 2004). That figure falls far short of the true situation, which is much more dramatic. Darfur in Sudan is currently suffering a serious humanitarian crisis affecting over 2 million people, most of whom have fled their devastated region. The UN estimates that there have been 300 000 victims. At least 200 000 have found refuge in

Chad, in camps run by the UNHCR, whilst the largest number, over 2 million, have moved to other parts of Darfur (M. Lavergne).

The map 'Flows of refugees from African countries, 2002' (see Annexe) illustrates the main trends in the asylum-related flows. As this shows, a minority of the refugees are admitted to the countries in the North, whilst the majority find refuge in neighbouring countries. It must be remembered that the dangerous journeys to Europe by asylum seekers that the media and politicians focus on in the North account for only a minority of the movements by refugee Africans.

Africa is unusual in that it takes in most of the refugees it generates, the majority going to the countries bordering on the conflict zones. Countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, DRC, Sudan and Guinea open their doors to thousands of fugitives, who are collectively granted *prima facie* refugee status. Some countries, like Uganda and Sudan, are unusual, although not unique, in that they both generate and take in refugees.

The economic dimensions of asylum are numerous and complex. The host countries always regard it as a cost, whose effects they exaggerate. They see refugees as a burden to be shared with the countries in the North. However, there is no doubt that, whilst taking in thousands of refugees has a political, economic and environmental cost, it also produces gains that are all too often overlooked. In fact, the activity generated by the presence of the humanitarian organisations, the investment by the international community in setting up the camps and the work by the refugees promote development.

The arrival of huge numbers of refugees inevitably affects the labour market. Whether or not they are skilled, the refugees manage to bypass the restrictions on access to employment and, because of their precarious situation, are a cheap and available labour source. Thus they compete with nationals in certain sectors of the economy.

10.1. Refugee camps

The vast majority of refugees from countries in the South are in the South and remain there and refugee camps are the most common form of aid, as Luc Cambrézy points out in an article with the hard-hitting title: 'Stagnating conflicts and entrenched refugee camps: a containment policy, not political asylum' (L. Cambrézy, 2003).

Camps are the most usual method used by the authorities to aid and control foreigners coming into the country, whether they are without residence permits or are seeking protection. All too often, the camps are looked upon as a single enclosed model, when in fact they can vary widely. They may be closed or open, depending heavily on international aid or taking the form of agricultural settlements on which arable land is made available to the refugees (Zambia, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania). They are at the same time places of protection and confinement, support and control, refuge and violence, especially for women (L. Cambrézy, 2001)

It must be remembered that the people in these camps are 'legals', refugees who are recognised and therefore helped, protected and properly registered, those who are 'visible', as opposed to the 'invisible' who are greater in numbers and hide in the cities or on the rural margins near the borders. There is no shortage of reports and information on the refugees in the camps, whereas very little is known about the situations and living conditions of those who disperse into the host country as illegal immigrants.

The camps, which are sometimes close to borders even though under international rules they should be more than 150 kilometres away, can become a threat (because of military incursions or because the camps themselves become militarised). The host countries use the

refugees as a way of putting political and military pressure on the leaders of their countries of origin.

The camps raise the issue of the role of humanitarian action. In fact, with the end of the Cold War and funding from the superpowers no longer available, State development aid has increasingly become humanitarian aid. It has been considerably reduced, falling from 26.6 billion dollars in 1990 to 16.4 billion in 2000 (S. Smith, J.-P. Tuquoi, 2004) and has been replaced by humanitarian action.

The neutrality of the humanitarian agencies creates an impossible situation for them, because it is forgotten that refugees are not just victims but also active participants and, having been made refugees for political reasons, they become a political issue. Describing the situation in the Tutsi refugee camps in Uganda and the Hutu camps in Congo-Zaire, Roland Pourtier shows how the camps are inseparable from the conflicts that gave rise to them and help to prolong those conflicts because the presence of the HCR provides 'a system of protection and support that turns the camps into centres for political reorganisation, as a basis for regaining lost power' (R. Pourtier, 2006).

Large refugee camps have an impact on the environment. Much has been said about the widespread damage in the Virunga national park in North Kivu, particularly through intensive woodcutting and poaching when thousands of Rwandan refugees were brought together there in 1994. But this environmental impact must be seen in relative terms. It has recently become a matter of concern to the host countries and the HCR. The HCR started to attach greater importance to environmental issues when planning refugee aid programmes. In 1994, an environmental unit was set up in the body that drafted environmental directives. For the host countries, protection of the environment has become an excuse to win compensation from the international community and in particular to speed up the repatriation process. Tanzania, for instance, held out the spectre of destruction of its environment to send back the thousands of Rwandan refugees who flooded into the country in 1994, accusing them en masse of destroying and wasting another country's environmental resources (R. Black.). The risk of destruction of the environment has become a pretext for threatening to expel refugees. Nowadays, the environment is used as a political weapon.

Furthermore, the environmental damage laid at the door of the refugees is an excuse to conceal the failure of humanitarian action. Research at the Ukwimi agricultural settlement in Zambia showed that the 25 000 refugees from Mozambique were directly dependent on environmental resources for their daily needs and to earn a small income. Although they certainly placed heavy pressure on resources, attracting protests from local people, the tension between the two groups was caused more by the unequal distribution of humanitarian aid. Apart from its primary purpose, feeding people who have nothing, food aid has a number of functions that are sometimes conflicting.

10.2. Food aid

For the international community, feeding refugees is a requirement of aid. That means providing help to people who are seen as victims, who need help and are unable to help themselves. However, feeding people is also a way of counting refugees and keeping control over the camps. The refugees are counted because the HCR needs to produce figures to justify its existence and its action, in order to ensure its survival. It also needs to control and keep a check on the refugees. The camps are on settlements ceded by the authorities to the humanitarian organisations, which take over and compete for their land.

Feeding people also creates a category outside the rules, a category labelled refugee which groups them all together and stigmatises them, thereby separating them from the surrounding

community. Between 1987 and 1994, long-term aid was distributed to all Mozambican refugees on the Ukwimi agricultural settlement in Zambia without exception, and only to them. Despite the fact that some of them had grown rich and had over the years become better off than the local villagers, they were still recognised as refugees and continued to receive aid on that basis.

Feeding people also creates dissension with the local population, who are not taken care of and are sometimes in dire poverty. Between 1987 et 1994, two communities living side by side on the Ukwimi agricultural settlement – refugees from Mozambique and Zambian villagers – were administered by two authorities, one of which, the international community, was extremely generous, whilst the other, the Zambian Government, was very short of resources. This was a major cause of tension between the two groups.

For the host countries, the fact that refugees receive food and aid from the international community is the sharing of a burden that should be short-lived. Feeding people to some extent avoids them having access to local resources and thus prevents them settling permanently. Feeding them is also a way of prolonging and justifying international aid. It is noticeable that an agricultural settlement like the one at Ukwimi in Zambia has constantly taken in new arrivals to justify the need for food aid and hence the role of the HCR until the mass repatriation of the Mozambicans. The HCR usually only withdraws from a settlement when the refugees leave, because of pressure from governments for international aid to continue while the refugees are still there.

Feeding people also makes countries secure. Host countries sometimes claim that the international community is putting them at risk when it cuts back on food rations, arguing that the starving refugees will riot, causing unrest in the host areas. In 2003, Tanzania, for example, threatened to forcibly repatriate over 530 000 refugees from the Great Lakes on the pretext that rations were being halved. It was a matter of national security. In those circumstances, food becomes a strategic weapon, a tool used to deter people from staying.

In addition, the cuts in the HCR and WFP budgets for Africa, coupled with the development of other humanitarian crises in Asia in particular, have meant that refugee crises that have been going on for many years are being overlooked. The food rations distributed in the Sahraoui camps have been considerably reduced, against a background of general indifference. Reducing the quantities distributed in a desert area forces the refugees in these 'forgotten crises' to return 'home'. Reducing rations also means that the refugees have to work for the local population.

Thus the food aid distributed to refugees has many functions apart from its primary purpose. For the international community and the host country, it is an instrument for counting and controlling the whole group and keeping it under supervision. Depending on the quantities distributed, groups are either marginalised from poor local communities, or obliged to work for those communities, or pressurised to return home. Food aid can therefore be used as a strategic weapon.

11. Forced expulsion and repatriation

Migration for work within Africa is vulnerable to the hazards of political and economic developments in the host country. In crises, governments order mass expulsions of immigrants or even national ethnic and religious groups. The 50 000 Ugandan Asians expelled and stripped of their property by president Idi Amin Dada in 1972 are a typical example. The two million migrant workers, mostly Ghanaians, deported from Nigeria in 1983 are another example. In Senegal, too, tensions with Mauritania led to the expulsion of

Mauritanian traders, people from Burkina Faso have recently fled Côte d'Ivoire in a hurry after being persecuted, and in Gabon illegal workers are regularly deported.

In 1995, Gabon sent back 80 000 aliens from West Africa. These sudden mass forced repatriations of immigrant workers have long-term effects on both their home countries and the host regions.

Lastly, population groups are repatriated by force. Often people are repatriated prematurely, while conflicts are still going on or the reasons for fleeing the country still apply. Forced to return home, the exiles are exposed to the risks they fled from and they may be doubly uprooted. Their premature return turns them into refugees in their own country, once again in need of assistance. That was the case with the Angolans who had been living in agricultural settlements in Shaba province in the south of Zaire since 1983 and were then flown back in 1990, not to the regions they had originally come from but to transit points. In that case, political and diplomatic considerations prevailed (A. Bartoli). For refugees in the camps, cutting or stopping humanitarian aid is a way of forcing them to leave the host country.

12. The urbanisation of poverty

Nowadays most African migrants gravitate to the cities, the majority of them working in the informal sector of business, transport, crafts and services. For instance, a quarter of the population of Libreville in Gabon is from another country, from Central Africa (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, the two Congos) and West Africa (Mali, Senegal, Togo and Benin, Nigeria). So many Africans from other parts of Africa are working as small traders that they are a vital part of the urban economy. *'These temporary migrants establish transnational networks, contribute to regional money distribution, spread religious and cultural practices, fashions in clothing, etc, thereby contributing to the urbanisation of Africa'* (R. Pourtier).

Forced migration is also a factor in the urbanisation of countries in the South. War and ecological or economic crises lead to major population redistribution, especially towards the towns, where people take refuge. There are apparently more than 2 million Somalis in Mogadishu, mostly refugees driven out by the fighting and seeking the protection of the NGOs or the warlords. Many refugees fleeing from war zones or areas of insecurity have added to the flow of people to towns in Sierra Leone, Sudan, DRC and the periphery of Rwanda and Burundi. Khartoum has become a typical example of the use of State violence as a means of regulating urban growth. Migrants flood in from all over the country, victims of drought, famine, the civil war in Darfur and Southern Sudan. The first victims of these forced movements are the 'displaced persons' of the South, non-Arab, non-Muslim groups unable to integrate into the city. It is difficult for them to return to their home region when it is being ravaged by civil war. Yet between 1987 and 1995 the authorities expelled 712 000 people from Khartoum (M. Lavergne). These forced migrants bring poverty to the cities, leading a hand-to-mouth existence in settlements on the outskirts that grow uncontrollably.

Conclusion - MIGRATION, POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT

13. Migration and development in Africa

Transfers (of money and trade) by migrants are becoming increasingly important in African national economies, although it is difficult to place a precise value on them because they are rarely through conventional channels (such as banks).

They are mainly informal transfers which, in a number of countries, are the main source of foreign currency. However, their scale is related more to movements to countries in the North than countries in the South.

The relationship between migration within Africa and development seems more complex because, unlike South-North migration, South-South migration between countries at similar levels of development does not generate sufficient revenue for migration to be profitable. That is why, as explained above, this migration has to be seen as a resource and not a means of saving money. It is the actual circumstances of the migration (dispersal of individuals in the same group, the diaspora principle and different types of movement by individuals) that affect the development of the countries concerned. In order to understand a social group, its means of survival and its level of development, account has to be taken of all the individuals in that group and all the places in which they live.

Migration can sometimes have an adverse effect on the country of origin (manpower shortages) or the development of a region can stabilise the population (by creating jobs), but generally speaking, as we have just shown, international migration assists the development of the departure, transit and arrival countries, just as development encourages international mobility by the individuals concerned, whatever legislation is put in place. *'Hence the two new paradigms for international migration, "control" as a means of containing migration and "development" as a means of stopping it by eliminating the basic cause, poverty, do seem to be based on a simplistic view of the factors involved' (J.-P. Guengant, 1996).*

14. Should the European Union act on migration within Africa?

This summary of international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa identifies several basic factors that need to be considered before taking any action:

- Diversity: the profile of migrants in Africa is diverse; so too are the causes and forms of migration and its impact. Since there are so many different types and cases, action cannot be standardised.

- Complexity: migration 'connects': it establishes links between places, people and economic sectors. Acting on one component of the system will have repercussions for the whole system.

- Legality: international mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa is based more on the practical possibilities of travelling, by negotiating transport and border crossings, than on the legality of people's situations while they are travelling. The connection between migration policy and international mobility is not direct, but variable and complex.

- Imagination: there is a dimension to migration that is not quantifiable or even classifiable. It relates to the imagination of individuals and is a vital factor in the decision to take the risk of migrating.

General guidelines for action might be as follows:

- In view of the link between the spread of sexually transmitted infections and diseases in Africa, it might be possible to take action on this along the migration routes and in the migration centres, specifically targeted at the migratory populations. Similar action in the refugee camps should also be considered.

- Migration would be more of a resource and a tool in the development of African States if there were actually official freedom of movement throughout the continent, or at least regionally. In areas with official freedom of movement (such as ECOWAS), people still have to pay to cross an international border, and in many cases foreign migrants are taxed even within the countries they travel in, regardless of their circumstances. In many countries, furthermore, foreign migrants (whether or not they entered the country legally) are allowed to settle and work, but not officially. In such cases they can remain in an illegal and uncertain situation for a very long time, which limits their ability to contribute to the development of both their host country and their country of origin. The European Union should encourage African States to coordinate their practices and laws for the management of international migration and keep their officials who check and tax international migrants, particularly at the borders, under tighter supervision.

- The closure of EU borders, and the very costly control policy that that entails, restrict legal immigration (right to asylum, possibility of bringing in families, short-term visas, opportunity to acquire citizenship, etc.), encourage the development of illegal immigration networks, indirectly cause a large number of deaths at European entry points¹, and prevent movement and voluntary return by migrants. Would opening up Europe's borders significantly increase the number of potential immigrants? Would it not make it easier for African migrants to contribute to the development of their country of origin and their host country? At the conclusion of this report, these are questions that are worth considering.

¹ cf. Monde Diplomatique Atlas 2006.

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ANNEXES

International migration in Africa, 2002

			Migrant po	pul	lation	,	r 1		Migrati	on p	policy
West Africa	Tot 2241		umber of migraphe		Doroontago of	3.Ó	of 7	10			
Benin	population	272	(thousands)101	B _t	tal population	.6	efugees	4	On immigration acti	on	On emigration action
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Gambia Gambia Less developed countries	667613		10458	В	1.5	.2	3066	12	Limited acti	on	No actio
Ghana	793627		1627 ⁶¹⁴	в	2.1	.2	3627	13	No acti	on	No actio
East Africa	2503 ľ8		4515 ⁴¹	C	18	_	1667		No acti	on	No actio
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Mozambique	18292		366 B	ľ	2.0		0	_	No action		No action
Réunion	721		106 B		14.7						
Rwanda	7609		89 B		1.2		28		No action		No action
Seychelles	80	-	5 B		6.3				Strong action		Strong action
Somalia	8778		22 I		0.3		1		No action		No action
Uganda	23300		529 B	F	2.3		237		Strong action		No action
Tanzania	35119	-	893 B		2.5		681		Limited action		No action
Zambia	10421		377 B	F	3.6		251		Limited action		Limited action
Zimbabwe	12627	'	656 B	F	5.2		4		Limited action		No action
Central Africa	95404		1490		1.6		603				
Angola	13134		46 B		0.4		12		No action		No action
Cameroon	14876		150 B		1.0		44		Limited action		No action
Central African Republic	3717		59 C		1.6		56		No action		No action
Chad	7885		41 I		0.5		18		Strong action		Strong action
Congo	3018		197 B		6.5		123		Limited action		No action
Democractic Republic of Congo	50948		739 C		1.5		333		Limited action		No action
Equatorial Guinea	457	·	1 C		0.2		0		No action		No action
Gabon	1230		250 C		20.3		18		Limited action		Limited action
Sao Tome and Principe	138		7 C		5.1				No action		No action
North Africa	174150		1945		1.1		606				••
Algeria	30291		250 C		0.8		170		Strong action		No action
Egypt	67884		169 B		0.2		7		Limited action		Increasing action
Libya	5290		570 C		10.8		12		Limited action		Strong action
Morocco	29878		26 C		0.1		2		No action		Limited action
Sudan	31095		780 B		2.5		415		Increasing action		Limited action
Tunisia	9459		38 C		0.4		0		Limited action		Strong action
Western Sahara	252		113 I		44.8						
Southern Africa	49567		1544		3.1		47				
Botswana	1541		52 C		3.4		4		Limited action		No action
Lesotho	2035		6 C		0.3		0		No action		No action
Namibia	1757		143 B		8.1		27		Limited action		No action
South Africa	43309		1303 B		3.0		15		Strong action		No action
Swaziland	925		42 B		4.5		1		Strong action		No action


Source: International Migration 2002, United Nations, Population Division B = birthplace

C = citizenship I = imputed (estimates based on a model)


This table, drawn up by the United Nations, can only be an estimate of the current migration situation in Africa. The standard of African censuses varies considerably. Moreover, the figures are not entirely comparable, because of differences in both the method of counting migrants (those who were born abroad and those who are actually foreign) and the length of residence. For some countries, migrants who have been in the country for six months are counted, for others, migrants who have been there for nine months. No distinction is made here.

Also, the column showing action or lack of action on migration policy refers to the situation in 2002. Many countries have changed their migration policies recently, notably Côte d'Ivoire.


The two maps below have been drawn up on the basis of that information; they are therefore subject to the same provisos as the table. The first map, showing migrants as a percentage of total population, indicates the main migration centres; however, these are clearer from the second map, which shows the number of migrants for each country.



Migrant population as a percentage of total population of each African State, 2000 Migrants as percentage of total population Percentage of migrants in Africa: 2%



Breakdown of migrant population in Africa by country, 2002 Migrant population in Africa: 16 141 000



Flows of refugees from African countries, 2002

Canada/United States/Brazil/Russia/Australia Number of refugees Host country / Country of Origin Over 50 000 / 10 000 to 50 000 / under 50 000